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This study explores the interlinkages between civil war and communal vio-
lence which conflict literature has endeavoured to categorise as two signifi-
cantly different types of intra-state warfare typologies. A lot has been written 
about civil wars, but their connections with other conflict categories have so 
far been under-researched. This is especially true of the connection between 
civil war and communal violence, which this study explores in the context of 
northern and north-eastern Uganda. Much quantitative conflict research uses 
statistical data as the basis for arriving at conclusions about typologies and 
categories. However, quantitative approaches in conflict studies are usually 
based on secondary sources, which sometimes have little regard for the com-
plexities of the changing dynamics of violent conflicts in specific locations 
like Uganda. This study combines a qualitative and interpretative approach 
with reflections on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) data sets. 
Empirical data collected from interviews and focus group discussions with 
various key actors was combined with reflections on dataset measurements 
of civil war and communal violence in Uganda, and a range of scholarly doc-
uments. This study looked closely at quantitative measures of these two con-
flicts, in northern and north eastern Uganda, questioning the typologies and 
quantitative indicators used, as well as the key actors identified in the UCDP 
and PRIO (Peace Research Institute Oslo) databases.  Through two distinct 
case studies from within Uganda, this research examines the complex inter-
connections between the civil war in northern Uganda and what is often 
termed communal violence in north eastern Uganda. The study examines the 
causes as well as the actors involved and how these conflicts changed course 




Uganda, civil war, communal violence, UCDP/PRIO datasets, interpreta-
tive.  
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xv 
Inzicht in de complexe verwevenheid van burgeroorlogen en 
sektarisch geweld: Het geval van Oeganda 
 Samenvatting 
 
Dit onderzoek gaat over het onderlinge verband tussen burgeroorlogen en 
sektarisch geweld. Deze twee typen conflict worden in de literatuur opgevat 
als twee duidelijk verschillende categorieën van gewapende strijd binnen sta-
ten. Er is veel geschreven over burgeroorlogen, maar tot nu toe nog weinig 
onderzoek gedaan naar het verband tussen burgeroorlogen en andere typen 
conflicten. Dit geldt in het bijzonder voor het verband tussen een burgeroor-
log en sektarisch geweld, dat in dit onderzoek wordt verkend in de context 
van Noord- en Noordoost-Oeganda. In kwantitatief onderzoek naar conflic-
ten worden de conclusies over typologieën en categorieën veelal gebaseerd 
op statistische gegevens. Kwantitatief conflictonderzoek is echter gewoonlijk 
gebaseerd op secondaire bronnen, waarbij er soms weinig aandacht is voor 
de complexe werkelijkheid van de veranderende dynamiek van gewelddadige 
conflicten in bepaalde gebieden zoals Oeganda.  
 In dit onderzoek wordt een kwalitatieve en interpretatieve benadering ge-
combineerd met inzichten verkregen uit gegevens van het Uppsala Conflict 
Data Program (UCDP), een databank van de Universiteit van Uppsala. De em-
pirische data die zijn verzameld in interviews en focusgroepsdiscussies met 
verschillende hoofdrolspelers zijn gecombineerd met bestudering van de da-
tasets over burgeroorlog en sektarisch geweld in Oeganda en bestudering van 
de wetenschappelijke literatuur.  
 In dit onderzoek worden de kwantitatieve data over het conflict in Noord-
Oeganda en dat in Noordoost-Oeganda onder de loep genomen, waarbij kri-
tisch wordt gekeken naar zowel de gebruikte typologieën en kwantitatieve in-
dicatoren als naar de hoofdrolspelers die worden onderscheiden in de data-
banken van het UCDP en PRIO (Peace Research Institute Oslo). Met twee aparte 
casestudy’s in Oeganda is onderzoek gedaan naar de complexe verwevenheid 
van de burgeroorlog in Noord-Oeganda en het conflict in Noordoost-Oe-
ganda dat vaak wordt aangeduid met de term sektarisch geweld. Het onder-
zoek gaat over zowel de oorzaken als de bij de strijd betrokken partijen en 
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belicht de wending die de conflicten hebben genomen en de implicaties daar-
van voor de conceptualisering van deze conflicten. 
 
Trefwoorden 










1 Background to the Study  
 
1.1 The research problem  
Over the years, conflict scholars and organisations have preoccupied 
themselves with defining various types of violent conflict, which has raised 
a lot of debate and contestation. Conflict scholars have often discussed 
conflicts in Africa using generic definitions or concepts of violent conflict 
that do not grapple with local African realities. Often, terms such as 
violent conflict, civil war, and communal violence have been used with 
little in-depth clarification of how these concepts differ and what are the 
dynamics involved among and within these conflicts. Violent conflict, a 
major problem for many third world countries, such as Uganda has been 
experienced almost throughout much of its post-independence history 
(Fituni 1995:147, Hironaka 2005:01).  
This study uses two distinct cases of conflict, referred to as civil war 
and communal violence. It challenges the dominant view that these can 
be clearly distinguished from one another and constitute two significantly 
different forms of violent conflict that can be measured in different ways 
(Small and Singer 1982:217, Sarkees and Schafer 2000:130, Gleditsch et al. 
2002:619, Sundberg et al. 2012:253). This study seeks to correct a 
widespread tendency for scholarly researchers to put increasing effort into 
showing how civil war and communal violence are distinct forms of 
conflict. Instead, it suggests that, whilst these may be significantly different 
intra-state warfare categories, there are also some significant linkages and 
continuities between these two broad forms of violent conflict.  
According to ‘conflict’ literature, the main parties to a civil war are 
the state as the principal party and the rebel faction or factions as the other 
(Small and Singer 1982:213-214, Fearon and Laitin 2003:76, Sambanis 
2004:829-830). In communal violence, by contrast, violent interactions are 
said to be mainly between communal groups without the involvement of 
509974-L-bw-isimon
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external actors (Sundberg et al. 2012:353, Brosche and Elferversson 
2012:33). These have been seen as the most significant distinguishing 
factors that set the two types of violent conflict apart. Sometimes violence 
is categorised as communal violence, despite pronounced levels of state 
involvement. Some examples that can be cited are Somalia, where warfare 
between clans was facilitated by the state, when Said Barre’s regime 
encouraged warfare against insubordinate clans by arming loyal clans 
(Adam 1999:174). This laid the foundation for the continuation of 
communal clashes between clans for decades, but it was strictly speaking 
as much civil war as it was communal violence. Violent clashes among 
warlords thus initially emerged as a form of defending and attacking the 
government of the state; only later did the violence in Somalia evolve into 
communal violence, as defined by the datasets. Yet this complex form of 
violent warfare in Somalia is largely termed ‘communal violence’ 
throughout in the UCDP Non- State conflict datasets (UCDP Non-state 
conflict dataset V 2.4-2012). 
The case of Darfur and Southern Kordofan (Nuba Mountains) is 
similar, since there communal violence arose in which the Sudanese 
Government was criticised for arming the ‘Janjaweed’ militias, mainly 
comprised of Sudanese of ‘Arab’ origin, against the Fur, Masalit and 
Zaghawa ethnic groups, of more ‘African’ origin (Flint and De Waal 
2008:80-95, Salih 2005:8-13). Such was also the case in Kordofan in the 
Nuba mountains, where the Sudan Government was accused of openly 
arming the ‘Baggara Arabs’, militias fighting the Nuba people, in turn said 
to be backed by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) (Salih 
1995:75-7, Salih and Harir 1994:186-202Salih 1995). This kind of proxy 
civil war aggravated tensions between different groups and could possibly 
explain the persistence of violent warfare. As Brosche and Elferversson 
(2012) confirm, armed conflicts between the government of Sudan and 
SPLA (and SPLM, the political movement linked to the SPLA), played a 
contributory role in perpetuating what is defined by datasets as ‘communal 
violence’. In this way, between 1989 and 2010, a total of 27 communal 
violence-type conflicts were recorded within south Sudan, the Darfur 
region and Kordofan, which was distinguished in a very clear way from 
the ‘civil war’ between north and south Sudan (UCDP Non-state conflict 
dataset V.2.3-2011, UCDP Non-state conflict dataset V.2.4-2012). 
Cases such as Somalia and Sudan can reveal how the politics of a 
communal violence-type conflict is a matter of interpretation, especially 
509974-L-bw-isimon
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when communal violence is connected to wider civil wars. This has 
significance for the present study, since some traits of civil war can be 
found within communal violence, and vice-versa. Thus communal 
violence, or conflicts defined as such in the datasets, can be characterised 
by state involvement and state-funded militia groups.  
Debates among ‘conflict’ scholars have centred on the question of 
how to measure death tolls, and this question is linked with the question 
of how to exactly define civil war. Some scholars note that communal 
violence is mainly characterised by a few days of intense clashes, with 
relatively fewer fatalities than those resulting from civil war over a more 
sustained period.  Apart from a few exceptional cases, civil wars, it is 
argued, have been more lethal and protracted than communal violence 
(Petterson 2010:190-191, Brosche and Elfversson 2012:43, Sundberg et al. 
2012:353). However, in practice there are complex overlaps in time span 
and lethal effects between civil war and communal violence. In terms of 
death toll, for example, the record appears to be not that different between 
the two types of conflict, since some communal violence-type conflicts 
have been very lethal and produced devastating death tolls which can be 
equated to those of a civil war (Sundberg et al. 2012:351). For instance, 
cases of armed conflict between the Cameroonian government and the 
Union of the People of Cameroon (UPC) rebel faction between 1957 – 
1958 and the Togolese government and the Togolese Movement for 
Democracy (MTD) rebel faction in 1986, were all recorded as minor cases 
of armed conflict, throughout the course of these short-lived civil wars 
(UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Version 4-2014). According to Sundberg 
et al. (2012:357), between 1989 and 2008, communal clashes in the 
following countries generated the following estimates of annual fatalities: 
Sudan -12,676; DRC - 11,886; Somalia - 9,319; Nigeria -7,635; India - 
4,264; Ethiopia - 4,017. These numbers of fatalities can certainly be 
compared to the numbers of fatalities in some civil wars. Another issue is 
the characterisation of communal violence as intermittent and brief, 
whereas some of the violence categorised in this way lasted for years and 
had a devastating toll on local people such as in the cases noted above: 
Sudan, the DRC and Somalia, among others.   
Overall, a lot has been written especially about categories of collective 
violence with high levels of state involvement and coordination, mainly 
civil war (Hironaka 2005: 3-9, Sundberg et al. 2012:351). Much less 
scholarly attention has been paid to other conflict categories such as 
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communal violence, even though the latter is not a new or rare 
phenomenon (Sundberg et al. 2012:352, Sarkees and Schafer 2000:130, 
Brosche and Elferversson 2012:36). This is significant because it results in 
the inter-connections between civil war and communal violence being 
under-researched. In the light of this, Sundberg et al. (2012) point out a 
pertinent issue when they note that: 
“In addition to questions regarding the origins and dynamics of com-
munal violence, the phenomenon is also interesting vis a vis other 
forms of violence: do communal violences spill over in to armed re-
bellion against the Government? Or are they a consequence of armed 
conflict, a result of social polarization or enmity? This relationship 
has received little attention...” (Sundberg et al. 2012:352; see also 
Brosche & Elfverversson, 2012:55-56). 
The questions raised above highlight the need to examine the connections 
and inter-linkages between the conflict categories of communal violence 
and civil war. The way communal violence and civil war are conceptualised 
in academic and policy discourse often differs significantly. This study will 
challenge the common understanding in much of the conflict literature 
that civil war is disconnected from communal violence and differs signif-
icantly from it. The study starts from the assumption that these two con-
flict categories are not static in their course and that their complex inter-
connections have been under-theorised. Using the case of the civil war in 
northern Uganda and the communal violence in north eastern Uganda, 
this study seeks to show how these two conflict categories display  traits 
that are similar and may in practice not only overlap and inter-connect but 
even merge into one another, under certain circumstances. This is done 
by examining the underlying causes of these conflicts, the conditions un-
der which these conflicts changed form and direction over time, the actors 
involved and what their role was in influencing the course and direction 
of these conflicts. Changes in the dynamics and characteristics of the vio-
lence conflicts can also alter (or not be reflected in) how these conflicts 
are conceptualised.  
1.2 Violent conflict in Uganda 
Conflict scholars note that during the Post-Cold War era, many African 
countries were engulfed by violent conflict and the continent was very 
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unstable (Wallensteen and Axell 1994:334-337, Wallensteen and Sollen-
berg 1999:593). According to Fearon and Laitin (2003:77), Sub-Saharan 
Africa had the highest number of armed conflicts. By 1994, an estimated 
28 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa had been or were still affected by vio-
lent conflicts, most of these civil wars. In the same year, 12 of the 48 coun-
tries had armed conflict, while others were coming out of war into a post-
war transition (Sandberg and Smith 1994:02-5). By 1999 the number had 
risen to 18 armed conflicts in the same 48 countries, with a further 11 
affected by severe political crises (Adedeji 1999:03-05). Countries such as 
Angola, Algeria, Burundi, Congo-Brazzaville, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Si-
erra Leone, Liberia, Somalia, Rwanda, Sudan, the Central African Repub-
lic, Zaire and Uganda among others were involved in serious violent con-
flicts over sometimes quite prolonged periods of time (Allen 1999:368, Ali 
and Mathews 1999:5).  
As noted above, Uganda was one of these conflict-affected countries. 
The northern and the north-eastern region of Uganda were engulfed in 
violent conflict that for decades. The Government of Uganda has battled 
with the Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement (LRA/M) rebel faction led 
by Joseph Kony since 1987, after the National Resistance Army/Move-
ment (NRA/M) took over power (Nsubuga 1999:15, Branch 2007:154-
176, Doom and Vlassenroot 1999:05, Gersony 1997:30-35). 
As shown in Map 1.1, Uganda is also located at the centre of several 
regions of violent conflict and political crisis, including sharing a border 
with South Sudan to the North, formerly Sudan, and with the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, formerly Zaire, to the south west, as well as Rwanda 
to the south, where Uganda was closely involved in the genesis of civil war 
that eventually culminated in genocide in 1994.  
Besides the civil war in the northern region, communal violence has 
also plagued the north eastern part of the country for decades, among the 
Karamojong sub-groups, with neighbouring ethnic groups across other 
frontier districts such as Katakwi, Kumi, Kapchorwa, Kitgum, and the 
cross border ethnic groups in Kenya and Sudan as well. Like the civil war 
in the northern region, this communal violence in the north eastern part 
of the country had been ongoing since the pre-colonial era, throughout 
the colonial era and the successive governments of Uganda, till the early 
2001, when a disarmament programme was launched (Gray 2000:412, 
Muhwereza and Otim 2002:163,  Mkutu 2006:61, Safer World 2010:8-88).  
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Map 1.1: Map of Africa showing the location of Uganda 
 
Source: Google images 
https://nl.pinterest.com/pin/313844667756578712/ 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 contextualises these distinct cases of violent conflict 
and the pathways they took, raising interesting questions about the 
complex inter-linkages between them. To examine these complex 
connections between the civil war in northern Uganda and the communal 
violence in north eastern Uganda, the study uses a conflict analysis 
framework.  As elaborated upon below, the conflict analysis framework 
significantly assists in suggesting levels of analysis that are significant in 
opening up debates about the inter-linkages between these two distinct 
cases of violent conflict. 
1.3 Conflict analysis framework  
A conflict possesses dynamic features and sometimes its pathways can be 
influenced by several factors. These dynamic features can alter the 
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structure as well as inter-actor relationship of a conflict. As conflicts 
transform over time, new issues come up and several other actors are 
drawn in as well. This means that a comprehensive understanding of the 
pathways of civil conflicts and communal violence is important.1  
Since conflict can sometimes be multi-leveled and complex, a multi-
disciplinary conflict analysis framework is used. With regard to a conflict 
progression model, Ho-won Jeong argues that conflict stages (or phases) 
are usually portrayed “as an orderly evolution from initiation of struggles, 
escalation, entrapment, de-escalation and termination” (Jeong 2008:97)2, 
as illustrated below, in Fig. 1.1. 
The linear progression model describes the intensity of a conflict with 
a peaked curve where eruption of hostilities builds in to violent interaction 
before any de-escalation attempts. And it conceptually helps to imagine a 
series of scheduled phases. However, he also notes that this is a very 
simplistic model because pathways of conflict are full of “discontinuous, 
transformative events” that happen in a non-linear, self-sustaining way. 
He notes that:  
“Diverse passages of a conflict are illustrated by the fact that most 
events do not go through a prescribed trajectory. The messiness does 
not fit in to a simple stage by stage that is within any particular actor’s 
control” (Jeong 2008:100-101)3. 
Each conflict phase is characterised bya different degree of complexity, 
with differences in the nature of transition and developing retrospec-
tively other than prospectively planned. So conflicts can be caught up in 
protuberances of “escalation, continuing stalemate, de-escalation and re-
escalation” (Jeong 2008:104). 
In the light of the above, Christopher Mitchell notes that ‘con-
flicts are not static phenomena, and hence the dynamics aspects of con-
flict which alter both structure and inter-party relationships over time, 
are essential aspects of any satisfactory analysis’ (Mitchell 1981:33). He 
highlights further how complex conflicts can be and how they can draw 
                                                 
1 See Crocker et al. 2001, Jeong 2008, Mitchell 1981:33, Kalyvas 2003:487.  
2 For details on these phases see Jeong (2008). 
3 See also Kriesberg (1998) 
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in diverse actors not only from the local level but from national, regional 
and global level.4  
Figure 1.1: Conflict Progression Model 
 
 
Source: Jeong (2008: 97). 
 
With that in mind, the study uses a multidisciplinary approach with 
different theoretical frameworks effective in examining the evolution of 
these conflicts. This conflict analysis framework blends different 
conceptual elements which focus on three key levels, i.e., the structures, 
actors and dynamics which are used to systematically assess these conflicts. 
The study analyses structures, which involves an historical analysis of the 
conflict and the key sources of tensions and conflicts. The study identifies 
the key actors and highlights their role in influencing the direction of these 
conflicts.  
                                                 
4 On complexities of contemporary conflicts, see Kalyvas (2003:487). Edward 
Azar refers to their complex episodes as “blurred demarcations” (Azar 1990:06). 
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Figure 1.2: Conflict Analysis Framework. 
 
Source: Authors own design, adapted from O’Gorman (2011) 
 
Examining the dynamics of the conflict involves tracking the development 
of the conflict. These several levels were analyzed together, so as to estab-
lish the interlinkages between the civil war and communal violence in 
these different regions of Uganda. This is the case because the study fo-
cuses on the need to understand the complexities and dynamics of these 
violent conflicts through underlying tensions, actors involved and how the 
development of these conflicts impacts how these violent conflicts are de-
fined. 
1.3 Objectives of the study  
This research examines conflict dynamics of and complex interactions and 
connections between civil war and communal violence. Specifically, it 
looks at these complexities and interlinkages in the Ugandan context. The 
study seeks to:  
x Identify the underlying tensions that caused and prolonged the 
civil war in northern Uganda and the communal violence in 
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north eastern Uganda, and determine how these tensions 
influenced the form and direction of both conflicts  
x Identify and map the various actors involved in the conflicts, 
their motivations, as well as the major inter-connections and 
changes in the form and direction of these conflicts 
x Reflect, on the basis of field findings and interpretative data 
analysis, the implications of how civil war and communal 
violence are conceptualised. 
1.4 Main research question 
What are the complex interconnections between the civil war in northern 
Uganda and the communal violence in northern eastern Uganda?  
 
1.4.1 Sub-questions  
1. What were the underlying causes of the civil war in northern 
Uganda and the communal violence in north eastern Uganda? 
2. Who were the main actors in the two conflicts? What were their 
incentives and their role in influencing the direction of these 
conflicts? 
3. Under what circumstances did the form, content and direction of 
these two conflicts inter-connect and overlap? 
4. What are the implications of the distinct and overlapping nature 
of these two conflicts for how civil war and communal violence is 
conceptualised? 
1.5 Chapter outline 
The structure of the thesis will be presented as follows: Chapter 1 provides 
the background to the study, the research problem and objectives of the 
study. Chapter 2 presents the methodology, field experiences and 
challenges faced during the field work in each region, and its implications 
for the study. This is followed by Chapter 3 which theorises civil war and 
communal violence including the causes and actors in violent conflict. 
This is followed by Chapters 4 and 5 which contextualise the armed 
conflict in northern Uganda and the communal violence in north eastern 
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Uganda, respectively, based on scholarly materials and empirical findings 
about the realities of the target population of the study. Chapter 6 critiques 
conflict categorisations of both conflicts and highlights what this means 
for conflict coding and conceptualisation. For both conflicts, and in 
comparison between them, Chapter 7 synthesises the causal and actor 
linkages, and Chapter 8 concludes with a discussion on the contribution 
of the study to the field of conflict studies and policy recommendations. 
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2 Methods of Inquiry and Field 
Experiences  
 
2.1 Introduction  
This document presents the methodology of the study, the challenges 
experienced in implementing the research design during the fieldwork 
process in each region, and how the researcher was able to overcome some 
of these challenges by making adjustments. It proceeds to show what 
implications these adjustments have for re-doing the research design and 
its effects on the field outcomes.  
2.2 Research methods 
The methodology of the study usually comprises how various approaches 
combined can generate relevant research information that forms a 
response to the research objectives or questions (Sumner and Tribe 
2004:13). Any research always considers how it is going to be carried out 
and where it is going to be carried out and with whom, and finally how to 
process, interpret and analyse the data. These research procedures enable 
one to reach credible conclusions about the field findings (Hancock and 
Algozzine 2006:4).  
A qualitative approach is what the study mainly took, as the focus of 
the study was intended to carry out an investigation about phenomena. 
According to Ritchie (2003:31) qualitative research is an “independent 
research strategy” useful in studying complex subject matters that require 
understanding of occurrences or events that are “innately intricate or 
conceptually difficult to relate” and require reflection on the issues and 
processes to derive meaning significant for the study such as the 
protracted cases of armed conflict in northern and north eastern Uganda.  
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In this approach, studies are usually carried out in their natural 
settings, attempting to create sense out of the social reality experienced by 
people and how they understand it. In the light of the above, some of the 
key elements that give qualitative research its distinctive character, are its 
aims of providing an in-depth and deduced understanding of the social 
world, its processes and events through people’s lived experiences and 
histories (Snape and Spencer 2003:3-4, Denzin and Lincoln 2000:3,  
Bryman 1988:8). 
There are many ways of doing qualitative research.  The research 
process is influenced by various factors such as ontological and 
epistemological orientation, purpose of the study, the characteristics and 
settings of the target population and the audience of the research. (Snape 
and Spencer 2003:1). Furthermore, the different methodological 
approaches are supported by specific philosophical assumptions and 
consistency between them should be maintained to ensure the generation 
of valid findings (Demmers 2012:15-17, Morse et al. 2001:3-4, Seale 
1999:465-6).  
Some of the main qualitative methods are: in-depth interviews, group 
discussions or focus groups, life histories/narratives (biographies) and 
document and text analysis (Snape and Spencer 2003:4).  This study also 
combines the qualitative approach with a quantitative one which mainly 
examines the quantitative measures of civil war and communal violence in 
UCDP/PRIO datasets. This combined approach proved to be very 
significant in understanding the cases used in the study and its implications 
on how they are conceptualised. The section below highlights how the 
information obtained during the field exercise was used. 
2.3 The ontological and epistemological stance 
The ontological and epistemological stance taken by the study was very 
instrumental in influencing the research process right from the 
formulation of the research problem, data collection strategy, data analysis 
and interpretation of data. The traditions of this specific stance dictated 
the whole research process and below are some of the specifications of 
this tradition and their relevance to the study. 
There are differing traditions in the study of violent conflict. These 
traditions differ in the way the ontology, which is what exists, and the 
epistemology, which is how is this knowledge derived, are used (Hollis 
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1994:107, Demmer 2012:15). This is because the ontological claims have 
to be connected to the epistemological positions to make sense. The 
relevance of this is clearly expressed below:  
‘But facts do not make history; facts do not even make events. Without 
meaning attached, and without understanding of causes and connections, a 
fact is an isolate particle of experience, is reflected light without a source, 
planet with no sun, star without constellation, constellation beyond galaxy, 
galaxy outside the universe—fact is nothing’ (Morse et al. 2001:5). 
And within epistemology (the way knowledge is derived) there is a divide 
as well. This is illustrated in Table 2.1 
 




Explaining (Positivist) Understanding 
(Interpretativism) 
Structuralism Social structures are 
systems (like clocks, 
planets, bodies, beehives) 
external and prior to 
actions and determining 
them fully. 
Social structures are sets 
of meaning (games) 
telling people how to do 
social life (language, 
religion, economy). 
Actors are role/rule 
followers. 
Individualism Actors are self –
contained units and the 
source of action (act 
upon individual laws of 
utility maximization, 
natural preferences, 
psychological laws)  
Actors are embedded in 
society but have agency 
they can act, initiate 
change, they have room 
for reflexive self-
direction.  
Source: Based on Hollis (1994), the Philosophy of Social Sciences, cited from Demmers (2012: 
16) 
 
Some social scientists claim the social world can be studied from 
‘without (explanation)’ and ‘within (understanding)’. The ‘without 
explanation’ departs from a positivist stance that claims human behaviour 
is predictable and follows causal laws. So with the creation of hypotheses, 
509974-L-bw-isimon
Processed on: 1-5-2017 PDF page: 31
 Methods of Inquiry and Field Experiences 15 
general explanations of human behavior can be generated. This positivist 
stance claims theory is derived from hypotheses that relate cause and 
consequence (Demmer 2012:15, Hollis 1994: 107-110).   
Furthermore, opponents of the positivist stance that the study relies 
on claim that the ‘within (understanding)’ seeks to understand the meaning 
of human action instead of looking for the cause. This interpretative 
epistemology claims that the meaning of human action is acquired from 
common notions and rules of social life. And this meaning is historically 
and culturally specific, hence examined in context through the relevant 
population and informants. So the meaning of human action depends on 
the environment. This interpretative epistemology stance claims theory 
building is all about making sense of the social world (Demmers 2012:15-
16, Hollis 1994:107). Hence, this tradition acquires knowledge through the 
target population and how they understand their social world. A qualitative 
study ‘focuses directly on meaning and interpretation’ as a result of 
stressing the value of the interpretative features of understanding the 
social world and the importance of the researcher’s interpretation ability 
of the events or processes being studied (Snape and Spencer 2003:13). 
This is why the study took up a qualitative research approach and methods 
of inquiry that necessitated an interactive process that focused on the 
realities and experiences of the target population.  
Wilhelm Dilthey, one of the key contributors of a more participatory, 
interpretative orientation, noted that this stance strives to understand the 
actual accounts or experiences of people studied within specific historical 
and social settings. Through this, links between social, cultural and histor-
ical aspects of that population are revealed and, consequently, how certain 
events come about in these settings is understood (Snape and Spencer, 
2003:7). In addition to the above, they argue that the qualitative research 
practice provides methods of data collection that align with this stance and 
can generate data that can provide a holistic view of the lived experiences 
of the target population as well as the researcher’s view.  
In conclusion, the approach the study adopted was useful in 
studying such complex events/phenomena that are conceptually difficult 
to relate and require reflection on the issues and processes to derive 
meaning for the study. This provided an in-depth understanding of the 
processes leading up to these events through these local communities’ 
lived experiences and histories. The ontological and epistemological 
stance that the study took guided the research process in several ways. 
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This stance influenced the data collection strategies employed, sampling 
approach, data analysis and interpretation of findings. Given the 
complexities of the conflict phenomenon, the preferred methods of 
inquiry used open ended questions that encouraged participants to 
elaborate on issues of the subject. Even the target populations were 
purposefully selected. This purposeful sampling reflected the research 
problem, and was meant to tackle the important questions of the 
phenomenon under study. Even in data analysis and interpretation, the 
researcher dialogued with the data, making sure that the informants’ voice 
is heard and not overpowered. By allowing the data to speak for itself, 
essential features of the phenomenon were unveiled. This is what an 
interpretative process requires; respecting the data and using the voice of 
the participants. The researcher’s preparatory journey while in the field is 
described below 
2.4 Steps taken before the field exercise 
Before the field exercise, from the research question, sub-questions were 
developed5. These sub-questions were broken down into understandable 
questions which could be used by the facilitators/research assistants. 
These question ‘guides’ were in a ‘logical sequence,’ aimed at developing 
thematic areas or structure. 
Before anything was done on the ground, the researcher sought 
permission from the authorizing agents in both regions. These agents were 
quite supportive. Through recommendations from friends and persons 
the researcher met in the field, as well as based on her own assessment, 
the researcher was able to identify two research assistants for the north 
eastern Region, and three for the northern region. The researcher 
interviewed the assistants, and then trained them for eight days. The whole 
exercise was a learning process for all of us. These assistants were quite 
useful as they were very informative about the Dos and Do Nots of the 
community. To avoid any difficulties, the researcher hired assistants with 
a proper command of the local language, and a minimum of a completed 
high school level of education. 
                                                 
5 Billson (2014:9) highlights the significance of research questions before a field 
exercise is embarked on.  
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Even after obtaining consent from the district level officials, the 
researcher followed the procedure of seeking the consent of the local 
leaders of various sub-counties, parishes as well6. The researcher sought 
consent from the various constituencies and this was done before 
indulging in any exercise. With the local leaders’ recommendations, the 
researcher was given guidance on how to penetrate the communities and 
which people should be contacted first and where to find them. The 
researcher realised it was also important to build rapport and gain the trust 
of the participants. Visiting the village a few times and meeting the local 
leaders who took her around, introducing her to some of the people in the 
community, made the exercise a bit simpler because, afterwards, the 
people were willing to open up and talk7. Through their guidance, the 
researcher was able to penetrate the communities, as some participants 
would always first ask if the researcher had sought permission from the 
authorities of their constituencies. News travels really fast in local settings, 
so any actions that would lead to misinterpretation had to be avoided, and 
the right channels ensured that word went around that there was a 
researcher, and she and her assistants were always welcomed, especially in 
the north eastern region.  
While in the field, the researcher preferred not to rush into the 
exercise. She first went around introducing herself to the relevant people 
in the constituencies. This made it easier to make appointments for face-
to-face interviews with some of the people, and not rely only on 
recommendations from local leaders who would in some cases send 
someone to escort you as well8. The researcher actively involved in the 
selection of participants, also in an effort to avoid pre-existing groups 
which could have cultivated rules on what should be or should not be said. 
Such pre-existing groups could have developed hierarchies within, which 
could obstruct the contributions of participants. The researcher found this 
important because various research projects in these regions have offered 
tips for the participants and some leaders have been quick to recommend 
their close relatives, in some cases.  In view of this, the researcher tried to 
                                                 
6 Billson (2014:7-16) recommend proper identification prior to any research ac-
tivity on ground. 
7 See Finlay (2002) 
8  Kitzinger and Barbour (1999:9) warns about possible bias as a result of the pre-
selection of specific groups by gatekeepers. 
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be involved in the selection or recruitment of the participants as much as 
possible.  
In addition to the above, the researcher also tried as much as possible 
to convince the leaders not to be part of the interviews, so as to avoid any 
uncomfortable or intimidating situations for the participants. The 
researcher introduced herself as a student at all times, and avoided giving 
unnecessary promises, as many participants claimed a number of people 
give them a lot of promises in exchange for information, but never to be 
seen again.   
2.5 Methods of inquiry  
Qualitative research is known for employing methods of inquiry that are 
flexible and are popular for being sensitive with the social context within 
which the data is generated9.   
This study was carried out in phases. The first phase of the study in-
volved an extensive review of existing literature. This included a historical 
analysis of these two conflict phenomena, their origins, the actors in-
volved, and their form, content and direction.  These historical records 
relevant to the topic helped the researcher study and understand the chro-
nology of events and sources of tensions that impacted on the course of 
these conflicts. There is an enormous amount of reports written by various 
NGOs, international organisations as well as government reports on the 
armed conflict in the north as well as on communal violence between 
tribal groups in the north eastern part of Uganda. These reports, articles, 
local newspapers and video clips were reviewed by the researcher before, 
during and after the field exercise. This provided information that could 
be further investigated by the researcher, and kept for her write up as well.   
The study used secondary sources such as published books, journals, 
articles, publications from relevant ministries of Uganda, NGOs and the 
local government. The examination of what various scholars have written 
about these phenomena offered various perspectives from which the 
researcher was able to assess facts in relation to those from the primary 
sources.  
                                                 
9 See Snape and Spencer (2003:4). 
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The second phase of the study combined different forms of data col-
lection sources. These were mainly primary sources involving fieldwork 
using individual and participatory group data collection research tools 
such as FGDs, in-depth face-to-face interviews and unplanned conversa-
tions with the target population. Triangulation of research tools was used, 
to guide against misinterpretations10. This is because different participants 
had their own experiences and realities, and, hence, had different percep-
tions about certain issues which some participants were reluctant to 
share11. So, cross-checking with other participants about some highlighted 
issues was done throughout the field exercise.   
2.5.1 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) 
The study used FGDs, which provided vast perspectives on the issues of 
the subject, and these were followed up using in-depth face-to-face 
interviews with the target population12. The FGDs generated a lot of vastly 
complex perspectives, because of their interactive nature that encouraged 
group participation, in contrast to individual interviews. However, issues 
raised during the FGDs were pursued further using in-depth individual 
interviews. The researcher observed participants and was always interested 
in those who appeared to be sometimes holding back information because 
of the crowd, or who would obviously appear to be in disagreement over 
certain issues raised by the members13.  
In relation to the number of participants for the FGDs, the exercise 
was conducted based on the availability of the people. The FGDs had a 
                                                 
10 Van der Haar et al. (2013:23) refer to this exercise as a ‘complex information 
economy’. 
11 This is not a problem, as long as the researcher understands the reasons for 
the lack of neutrality, so that the accounts given are not used as a representation 
for all, knowing that the knowledge is partial and situated. See Haraway (1988), 
and Drury & Stott (2001). 
12 On the importance of FGDs see Fern (1982), Baker (1999), Kitzinger and 
Barbour (1999), Billson (2014) and Bloor et al. (2001). 
13 The researcher should be able to understand that her subjects are not ‘neutral’, 
due to difference in motive and interest, and their narratives may be aimed at 
putting the blame on the other group or protecting their own image, and some 
may be unsure and use rumours or simply silence to hide whatever it is that they 
do not want you to know (Fuji 2009:147). 
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minimum of four and a maximum of twelve people. In some cases there 
were few people willing to participate and in other cases, others failed to 
turn up, and cancelling the exercise was not the best option. In some 
others cases, there were more people willing to participate, and there were 
moral challenges in asking the extra two or three people, especially the 
elderly, to leave the group14. The research assistants told me that this 
would be detrimental to the success of future exercises because some of 
the willing participants, when asked to leave, will pass around unpleasant 
rumours that would make us unwelcome in the next village. This would 
be a big challenge, so we were forced to carry on the exercise.  
Ethical issues were taken serious during the study, and participants 
were always informed in advance about the purpose of the study. At every 
exercise I always introduced myself, and would talk about the importance 
of their insights for the community and the country as a whole. 
Furthermore, the functions of each member of the team, such as the 
facilitator and note taker, were always laid out to create a conducive 
environment for the FGDs. The use of audio recordings in some cases 
was refused, and this wish was always respected.  
However, though confidentiality is an important ethical issue, the 
researcher could not guarantee participants’ confidentiality within FGDs. 
As in any group discussion, the researcher had little control over what 
participants would discuss outside the meeting, but care was taken to 
request participants to not disclose the details of the discussion in the 
FGDs.15 Furthermore, in a post-conflict setting with such traumatic events 
that have impacted people’s lives, some information’s significance goes 
beyond the merely academic. Information that might not seem sensitive, 
could become politicized in a highly polarised setting16. However, the 
researcher always tried to ensure the safety of those who preferred to 
remain anonymous, respected their wishes and kept their identity 
concealed by using pseudonyms.  
                                                 
14 Finch and Lewis (2003:190) and Billson (2014:2) recommend a minimum of 
six to eight participants for a time span of one and a half hours for a productive 
exercise, and the maximum pursuit of each question in the guide. 
15 Wood (2006:379), Billson (2014:5), Kitzinger and Barbour (1999:17) advise 
researchers to guarantee the participants’ anonymity.  
16 See Hilhorst (2003:227). 
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The venues in which FGDs were conducted17, were usually within 
easy reach for community members. However, though the researcher 
always sought the best venues for the exercise, in some cases it was 
difficult to keep the non-participating community members from 
observing the course of the exercise at close range. This disrupted the 
course of an exercise only once, when, in the Napak District, a snake 
spotted by one of the participants within the vicinity disrupted the 
exercise! The FGD had been held under a tree shade near a bush (like in 
Photo 1).  
 
 
Photo 1: FGDs under a tree shade facilitated by a translator/research assistant in NamNam 
Village, Rupa Sub-county, Moroto District (24/09/2014). 
 
                                                 
17  Kitzinger and Barbour (1999:11) recommend easy-access venues that are quiet 
and comfortable, without constant interruptions. 
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The group had soon relocated to a safer area, near the District offices. On 
other occasions, FGDs were typically carried out in the research subject’s 
compounds, community halls, churches, or next to community meeting 
places, and at times in local government offices and barracks. More than 
once we were forced to have the meeting meet inside police posts, 
especially in Karamoja.    
 
Photo 2: FGD in Naguru Surburb, 30/01/2015, Kampala District. 
 
2.5.2 In-depth semi-structured interviews 
The in-depth semi-structured face-to-face interviews contained open 
ended questions which the researcher and the research assistants used to 
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get clarifications about issues relevant to the subject of the study.18 These 
interviews were like conversations with guideline questions, and with the 
possibility of new questions arising during each interview. Since the focus 
of the study was to attain breadth and depth of coverage across and within 
each key issue, it was necessary to dig deeper. For this reason, content-
mapping questions were used for initially opening up the subject matter 
of the study and trying to get an overview, from interviewees, on how they 
would elaborate on the most relevant issues. This was followed up by 
content-mining of questions. Content mining involves exploring a fuller 
description of issues raised by the mapping process. The overview of 
issues obtained from content mapping is deepened through four kinds of 
content mining questions: amplificatory, exploratory, explanatory and 
clarificatory (Legard et al, 2003:50). In a nutshell, content mining questions 
drilled deeper and made it possible for interviewees to highlight sometimes 
hidden issues that improved the researcher’s understanding of less 
obvious issues arising in relation to the study focus.  
 
Photo 3: Researcher with Rwot Onen David Acana II, the Paramount Chief of the Acholi after 
an interview (09/01/2015) 
                                                 
18 See Heslop (2002: 51) 
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Exploratory probes in interviews are generally aimed at finding out more 
about the meanings behind the interviewees’ experiences and the events 
they talk about (Legard et al., 2003:148-155). Furthermore, explanatory 
probes helped to make sense of the reasons people gave for their 
perceptions about certain key issues around violence and conflict.  Lastly, 
clarificatory probes helped to highlight some inconsistencies in the 
interviewees’ responses19. These probes proved useful in elaborating on 
basic factual information, and encouraging respondents to analyse the 
situations they described. 
  
 
Photo 4: Severino Lukoya, Leader of Lord’s Army (1987-88). Father to Alice Lakwena and 
Uncle to Joseph Kony leader of LRA. (Gulu District 25/01/2015) 
                                                 
19 Legard et al. (2003:141-155) recommends the use of a number of probes and 
a range of techniques to acquire depth in response “in terms of penetration, explora-
tion and explanation”. 
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2.6 Sampling criteria for the study 
Once upon a time it was called the Karamoja District. Now, with the cre-
ation of new districts, the Karamoja District has been sub-divided into a 
number of districts, from the time of the Obote I regime shortly after 
independence (Uganda, 1965:18). Under the current government, the Kar-
amoja region now consists of seven districts: Abim, Kaabong, Kotido, 
Moroto, Nakapiripirit, Amudat and Napak. The ethnic groups that inhabit 
this region are the Dodoth, Jie, Pokot, Bokora, Matheniko, Pian and other 
smaller ethnic and sub-ethnic groupings such as the Tepeth, Nyakwe, Ik, 
Ngipore and the Ethur (Dyson and Hudson 1966, Turton 1994:15, Mir-
zeler & Young 2000:407-11).  
 As will be elaborated on in Chapter 5, the Jie are considered to have a 
distinctive identity as the result of their migration into the region (Lam-
phear 1994:63-94). During the colonial and early post-independence years, 
the Karamoja ethnic groups and sub-ethnic groups were seen as part of 
the wider ‘Nilotic’ peoples notably with close linguistic ties (Greenberg 
1966:85-6).Cultural continuities with other groups from northwest Kenya, 
notably the Turkana, have led some anthropologists to term these groups 
the ‘Ateker’ cluster, which stretches from southwest Ethiopia and south-
eastern Sudan to northwest Kenya and north-eastern Uganda. Groups 
such as the Turkana in Kenya, Toposa and Nyanatom in Sudan and Iteso 
in Uganda are also connected to the Karamojong through links that can 
be cultural and also competitive, involving inter-marriage but also cattle 
raiding, for example (Lamphear 1976, Dyson-Hudson 1966, Barber 1968, 
Okalanyi 1980).  
 Other tribes within Uganda that have conflicted with the Karamojong 
besides the Iteso are notably the Labwor and Pokot. The Labwor inhabit 
the Acholi frontier and belong to the Luo linguistic cluster comprising of 
groups such as the Acholi, Lango and Alur among others. The Pokot, with 
a few based in Uganda and the majority based on the Kenya side of the 
border, belong to the Kalenjin linguistic cluster (Greenberg 1966:85-6, 
Mirzeler & Young 2000:411-412). 
 
Nomadic pastoral tribes from neighbouring countries, with which Kara-
mojong have come into conflict in the past, have included the Pokot, the 
Turkana and Samburu from Kenya, and the Dinka, Didinga and Toposa 
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from Sudan (Knighton 2005:23, Dyson-Hudson 1966:148-150, Gray 
2000:402, Odhiambo, 2003:58).  
 The study employed purposive sampling within the conflict affected 
areas taking in to consideration the aim of the study and the research ap-
proach used which is aptly noted below: 
“…the aim of qualitative research is to gain an understanding of the nature 
and form of phenomena, to unpack meanings, to develop explanations or 
to generate ideas, concepts and theories. Samples therefore need to be se-
lected to ensure the inclusion of relevant constituencies, events, processes 
and so on, that can illuminate and inform that understanding. Units are cho-
sen because they typify a circumstance or hold a characteristic that is ex-
pected or known to have salience to the subject matter under study. We 
have termed this principle of qualitative sampling as the requirement for 
'symbolic representation' because a unit is chosen to both 'represent' and 
'symbolise' features of relevance to the investigation”(Ritchie 2003:82-83). 
2.6.1 North eastern Uganda: Field locations  
In north eastern Uganda, fieldwork was carried out in the Moroto District 
(August 2014 to mid-September 2014) and the Napak District (mid-
September 2014 to October 2014). Originally, the Kotido District had 
been selected as one of the districts for the fieldwork. However, after 
interacting with the Matheniko of the Moroto District, the researcher 
realized that to trace and understand the evolution of the Karamoja 
conflict would require inclusion of the perspectives of the Bokora of the 
Napak District (formerly part of the Moroto District) instead of the Jie in 
the Kotido District, usually considered ‘Turkana’.  
The sub-counties and parishes were selected according to the research 
objectives. A total of two sub-counties were chosen per district, and out 
of each sub-county, two parishes were selected and two villages per parish 
were selected. The selection of sub-counties and parishes was done based 
upon recommendation from the district planning unit, elders and local 
council chair persons for the constituencies most affected by communal 
clashes.  
In the Moroto District, the Rupa and Nadunget sub-county were 
selected. In the Rupa sub-county, the Rupa and Mogoth parishes were 
selected for their proximity to the Turkana and Jie of the Kotido District. 
In the Nadunget sub-county, the Loputuk parish was chosen for its 
509974-L-bw-isimon
Processed on: 1-5-2017 PDF page: 43
 Methods of Inquiry and Field Experiences 27 
proximity to the Pian and Pokot, while the Nadunget parish was chosen 
for its proximity to the Bokora. The clashes between the tribal sub-groups 
and the cross-border/district conflict issue are instrumental in the choice 
of the sub-counties. In the Moroto District, a total of 26 face-to-face 
interviews and 10 FGDs were conducted.  
Map 2:1: Map showing location of Moroto and Napak District 
 
Source: Human Rights Watch, September 2007 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/09/11/get-gun/human-rights-violations-ugandas-national-
army-law-enforcement-operations 
In the Napak District, the Lokopo and Ngoleriet sub-counties were 
selected. The Lokopo sub-county was selected because of its proximity to 
the Jie of Kotido and the Iteso of Katakwi, while the Ngloeriet was chosen 
for its proximity to the Matheniko and Pian. In the Lokopo sub-county, 
the Apeitolim and Bokora Corridor parishes were selected, while in 
Ngoleriet the Kautakou and Nawaikorot parishes were selected. A total of 
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19 face-to-face interviews were conducted, and 11 FGDs were conducted 
in the Napak District. 
2.6.2 Northern Uganda: Fieldwork Locations 
According to the Berkeley-Tulane Initiative on Vulnerable Population, the 
highest number of abductees (registered as 89%) were from the Acholi 
Districts of Gulu, Kitgum and Pader; 43% were from Gulu, 25% from 
Kitgum and 21% from Pader (Pham et al. 2007:14). This was the base for 
choosing the Gulu and Kitgum Districts for the fieldwork on the war in 
the north. The study also targeted sub-counties that had the highest 
number of abductees conscripted into the LRA, as well locations that had 
IDP camps, as their experiences were vital for the study. 
Fieldwork was carried out in the Gulu and Kitgum Districts between 
November 2014 and January 2015. In the Gulu District, two sub-counties 
were selected, two parishes were also selected per sub-county. In the Aswa 
County, the Bungatira sub-county was selected and two parishes, Laroo 
and Pabwo were selected. In Aswa County, 20 indepth interviews were 
conducted and 10 FGDs. In the Moro County, the Lakwana sub-county 
was selected, and two parishes, Parak and Lujorongole, were selected for 
the study. In Moro County, a 23 face-to-face interviews were carried out 
and 12 FGDs were conducted. However, it is important to note that most 
of the people in the specified locations, especially youth ex-rebels that the 
local chairperson would recommend were not within their home localities, 
and spent most of their time in the urban areas or trading centers. The 
researcher had to search for them, using the information provided for 
those who were reachable. Fortunately, some people were willing to 
recommend other returnees, although they might then either accept or 
decline to be interviewed. 
In Kitgum, which comprises of only the Chua County, two sub-
counties were selected: Kitgum Matidi and Labongo Amida.  
 
 
Map 2.2 Map of Uganda showing the location of the Gulu and Kitgum Districts 
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Source: Map No. 3862 Rev. 4 United Nations Cartographic Section, May 2003 
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/uganda0803/1.htm 
 
The researcher managed to carry out fieldwork in Kitgum Matidi; in the 
two parishes of Oryang and Lumule a total of 11 face-to-face interviews 
and 4 FGDs were carried out due to time constraint. A follow-up was 
conducted in Labongo Amida, where the research assistants were able to 
conduct a total of 14 face-to-face interviews and 6 FGDs were carried out.  
The researcher made contact with a good number of NGOs, but 
especially for the northern region, she felt a strong interest in GUSCO 
(Gulu Support the Child Center), a reception center set up in the early 
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1990s, after former abductees who had escaped LRA had been captured 
by soldiers and were paraded along the streets in the hope that relatives 
would identify them.20 For the northeastern region, the Karamoja Agro-
Pastoral Development Programme (KADP) also had a very useful library 
that provided some resources.  
Samples in qualitative research are usally small in scale although one 
usually has the opportunity to enlarge or enhance the composition as the 
research progresses. This is the case as emphasis is usually focused on 
quality of information (Ritchie et al. 2003:82-84). During the course of the 
field work, the researcher decided to incorporate the same target 
population from northern Uganda and a few from north eastern Uganda. 
These were especially immigrants who had fled the conflict torn areas to 
the capital city and reside in some well-known locations in Kampala such 
as Wandegeya, Nsambya and Naguru suburbs. 
While in Kampala, the researcher visited Makerere University, and its 
Department of Development Studies, where she taught as a teaching 
assistant before pursuing her Master Degree in Development Studies 
specialising in Development Research at the ISS in 2009. At the 
University, the researcher was able to interact with four academics who 
were experts in Ugandan history and knowledgeable with regard to the 
subject of the study.  
During the field exercise the researcher encountered a number of 
challenges and the following sections go deeper into the field practicalities 
and experiences of the field exercise.  
2.7 Field challenges and limitations to the study 
during fieldwork 
Qualitative researchers usually dip themselves in the settings they are 
studying, which is very vital for critical reflections. A lot of ethical issues 
have been raised about the researched subjects who are protected by 
research protocols21. Nonetheless, the implication of sensitive research on 
researchers themselves has been given less attention22. This is, in 
                                                 
20 See Pham et al. (2007:1) 
21 See Dickson-Swift et al., (2006:853) 
22 See Sword (1999), Watts (2008) 
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particular, with regard to how emotional experiences influence the 
fieldwork exercise, proper research conduct and the conclusions of the 
study. Some research projects have an added dimension of profound 
sensitivity and can come with a challenge of how to deal with the effects 
of emotional stress brought about by listening to people’s suffering. In 
cases where the researcher gets totally immersed and creates lots of 
attachments, the effects may be more profound. So, sensitive settings that 
have brought about suffering do not only affect the researched but the 
researchers as well. Post-conflict settings are emotionally charged terrains, 
and can impact on long-term researchers23.  
In the researcher’s own short-term experience, the impact was not so 
great since the research period was a couple of months and not a lot of 
attachments were made, compared to cases with a research period 
timespan of years. The researcher felt that these people’s experiences were 
like a doorway24 that enabled her to feel the participants’ bitterness and 
remorse in both regions. Listening to the realities of groups in the 
northern and north eastern region, she did feel a deep sense of injustice 
having been inflicted on them.  
The fieldwork period was quite an interesting experience, however, 
as the researcher faced a number of challenges and unforeseen risks that 
necessitated readjustment of the number of planned steps, to ensure that 
the research process would meet the objective intended. For each region, 
the researcher had different experiences, which are presented below. The 
section also provides insights on how they were dealt with and the 
implications they had on the research design. Later, the researcher 
discusses the significance of and role played by the two research assistants 
during the fieldwork exercise.  
2.7.1 Challenges faced in the north eastern region 
Fieldwork in the Karamoja region raised complex issues of cultural 
barriers and identities. Post-conflict setting sensitivity issues for the 
participants, among others, are described below.   
Before any research is carried out, one has to seek permission from 
the authorising agents. In this context, the researcher experienced some 
                                                 
23 See Watts (2008:3-14) 
24 See Li and Aber ( 2006:27-46) 
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unforeseen challenges from the top authorising agent of the Moroto 
District, who was dodging to approve her study in the district for a couple 
of days. In contrast, the Deputy Chief Administrative Officer, Mr. 
Ofwono Emmaunel, was very accessible and wrote a letter supporting her 
study in the Moroto District. This letter was presented to other authorising 
agents such as the Police commissioner, the District Internal Security 
officer, and the Local Council Chairman, who endorsed it, and gave her a 
go ahead to begin her fieldwork.   
One of the main reasons the district originally chosen was later 
changed was that, once the researcher was in the field, she discovered that 
the Jie of Kotido were not considered to be Karamojong as such, but 
Turkana. Some historians such as Augusto Pazzaglia, clearly indicate that 
the Jie and Turkana are brothers. It is noted that, in the eighteenth century, 
drought split the groups and the younger group moved far off to distant 
places in search of grazing land. When the rains returned the elders sent 
word for them to come back, but they refused. Augusto Pazzaglia notes 
that: 
“…the herdsmen had made up their minds not to return to their for-
mer villages. They opposed their elders’ violence with their own, and 
finally obliged them to withdraw. This is how they are said to have 
seceded from the main group…‘to dispute’ is to ‘ajikin’ and so the 
obdurate young tribesmen came to be called Jie” (Pazzaglia 1982:28) 
This unfolding fact seemed very interesting as the Jie were constantly 
referred to as ‘Karamojong’ because of the land demarcations made by the 
British colonialists that placed the Jie inside Uganda. This was viewed as 
an error by the locals. It was a problem because the researcher was 
interested in communal violence within a specific group, the Karamojong.  
Researching the Turkana would have implied going over the border into 
Kenya, which was not the original intention. The Matheniko of the 
Moroto District were selected, as well as a second group, known as the 
Bokora from the Napak District. The researcher decided to work with 
these two groups. During interactions with the host population and local 
organisations and institutions, there was constant reference to the 
Matheniko, Bokora and Pian as inter-related and originally one family. 
These references justified the researcher’s decision.  
Although the researcher’s father is an Iteso from the Kumi District, 
which is a group closely related to the Karamojong, this was her first visit 
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to Karamoja. In 2010, I had done her Masters’ fieldwork close to the 
region in Ngariam Sub – county - Katakwi district, examining the effect 
of Karamojong cattle raids and environmental stresses on the Iteso 
people. Though it was a frontier location, the insecurity reports made it 
impossible for her to cross over and visit the neighbouring Karamoja 
region.  
The Karamoja region is still widely regarded in the rest of Uganda as 
an insecure area. The researcher’s family and friends were surprised that 
she would even consider going there, but fortunately others, more familiar 
with the area, especially NGO workers, and a well-informed journalist 
friend, Oluka Jamila, from the Uganda Broad Casting Corporation, told 
her from experience that the Karamoja region had become safer since 
2006.  Even so, most people who visited had escorts, even inside public 
transport.  Though it seemed safe to travel there, the researcher, being an 
Iteso, was very cautious with regard to her identity.  
In relation to the above, the Karamojong and the Iteso are related 
and belong to the ‘Ateker’ group of people. This family of people 
recognise their common origin and inter-relatedness and speak mutually 
intelligible dialects of the same language25. Some of the other groups that 
belong to this group include the Jie, Dodoth, Turkana and Toposa, among 
others. Despite this, intertribal conflict between the Iteso and the 
Karamojong has historical links with new grievances evolving over the 
years on both sides26. For security purposes, the researcher, on several 
occasions, had to conceal her identity, and introduced herself through her 
mother’s lineage, as a Mugisu from the far eastern part of Uganda, from 
the Mbale District. This was essential to secure the researcher’s safety, 
since wanton raids and killings had taken place among the tribes for 
decades and had created animosity between groups that were once a one 
people. 
With this in mind, the researcher decided to travel, even without 
protection, and sought additional information about what she needed to 
do. Fortunately, through friends accommodation was found, in cheap 
hotels, and then, once she had authorisation, she found a room in the town 
of Moroto, for three weeks. She then moved around in the villages, leaving 
                                                 
25 See Webster (1973)  
26 See Muhwereza and Otim (2002:120, 162 -168) 
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most of her possessions in town. She travelled with just a few clothes and 
her recorder, so as not to be too visible, wearing simple clothing so she 
would fit in. In Rupa, in the small village of Namnam, she found a place 
to live with a village family, since she wanted to experience living in the 
manyata, even eating the same diet, including cooked (not raw) cattle blood.  
She took with her minerals and anti-malaria tablets, to ensure that she 
would be well during the fieldwork period.  
The researcher had to get used to easing herself in a nearby bush. 
There were no toilets; culturally, the local people saw no use for them. Her 
greatest fear was of snakes or scorpions. But with time, the researcher had 
to come to terms with the situation, the social-cultural ways of living and 
the traditional way of dressing.  
Talking with people about conflict meant people would talk about it 
with great bitterness, especially about the loss of youth and children who 
would be the ones who could not run fast enough during raids and lost 
their lives. One had to ask questions in an appropriate manner.  For 
instance, the researcher would not ask: “Why did you begin fighting with 
the Iteso?”  Instead, she would refer to the fact that those fighting were 
once united, and ask how this broke down, and where the fighting 
originated from.  People would then be more willing to talk to her.   
Unlike the strong sense of victimhood in the North, the bitterness of 
people in the Karamoja region was about themselves. For example, the 
elders regretted that they had lost their say, with the rise of the power of 
the gun in the region. An elder’s punishment or curse could not compete 
any longer with the power of the gun, and they were also bitter that so 
many young lives were lost in these reckless raids. The fear and respect of 
parents and elders was lost. In previous eras, young people who raided 
cattle would give them to the father. But with the arrival of small arms, 
young men, even children, would even kill their own relatives, their own 
families.  Women would use guns mainly in self-defence, and there were 
very few girls carrying arms during raids.  However, during interviews it 
was reported, at times, that women would encourage their menfolk to go 
and join and raid, in order to bring resources into the community and the 
household.  NGO workers who spoke with the researcher often explained 
that the cost of dowry, the cost of food, which is mainly dairy-related, 
would prompt men to go on raids.  Being a sensitive topic, with many of 
the research subjects affected in various ways by the conflict, the questions 
had to be modified. This was done, after a couple of interactive sessions 
509974-L-bw-isimon
Processed on: 1-5-2017 PDF page: 51
 Methods of Inquiry and Field Experiences 35 
with the participants, together with the research assistants, who were quite 
helpful in pointing out language in the interview list that would invoke 
unexpected behaviour from the participants. Re-adjustment of the 
questions, was a continuous process depending on who the participants 
were, in both regions.  
Furthermore, partly because of the long history of violent attacks, the 
transport infrastructure in north eastern Uganda is still very poor. The 
roads are in poor condition, and are currently being improved and 
upgraded. During the fieldwork period, it often rained, and since the roads 
are poor, on several occasions the researcher with the rest of the 
passengers had to sleep in the bus, stuck on the road. It would take up to 
20 hours to get the bus moving again. This was scary because in the past, 
road ambushes, robbery and killings were often reported in this part of 
the region, at least until the disarmament years. Fieldwork in north-eastern 
was quite tough because of the danger of wild animals; besides that, 
finding privacy for the most basic hygiene was very difficult when moving 
with a group. 
The researcher and her team usually had to trek from one village to 
the next for hours and trek back as well, taking the food and water that we 
needed with them. The best option was always to wake up early, before 
sun dawn, and start to trek.  However, on some days the rains were very 
heavy and disrupting the plans for the day, requiring their rescheduling. 
The researcher had to be flexible and not stick too rigidly to the schedule 
in such cases.  Eating in local restaurants proved a good way to avoid 
hunger, since local people eat only once a day, and there is simply not 
enough food for more than one meal for most families.   
A good number of participants were very sensitive to gadgets such as 
cameras and voice recorders. On several occasions they would ask, “What 
is that thing?” And even after an explanation had been given, some would 
still decline being audio-recorded. Sometimes the research assistants 
would help to persuade the respondent that there was no risk of the 
interviews being passed onto the authorities. Notes would have to be 
taken by the researcher herself or by her research assistants. This 
sensitivity also applied to taking photos, and that the number of 
participants in the villages, would decline. Some believed the camera might 
cause them ill health.  The District Information Officer, Mr Kidon 
Michael, explained to the researcher that it is because they believe the 
machine (camera) will suck their blood. Ben Knighton notes the same 
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understaning when he syays: “Ordinarily they can be very wary of being 
photographed, feeling that some part of their shade or selves is being taken 
away by the photographer” (2003:441). 
Both in the north east and the north, all military participants refused 
to be audio-recorded, some saying they were government servants and did 
not want to be recorded for fear of any unknown implications that might 
work against them in the future. Some suspected the researcher being a 
journalist or a spy, even after proper identification. The researcher’s effort 
to take a photo of the famous armoury in the Moroto District, which was 
looted by the Matheniko in 1979 when Amin Dada was overthrown by 
Milton Obote, was in vain. Division commanders said this was too 
sensitive, classified information. The researcher was not even allowed to 
get anywhere close to the building, even though it had been abandoned 
for more than thirty-five years.  It was pivotal in the violent conflict that 
engulfed the region, and having a picture of it would have been another 
achievement on the part of the researcher. 
2.7.2 Challenges faced in the northern region 
The second region in which fieldwork was conducted was very different 
from the first. People were much more often too busy to talk with the 
researcher. The problem of local people being tired of researchers is 
sometimes called ‘research fatigue’, and is discussed in the section that 
follows.  The second adjustment that had to be made in the northern 
region was to the very different culture, where many interviewees did not 
seem keen to talk openly about their experiences.  In the northern region, 
compared to north-eastern Uganda, it was also harder to get people to join 
in FGDs. This may have been because of fatigue, bitterness, as discussed 
in more detail below.  
During the fieldwork exercise, the researcher and her team redesigned 
the interview guides for face-to-face interviews to cater for the more 
sensitive groups of target population. Having to deal with disturbed and 
bitter participants was one of the biggest challenges.27 In some cases, the 
problem was that some participants, in the course of giving their 
                                                 
27 The New York Times editorial in an article titled “Armies of Children” (Octo-
ber 12, 2006) referred to these former child soldiers as “walking ghosts”. Blatt-
man and Annan (2008:103) referred them as the ‘lost generation’. 
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perceptions about the subject of the study, would find themselves drifting 
towards their own experiences. At times, whilst making a point in relation 
to their general perceptions, participants would start to get upset or 
emotional. Seeking to explain these reactions, Madam Christine Langol, a 
former counsellor at the Gulu Reception Center, cautioned me to take 
care, because, even though there were no more gunshots, the war was not 
really over in people’s minds. She explained that there were still many 
people who were traumatised and still trying to make sense of the past and 
their current situation, with unresolved grief and loss.  
Often their accounts were very disturbing to listen to, so it was 
important to not show too much emotion. They would navigate into their 
own experiences, and sometimes they could not be diverted from this. If 
the researcher and her assistants saw that participants were upset, they 
would try to divert their focus by asking questions that would change that 
focus. On some occasions, in the process, participants would break down 
in tears and others would go mute and unable to continue, resulting in 
awkward silences. Sometimes, the researcher and her assistants did not 
know how to react when participants, especially ex-rebels, would stop in 
the midst of the interview and give the researcher or the translator a 
drilling stare amidst a silence that could last for as long as two minutes. 
Sometimes, questions meant to shift their focus would be ignored. Some 
of these narratives were quite traumatic and violent, and hard to listen to. 
One old lady had lost five children, all abducted in a single night. She too 
was abducted but released after a few hours, whilst her children were taken 
away by the LRA.  It was impossible to avoid being moved by such stories. 
In such cases, the researcher and her team would give the respondent 
some time to recollect him or herself, and then continue the interview. At 
other times, the individual would be so distressed that it was agreed to 
stop the interview. 
Despite the emotional distress displayed by some participants, the 
researcher could do little to ease their pain, and her solution was to show 
empathy by maintaining eye contact, listening with concern and 
understanding, but avoiding any physical contact or emotional display 
(e.g., tears). According to the researcher, emotional display from her part 
could easily make them respond more emotionally, and even increase their 
suffering. The choice of words used in such situations was something 
discussed carefully with the research assistants and this would at times 
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help.28 Very direct questions could be modified to some extent, to make 
them less confronting.  
How the researcher felt and the impact of the participants’ 
experiences on her was something she did not think about a lot at first, 
but later on she understood that the experience did have its own impact 
on her. She definitely left the regions a different person, in relation to what 
she knew before, and what she had learnt.  
In addition to the above, certain responses, reactions, tearful episodes 
by participants did raise certain emotional concerns on the researcher’s 
part part; participants walking off, telling point blank that they were tired 
of re-telling their experiences or shedding tears during interviews did have 
its weight on her at some point. The researcher was always unsure of what 
to expect from participants, especially in the northern region. 
Nonetheless, their realities29 opened up her mind to understand certain 
significant aspects of these phenomena that she possibly would have 
overlooked without such emotional engagement.   
The researcher encountered a number of unreceptive participants 
who claimed they were tired of re-living the past over and over. Some 
participants would openly complain about these never-ending research 
projects. This is understandable, and as one former abductee said: “I’m tired, 
I do not want to talk anymore”. When a research assistant was able to take him 
aside and try to understand why he was not interested in the exercise, he 
noted that several research organisations had talked to him already, and 
after the information had been extracted, always left him feeling sad. The 
research assistant’s efforts to convince him were futile.  This was not an 
uncommon response of people who were tired of talking again about the 
past. On one occasion, the team interviewed someone who continued to 
dig in his garden during the process.   
The problem with the administration centres in the urban areas of 
Gulu and Kitgum was that the majority of the local government officials 
were too busy to give the team an audience, in contrast to the villages 
where the people were receptive. In the villages we spoke mostly with the 
                                                 
28 On the choice of language during sensitive research, see Thulesius et al. 
(2003:1360).  
29 Frank (1995) describes such people as ‘wounded story tellers’. 
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elderly, since most youth were absent, and were either in town or travelling 
away from home.  
In the case of the government officials, many would not show up, and 
even provide dates for interviews knowing that they would be travelling. 
They often complained about there being too many researchers. The 
researcher became disappointed that a good number of interviews could 
not be carried out. This affected the number planned, and actually 
implemented. A few local government officials rescheduled appointments, 
and they would sometimes not show up. After two reschedulings, the 
researcher would often try someone else.  
Alternatively, as mentioned earlier, the researcher sought out 
participants in the capital city who had fled the armed conflict in northern 
Uganda and communal violence in north eastern Uganda. Most of them 
were residing in the Nsambya Acholi Inn, Naguru and Wandegeya 
suburbs. The researcher also interviewed close friends of the refugees 
from these war torn regions, friends who had grown up here in the city, 
but were indirectly affected as well through the loss of close relatives. The 
researcher was also able to interact with four academics from Makerere 
University in Kampala. Due to busy schedules of some key informants, 
alternative approaches to data collection had to be devised, such as 
telephone calls and emails. 
The researcher also obtained a variety of reports or publications from 
government ministries, and international and well as local NGOs that have 
been operating in these regions. These reports contained a lot of valuable 
information, alongside the field findings. These reports covered diverse 
topics, such as IDPs, land conflicts, post-conflict situations and 
population and health-related issues of former warriors or rebels, as well 
as other topics, directly related to the subject of the study. Besides, a 
number of videos related to the study had been posted on-line, on the 
websites of various organisations working in these regions.  
2.7 The Importance of research assistants and NGOs 
When the researcher arrived in Moroto, the largest town in the north 
eastern region, she started to look for a couple of young people who would 
become research assistants for the study. She sought two people who were 
fluent in Karamojong and who could advise her on what to do and what 
not to do. She found two graduates, one from Makerere University and 
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the other from Kampala International University. A high unemployment 
rate means that many graduates in Uganda are available for work. Both 
had been involved in research projects with a number of NGOs in the 
region and had also supported visiting researchers like the researcher in 
this study. A local journalist introduced them to the researcher.  Both 
spoke Karamojong fluently and the researcher felt comfortable interacting 
with them.   
They were quite helpful as they constantly informed the researcher 
about the dos and do nots of the community during the fieldwork exercise. 
Sometimes, one of them would prepare the way for the team, by going 
ahead to ensure everything was as the team had planned. Without these 
young people, their encouragement and their local knowledge, the 
researcher could not have collected as many valuable data in the field. 
Informants were not paid but given small gifts, such as tobacco or a drink. 
Sometimes, people were happy to talk without even a drink. They 
understood the subtle ways in which Karamojong was being spoken.  The 
young men facilitated Focus Group discussions, helped with translating 
interviews, and they also gave the researcher invaluable advice. They 
helped with going to NGOs’ resource centres and with collecting reports 
and other sources of written data. Both research assistants had 
experienced and seen traumatic events in their lives, and were not shocked 
by the narratives.  
In Gulu too, the researcher ‘hired’ research assistants, including a 
graduate of Gulu University, and two younger students. As in the north 
east, they would help her with logistics, and with planning meetings in the 
villages. However, she did encounter a scenario where one of the LRA’s 
former commanders was really uncomfortable with one research assistant, 
Obwona Byron, a 28 year old linguistic graduate from Gulu University, 
claiming he was (too) young. In his own words: 
“People will not tell the truth, they will tell you what they assume you want to hear. 
These people are young, they don’t know the implications of some information. They 
will go out there and just begin talking faa-faaa, and then someone will be in 
trouble” (Annoymous, Former LRA commander, 25/01/2015 
Bungatira, Subcountry, Gulu District). 
 
He hesitated to give the researcher an audience, and postponed the 
meeting. The next time the researcher came around to see him as 
scheduled, he warned her about involving young research assistants in 
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such sensitive research topics. He was abducted at tender age and injured 
in a crossfire in Sudan, and having returned home, he was definitely 
conscious of whom he discussed certain issues with. 
The researcher made friends too, and had causal drinks and 
conversations with local community members, elites, elders and NGO 
employees, among others30. She made contact with the staff of local 
organisations, with whom she had great and meaningful conversations, 
and even after her departure from the field these connections have played 
a significant role in allowing her to follow-up on a number of questions 
that arose during the write up process.  
2.8 Data analysis, interpretation and reporting 
After the field study, the field notes and recordings from interviews and a 
considerable number of the interviews and focus group discussions were 
transcribed. This was followed by the development of thematic summaries 
which allowed the researcher to sort and arrange the data meaningfully. 
This enabled her to identify a general structure in the data, hence 
simplifying the identification of patterns and she started to recognize the 
puzzles presented by the data analysis. 
With the help of the investigative structure proposed by conflict 
analysis frameworks, the researcher created thematic sections in each 
phase of these conflicts highlighting the underlying causal factor, the key 
sources of tensions, and the actors and factors that altered the course of 
the conflict. Connecting these elements enabled the researcher to establish 
the complexities and interlinkages between these conflicts.  
The study extracted meaning from the perceptions of the target 
populations, then constructed themes which guided the layout of 
interpretation and reporting of the field findings31. Issues such as identity 
were highlighted by both the target groups in Karamoja and northern 
Uganda. Several causal conversations were held between the researcher 
and acquaintances in the field to cross-check ideas that seemed to be 
                                                 
30  Van der Haar et al. (2013:33), notes that “even more casual conversations 
might be taken as research encounters in which the researcher might ‘test’ the 
resonance of his/her interpretations and engage the other person in meaningful 
exchange of ideas”.   
31 See Spencer et al. (2003:217) 
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lacking. These interactions were helpful in the acquisition of several views 
of interpretations with regard to the events in these regions. 
The primary data were combined with secondary data from a range 
of academic publications, government ministries’ reports, international 
and local organisations’ publications and several local newspapers.  
The UCDP datasets were used to highlight problems of how civil war 
has been defined in the case of northern Uganda in relation to how 
communal violence was defined and measured in north eastern Uganda. 
Furthermore, this study aimed at generating rich descriptive as well as 
explanatory accounts of these events. So, quotes from interviews and 
FGDs were used to provide descriptive and explanatory evidence derived 
at the level of meaning32. Throughout the write-up, the researcher 
endeavoured to synthesise the field findings with some conceptual and 
theoretical underpinnings about conflict, in order to arrive at relevant 
conclusions from the study. 
2.9 Conclusion 
As described above, working with interviewees, FGDs and research 
assistants, and preparing for the field, meant the researcher was able to 
conduct this academic study in reasonable security and safety. The 
research subjects (local population), the local organisations, and the 
research assistants were all vital in the whole fieldwork exercise. The 
fieldwork experiences were significant in their own way, specifically in 
understanding the realities of the local target population in these post – 
conflict settings. The study strived at maintaining space for participants’ 
voices and perceptions. At the same time, the research process influenced 
the research design and prompted the researcher to modify the questions 
or focus, from time to time, in response to interview experiences. The 
realities and perceptions of interviewees were seen as very relevant to 
understanding underlying tensions around the conflict case studies. What 
emerged was a clearer appreciation of the actors and dynamics involved in 
each conflict situation, and the roles of different causal dynamics in the 
perpetuation of each conflict. From the epistemological stance of 
interpretative methods, the methodologies adopted were able to influence 
the researcher’s choice of relevant theories used later in this study for 
                                                 
32 See Snape and Spencer (2003:4) 
509974-L-bw-isimon
Processed on: 1-5-2017 PDF page: 59
 Methods of Inquiry and Field Experiences 43 
analysis of these two distinct cases of intra-state conflict categories. The 
conceptualisation of these two distinct conflict categories is elaborated 
upon in the following chapter. 
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3.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents the debates surrounding the conceptualisation of 
civil war and communal violence, the implications of the definitions and 
their relevance to the study. The conceptualisation of intra-state typologies 
of conflict has raised a lot of debate and has been challenged in academia. 
Authors hold diverging views and make varying claims in relation to what 
a civil war and communal violence is. This is elaborated upon below, and 
this is followed by sections discussing theories on the causes of violent 
conflicts and the nature of the actors involved. 
As some key words will be used throughout this thesis, it is important 
to understand their meaning. First, the term ‘conflict’ can be defined as a 
situation involving dissenting parties, with diverging interests, goals 
and/or ideologies. It is fair to say that most conflict scholars would agree 
with this broad definition (Galtung 1969: 167-91, Mitchell 1981:17, 
Kriesberg 1998: 2). 
Of course, the notion of violent conflict differs from conflict because 
it involves openly ‘hostile interactions’ between opposing groups that 
involve physical coercion, maiming or even death. Unlike conflict, violent 
conflict is almost always a collective phenomenon. It is characterised by 
the intention of destroying, injuring or causing harm to opponents; gaining 
control of available resources and institutions that others may depend on, 
such as land, minerals and even government offices (Nel and Righarts 
2008:161, Mack and Snyder 1957:218, Gurr 1980:2).  The term violent 
conflict can refer to armed combat between states, between government 
forces and rebel groups, or to more ‘horizontal’ group-to-group violence 
among non-state actors as well as riots, pogroms and other forms of 
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violent action (Demmers 2012:7-8). Therefore, this term is used in this 
thesis to refer to the two cases being researched.  This will be elaborated 
upon in relation to civil wars and communal violence in the rest of this 
chapter.  
3.2 Conceptualising and Coding Civil war: Debates  
According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP), a civil war is an 
internal armed conflict based on a political disagreement that concerns the 
government or territorial issues where warring parties use armed force and 
where this leads to at least 25 battle-related fatalities.  The Uppsala Conflict 
Data Project categorises intra-state warfare into three sub-sets: minor, 
intermediate and war intensity levels.   
For minor cases, a minimum of 25 battle-related fatalities annually 
should be registered, but fewer than 1,000 throughout the whole course 
of the armed conflict. For intermediate intensity level, at least 1,000 battle 
deaths should be registered throughout the course of the war, with an 
annual battle death toll of at least 25. For the case of full intensity civil 
war, at least 1,000 deaths annually should be registered (Gleditsch et al. 
2002:615-19, Harbom and Wallensteen 2010:508). These three thresholds 
were introduced because researchers of the UCDP found the ‘old’ high 
death threshold of 1,000 to be too high and disadvantageous because it 
would exclude smaller conflicts that were historically significant to some 
regions but less significant to the international community (Gleditsch et 
al. 2002:617).  
Furthermore, UCDP researchers note that whether the rebels are 
based within or outside the state territory they are considered party to the 
conflict if they challenge a particular government. The government has to 
be internationally recognised or controlling undisputed territory 
(Gleditsch et al. 2002:619, Sollenberg and Wallensteen 2001:631-633). 
This implies that the rebels do not necessarily have to be within the state 
boundaries. This differs from the view held by other conflict scholars such 
as Sambanis (2004:828-831), Small and Singer (1982:210), who have 
suggested that rebel factions should be based within state boundaries for 
a violent conflict to be called a ‘civil war’.  UCDP researchers also note 
that the civil war is over once a certain one side of the party is victorious, 
when there is a peace agreement and a ceasefire period of time has elapsed 
without a battle taking place (Kreutz 2010:243-250). 
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The UCDP also distinguishes the conflict typologies and notes that 
armed conflict between two or more states is an interstate armed conflict, 
while an armed conflict between a state and rebels outside the state’s 
territory is an extra-state armed conflict. However, an armed conflict 
involving international support from other states to the state and the rebel 
faction is referred to as an internationalised internal armed conflict 
(Gleditsch et al. 2002:619). 
As discussed above, UCDP researchers have their own definition of 
“internal armed conflict”, what most other conflict scholars refer to as 
“civil war”. There seems to be no consensus about the different 
definitions and some debates that have centred on death thresholds will 
now be considered in more detail. Different scholars have provided 
varying criteria for coding civil wars based on the numbers of battle-
related fatalities recorded within a specific period of time.  
The Correlates of War dataset (COW) was started at the University 
of Michigan in 1963 by J. David Singer, and codes international and civil 
violent conflicts. It does not include group-to-group violence. These 
scholars define civil war as an armed conflict within the confines of state 
boundaries, involving the national government as the primary party and 
rebel factions as the secondary ones. There must be effective resistance 
on both sides with a ‘reasonable’ ratio of fatalities of at least 1:20, i.e., the 
stronger forces must at least suffer 5% of the number of fatalities of the 
weaker opponent, whether that is rebels or government forces. More 
importantly, according to COW, to be a civil war the confrontation should 
result in at least 1,000 battle-related fatalities per year throughout the 
course of the armed conflict. COW scholars also note that the subject of 
contestation is usually related to changes in state policies, overthrowing 
the government or regional secession (Small and Singer 1982:210-11, 
Sarkees and Schafer 2000:126).  
In the light of the above, Fearon and Laitin (2003:76) make further 
clarifications in terms of inclusion and exclusion related to civil wars 
between 1945 and 1999. They developed secondary criteria with the 
following specifications: the commencement of the civil war is the initial 
year in which 100 fatalities are recorded as an outcome of armed conflict 
and a new war is coded if a key party withdraws but battle carries on. They 
thus define civil war in ways that are somewhat similar to the COW dataset 
definition, but with lower thresholds of fatalities.  
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For these authors, an end to the armed conflict is coded if victory is 
gained either on the part of the insurgent or the state, or if there is 
extensive demobilisation of armed forces, for instance once negotiations 
lhave led to a peace treaty. If this results in two or more years of peace, 
the conflict is said to be over (Fearon and Laitin 2003:75-90). These 
researchers have a broader definition of civil war, which can include cases 
of external support in the form of foreign troops, as well as multiple wars 
that can be coded if a state is battling dispersed rebel groups with different 
aims at different geographical locations within the country. Finally, if a 
state succeeds in conquering a territory outside its borders, and armed 
struggle continues afterwards, this is also coded by these authors as civil 
war (Fearon and Laitin 2003:76). 
In a critique of COW datasets, Sambanis (2004: 829-30) contributes 
the suggestion that armed conflict should be defined as a civil war if it 
occurs within a state territory of 500,000 or more people, recognised as 
part of the international system. For Sambanis, the confrontation should 
also be between parties that are politically and militarily organised with 
openly stated political goals. The ruling government should be the main 
party and the weaker side must be able to inflict on the stronger opponent 
a minimum of 100 deaths, most of these in the initial year of the combat. 
If the violence become more one-sided, the civil war is over, according to 
Sambanis, and the incidents should be coded differently. Sambanis 
suggests that the first year of the war be coded as civil war only if the 
fatality count amounts to 500 to 1,000 deaths. Even if there is a low death 
count in the first year, if the cumulative death count reaches 1000 with 
three continuous years of violence, then this too can be coded as a civil 
war. Furthermore, he notes that despite a certain degree of external 
involvement, the insurgents should be recruited locally and should have 
bases at home of which they have control, though they may be operating 
from neighboring countries.  
Sambanis suggests that to code an end to a war; a peace agreement 
must generate peace for at least six months after a ceasefire or no battle 
for at least two years or more. Another condition that would lead to coding 
the end of war is military victory by the insurgents leading to creation of a 
different government.  Should there be continued armed conflict against 
the new regime, then another civil war may be coded with new parties 
involved. If the same parties continue to fight over the same issues, then 
this is coded as continuation of the old civil war (Sambanis 2004:829-30). 
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Closer analysis reveals that Nicholas Sambanis replicates the COW dataset 
and makes what amounts to a few modifications to what he considers are 
ambiguities in the COW. His emphasis is on the status of government, 
population size, war onset and definitions of termination of civil war. 
Conflict issues that divide scholars range from the significance of 
taking over central government, government policies, territorial disputes, 
and identity politics, to mention a few. Some issues have been used to 
distinguish and categorise civil war in the conflict literature. Some existing 
definitions view civil war as aimed at deposing the government in power 
(Fearon and Laitin 2008:280, Cederman et al. 2013:59, Sambanis 2004). 
Not all civil wars, however, are carried out by rebel factions. Fearon and 
Laitin (2008) also cite leaders of armed forces of the state itself who may 
generate extensive defections within the military, and reflect ethnic 
divisions within the state, or newly-made militia organisations backed by 
parts of the army (Cederman et al. 2013:60).  
Furthermore, separatist civil wars are a specific form of civil war 
aimed at attaining greater autonomy or independence (Fearon and Laitin, 
2004:291). Cederman et al. (2013:59) argue that groups that have been 
politically and economically marginalised, or sometimes are economically 
privileged (e.g., have oil resources on their territory) are the ones most 
likely to seek independence through secessionist wars. Fearon and Laitin 
(2004:277) argue that secessionist movements can be related to 
incompatibilities over explicit disputed territories that have nurtured 
enmities between groups, which can culminate in secessionist movements.  
Conflict scholars have used these conflict traits to distinguish among 
conflicts depending on the nature of the incompatibility. As described 
above, scholars have defined and given varying criteria for identifying what 
is referred to as civil war. However, the most significant issues used to 
identify them are: the parties involved, the space within which the conflict 
occurs, death thresholds, the nature of state institutions and the armed 
forces.  All these will influence how the onset and end of civil war are 
coded.  
The most problematic source of disagreement for this research has 
been that of the casualty thresholds. These are especially problematic in 
contemporary Uganda, given the unreliable nature of battle-related death 
statistics and the disastrous war-related effects that can claim numerous 
lives, such as famine and disease. The datasets, whether COW or UCDP, 
are not able to allow for such variations in the accuracy of data.  Another 
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problem is the fluctuating intensity levels over time of these wars (Francis 
2006:71), which will be something returned to in northern Uganda’s civil 
war.  
Besides issues surrounding the features of what defines a civil war, 
there are different typologies of civil wars. These are defined based on the 
objective of the study. There are different objectives as to why rebel fac-
tions engage in violent interactions with the government and these varia-
tions have been used to distinguish between typology of civil wars. There 
are a number of issues that have led to incompatible interests between the 
government and rebel factions and some of these issues are related to tak-
ing over the central government, government policies, territorial disputes 
and identity politics, to mention but a few. Some of these issues have been 
used to distinguish and categorise civil war in conflict literature. Some of 
the existing categorisations are: civil war aimed at deposing the govern-
ment, separatist civil war, ethnic civil war, decolonisation civil war and 
new-old wars. 
According to conflict literature, civil wars that aim at deposing the 
government mainly involve rebel factions that challenge the government 
and publicly state their objectives of toppling the government with the aim 
of taking over the state. These mobilised political and military organisa-
tions or non-state actors usually challenge the government’s right to sov-
ereign rule and are also referred to as coup-related civil wars (Fearon and 
Laitin 2008:280, Cederman et al. 2013:59). These types of civil wars tend 
to be situated nearer to the capital city unlike ethnic or secessionist civil 
wars that are usually situated far from the capital city. However, James 
Fearon and David Laitin note that these types of civil wars are not only 
carried out by rebel factions but also by leaders of armed forces of the 
state who generate extensive defections within the military and using vio-
lent strategies such as coups and peripheral insurgencies to pursue their 
intentions to take over power. Cederman et al. (2013:60), in the same light, 
note factions in the army as challengers, but go ahead to point out others 
as well such as ethnic groups and newly made political or militias’ organi-
sations. 
In addition to the separatist civil wars mentioned above, there is a 
type of civil war that aims at attaining greater autonomy or independence 
(Fearon and Laitin 2004:291). Cederman et al. (2013:59) argue that groups 
who have been politically and economically marginalised or economically 
privileged usually seek independence through secessionist wars. In the 
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same light, Gurr (1993:188) and Brass (1991:238) attribute political hori-
zontal inequality and collective history of lost autonomy by some ethnic 
groups to the cause of civil war. This is related to incompatibilities over 
explicit, disputed territories that have nurtured enmities and have culmi-
nated in to secessionist movements. This issue has been used by conflict 
scholars to distinguish separatist civil wars from others. 
Ethnic civil war is another classification used in distinguishing civil 
wars and according to Fearon and Laitin (2004:277), these have been pop-
ularly labelled as ‘ethnic’ conflicts as they mainly involve groups organised 
and fighting along ethnic lines. They also refer to them as ‘sons of the soil’ 
civil wars where dominant ethnic groups who usually are in power support 
their members against minority groups, which breeds grievances resulting 
in ethnic conflicts. A number of conflict scholars have attributed a number 
of factors to the cause of this type of war such as natural resources, identity 
politics and state repressive policies. Many other scholars have attributed 
these types of civil wars to competition for access to power as a result of 
exclusionary/discriminatory policies directed towards other ethnic groups 
in a country. These cases have been documented in countries where ethnic 
majority or minority were undermined or in situations where previously 
privileged groups enjoy an advantaged position (Cederman et al. 2013:58, 
Rothchild 1981:217, Gellner 1983:1). 
 Since the excluded groups experience what Cederman et al. 
(2013:59) refer to as ‘alien rule’ from ‘foreign’ ethnic groups, the aggrieved 
ethnic groups tend to protest through violent means, hence resulting in an 
ethno-nationalist civil war. However, Williams (2003:150) notes that these 
wars are also waged by ‘included’ groups who have full access to state 
resources but are still dissatisfied due to the state’s inability to fulfil their 
policy preferences.  
Another classification used is that of the wars of independence or 
decolonisation wars. These have been regarded as extra-systemic wars 
(Small and Singer 1983:210, Sarkees and Schaffer 2000:124-127). These 
wars that transpired against the former colonial empires have been dis-
missed as intra-state wars for operational reasons, there are similarities 
with civil wars (Sambanis 2004:828). Although colonial states were not 
regarded as proper sovereign states, and since a civil war is between state 
and non-state actors within state boundaries, Fearon and Laitin (2004:281-
2) note that some of the anti-colonial wars of the 1950s and 1960s can be 
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categorised as civil wars as they meet some of the criteria for a civil war 
classification. 
Some contemporary conflict scholars have devised ways of classi-
fying civil wars of the post-cold war era from previous wars using terms 
such as ‘new’ and ‘old’ wars (Kalyvas 2001:99). According to Mary Kaldor, 
the nature of warfare has evolved, “characterized by a different mode of 
warfare involving different types of military forces, different strategies and 
techniques, different relations and means of warfare” (1999:15). Post-cold 
war era wars have been mainly referred to as intrastate, internal, civil, or 
as ‘privatised’ or ‘informal’ wars (Keen, 1998).  
A number of scholars argue that these new wars possess unlawful 
features, are personalised, destructive and based on greed (Kalyvas 
2001:100). Additionally, the violence involved in these civil conflicts has 
been described as horrific, senseless and barbaric, owing to the warfare 
techniques (Kaplan 1994:35-40, Enzensberger 1994:22-30, Lacina 
2006:276-277, Allen 1999:369). They have been noted for avoiding direct 
confrontation and rather employing techniques of coercion, involving 
economic, political or psychological acts of massacre, rape and mutilation, 
among others. This has been attributed to the advancement of technology 
in terms of weaponry and communication, which can cause extreme de-
struction (Kaldor 1999:8). Another distinctive trait of the contemporary 
civil wars is that they are heavily dependent on resources to sustain their 
activities; the looting has become more vital than the ideologies behind 
the war or battle victories because a lot of the war lords’ interests are di-
rected towards resources (Hironaka 2005:152). Claims about war lords de-
veloping business links and getting involved in export business with over-
seas companies have also been made (Allen 1999:371-72). In relation to 
the above, the scale and duration of civil wars of the contemporary times 
cannot be understood without reference to the international community, 
international processes and resources (Hironaka 2005:149, Kaldor 1999:2-
4). 
In contrast, old wars are labelled as those whose aims were clear, 
had articulate boundaries, had popular support, were handled in a legiti-
mate manner, and were based on well-defined beliefs and ideologies about 
society contrary to the new civil wars that lack motive (Kalyvas 2001:100, 
Voigt 1949:68-69). Nettleship & Givens (1975) note that in ancient times, 
pre-colonial states did not have or use ‘civilised’ armaments that could 
bring about large scale destruction to villages, nations or the whole world. 
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Kaldor (1999:9) notes that in previous eras the war economy was central-
ised, and that the new war economy is decentralised and sometimes re-
ferred to as ‘globalised’, since these new wars are dependent on external 
funding and support. Conventionally, civil wars were considered to be an 
issue to be handled by a sovereign state by law, a matter that has been 
undermined by the huge level of decisive external intervention in the af-
fairs of sovereign states by the international community (Brownlie 1963). 
However, Newman (2004:173-4) dismisses these claims arguing that all 
these so called ‘new war’ characteristics were clearly evident in many civil 
wars that occurred in previous eras before the end of the cold war and 
these notions are an exaggeration. 
Overall, these distinctions are very significant for the study, as 
identifying which types of civil war have occurred in Uganda is of essence 
to the study in examining the conditions that can explain the emergence 
and persistence of the armed conflict. This is so because sometimes during 
the course of a conflict new issues arise and the existing conditions are 
significant in mapping a conflict and understanding the dynamics in-
volved. And though civil war has been conceptualised with neatly demar-
cated boundaries from communal violence, this researcher now argue that 
sometimes an armed conflict may overlap such boundaries and get em-
bedded in or become an extension of smaller or narrower conflicts. This 
alters the politics and dynamics of a conflict, especially with the emergence 
of new actors or stakeholders that influence the form and direction of the 
conflict. 
 
3.3 Conceptualisation of communal violence 
According to Sundberg and colleagues, a non-state conflict involves: “the 
use of armed force between two organized armed groups, neither of which 
is the government of a state, which results in at least 25 battle-related 
deaths in a year” (Sundberg et al., 2012: 352-3). The deaths should be the 
result of combat between warring groups and not the result of only one 
group attacking the other, which would be termed one-sided violence. 
Non-state conflicts are grouped into two categories: formally and 
informally organised groups. The definitions have separate elements that 
clarify the criteria of coding a non-state conflict. According to Sundberg 
et al. (2012), organised groups consist of: 
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“(3.1) formally organized groups: any non-governmental group hav-
ing announced a name for their group and using armed force against 
another similarly formally organized group, or 
(3.2) informally organized groups: any group without an announced 
name, but who uses armed force against another similarly organized 
group, where the violent activity meets the following requirement:  
(3.2.a) there is a clear pattern of violent incidents that are connected 
an in which both groups use armed force against the other” 
(Sundberg et al. 2012:353, UCDP Non-State Conflict Codebook ver-
sion 2.4-2012:1-3)33. 
Furthermore, they note that these warring groups can only fight 
groups within their own level of organisational capacity. At organisational 
level 1 (formally organised groups), rebel factions or any group with an 
equivalent level of organisation usually with pronounced names or military 
factions, clashes between such groups is regarded as “fighting between 
highly organised rebel groups”. However, the UCDP non-state conflict 
code book (2012:1-3) also notes that these groups should target other 
groups within the same level of organisation. However, should they attack 
or target individuals or civilians not of the same level of organisation, such 
an attack will be referred to as one-sided violence.  
At organisational level 2 (informally organized groups) are groups 
affiliated to political factions and contestants which are usually not 
permanently created for combat but do on certain occasions use their 
structures for such commitments which usually results in to what is 
referred to as electoral violence. 
At organisational level 3 (informally organized groups) are groups 
along identity lines such as religion, ethnicity, clan, tribe, who are not 
permanently organised for combat but can organise themselves along 
these lines to engage in combat. This results in what is commonly referred 
to as communal violence (Sunderburg et al. 2012, UCDP Non-State 
Conflict Codebook version 2.4-2012:3). 
                                                 
33 The same conditions are maintained in other versions as well. See UCDP Non-
State Conflict Codebook version 2.5-2014 
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Communal violence has been mainly defined as a hostile interaction 
that involves communal groups. This occurs between identity groups or 
different sects within a community or nation with incompatible interests. 
These differences can be based on i.e., religion, ethnicity, tribe and race 
(Tadjoeddin 2004:02).  
Brosche and Elferversson (2012:33) define communal violence as 
violent confrontation between non-state actors arranged along a shared 
common identity.  This aspect of communal identity is derived from 
common historical background and cultural values. However, conflict 
literature also notes that what forms the basis for communal identity can 
vary over time and is dependent on the environment (Gurr 2000:4-20). 
 The Uppsala Non-State Conflict Codebook (2012:3) defines 
communal violence as a category of non-state conflict that involves armed 
confrontations between non-state groups that share a common identity 
such as i.e.., ethnicity, religion, race and tribe. Notable cases mentioned in 
the Codebook include Hindus and Muslims in India, Christians and 
Muslims in Indonesia and Nigeria, or pastoralist herders and settled 
farmers in the Sahel region and the north eastern parts of Uganda 
(Sundberg et al. 2012:351).  
In relation to non-state violence between informally organized 
groups, some communal violence forms is of this type. In this case, arms 
used are either manufactured or home-made and result in battle-related 
deaths between the warring groups. Furthermore, the UCDP Codebook 
(2012:2-3-4) points out that these groups are not always ready for battle, 
but at specific times can become united along communal lines, and 
prepare themselves to take part in armed combat. This is different from a 
formally organized group which involves non-state groups with 
recognized names, who are already armed and prepared to fight.  
To code the beginning of a period of communal violence, the start 
date is taken as the first year in which battle-related deaths reach the 
number 25. This start date applies even to those conflicts that have been 
active for a while.  The end of the conflict is coded when lethal violence 
has not taken place for a year (UCDP Non-State Conflict Codebook 
2012:5). For violence or warfare to be coded as non-state violence (which 
includes communal violence) it is generally agreed that the state or 
government and the national army should not be involved at any level, nor 
be the main target (Sundberg et al. 2012:353, Small and Singer, 1982:216-
217, Sarkees and Schafer 2000:217). All these studies agree that the groups 
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should have no alignment with state institutions, whether armed or not. 
As suggested earlier, when referring to the cases of Somalia and Sudan, 
this study proposes to question such an assumption of state non-
involvement, despite this being a widely agreed upon characteristic of 
communal violence. 
Sundberg et al. (2012:353) note that the level of organisation of 
communal violence is low and informal compared to civil war and in cases 
where they may be highly coordinated, they usually lack a formal military 
group. Furthermore, some scholars note that communal violence has a 
tendency of being short-lived or characterised by a few days of intense 
clashes, which results into significantly less fatalities, apart from a few 
exceptional cases that have been more lethal (Petterson 2010:190-191, 
Brosche and Elfversson 2012:43, Sundberg et al. 2012:353). Communal 
violence do not usually spread across the whole country but occurs in a 
more localized environment and are ‘episodic in nature’ However, some 
cases of communal violence have been protracted and spanned decades 
such as in Nigeria, India and Sudan (Sundberg et al. 2012:351). 
 
Figure 3.1: Global Active Communal Violence from 1989 to 2010 
 
    
Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Non-state conflict Dataset V.2.3-2011 
In addition to the above, The UCDP non-State conflict dataset (2011) 
reveals that in the year 2000, most communal violence took place in 
Africa. Out of the 27 communal violence conflicts in the year 2000 (in 
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Table 3.1), seven were situated in Uganda, five in Ethiopia and four in 
Nigeria. The data set also reveals that, between 1989 and 2010, the 
countries most affected by communal violence were Somalia, Nigeria, 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya and Uganda.  
Regional trends, as shown in Figure 3.2, also illustrate that the highest 
number of active communal violence conflicts, from 1989 to 2010, were 
in Africa. Although the communal violence phenomenon is not confined 
to Africa, of the 316 conflict years coded in the UCDP non-state conflict 
dataset, the majority of non-state conflicts (275) were situated in Africa, 
32 were in in Asia, 4 in Europe and America and 1 in the Middle East34. 
With regard to long-duration conflicts that recur for more than one year, 
193 were recorded in Africa, 19 in Asia, 4 in America, 3 in Europe and 1 
in the Middle East (UCDP, 2011). 
Figure 3.2: Active communal violence by year and region, from 1989 to 2010 
 
 
Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Non-state conflict Dataset V.2.3-2011 
 
As will be explained below, communal violence has been depicted as 
a significantly different intra-state warfare category than civil war. It differs 
at the level of the parties involved, at the level of organisation and 
                                                 
34 A conflict year is coded every time a communal clash results in a minimum of 
25 fatalities (UCDP, 2011). 
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coordination, with regard to the space within which it occurs, in how long 
it lasts and in death threshold. This has been highlighted as significant for 
locating the typology of one conflict in relation to another.  
However, the criterion used in aiding the conceptualisation of 
communal violence does not tackle the complexities and dynamics that 
emerge during the course of this type of violent conflict. The 
distinguishing factors are too simplistic because some communal conflicts 
are transformed into narrower or wider conflicts. Some communal 
violence conflicts have continued to be defined as such even though new 
actors emerged that alter the politics and dynamics of these conflicts 
contributing to their protraction. This study intends to examine conditions 
under which such conflicts change form and direction with the aim to 
make a contribution to the debate on the conceptualisation of communal 
violence.  
3.4 What are communal groups? 
In the contemporary world, there are very few states comprising a mono- 
or broad-based ethnic administrative community, which can be labelled as 
‘nation states’, with the people simply identifying with one another as a 
nation and with the reigning government as theirs (Etzioni 1992). This is 
because of the existence of multiple communities within a state, 
possessing different cultural values and norms. Within these communities 
are histories of reciprocal antagonism towards one another and 
profoundly rooted differences evident in the dialect, beliefs and physical 
appearance (Connor 1994). These partially explain why conflict is not a 
new phenomenon among communities within self-labelled ‘nation’ states. 
According to Ted Gurr, communal groups are “cultural or religious 
identity groups that do not have recognized states or institutionalized 
political status” (Gurr 1993:161). He further notes that they share a 
common identity which is important to them and the people they relate 
with. In the light of this, Stewart (2000:246) defines them as collections of 
people who for various reasons and similar interests identify with each 
other against other groups. The group’s organisation may be informal but 
the group has self-defined interests and within it a level of agreement 
about the roles and activities of its members.  
Some observers, such as Geertz (1963) and Stack (1986), depict 
communal groups as ancient social entities founded on hereditary, 
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cultural, linguistic and religious principles. However, some scholars argue 
that group identities are not constant; they are situational and subject to 
change (Gurr 1993:162, Stewart 2000:255). To add to that, Gurr argues 
that communal identities when faced with external challenges become 
more significant, but weaken when the utility of amalgamation into larger 
communities increases (Gurr, 1993:162), implying that the homogeneity 
or heterogeneity of groups has implications for their internal cohesion. 
However, identities that are overlooked and weaken can only be revived 
by new leadership sensitive to pressures to their identity and status (Gurr 
1993:162-3). 
Although communal violence is an under-researched area, with the 
exception of South Asia where it has been the most dominant and 
widespread form of social violence since the 1990s, it is not a new 
phenomenon and is attributed to hundreds of fatalities (Varshney et al. 
2004, Sundberg et al. 2012:351). Understanding the nature of groups 
involved in communal violence is significant for the study and the 
following sections will therefore explore the classical and contemporary 
debate surrounding the causes of communal violence, and its impact on 
communities and actors involved. 
 
Table 3.1: Summary of features of civil war and communal violence 
Features Civil war Communal violence 
Parties Government of a state 
vs. non-state actors 
Non-state actors vs non-state 
actors i.e., communal groups 
Fatality 25 battle-related deaths 
in a year 




Government, Territory No  issue of incompatibility 
Level of 
organization 
High level of 
organisation 
Formally organised groups 
(organisational level 1). Highly 
organised, i.e., rebel faction  
Informally organised groups 
(organizational levels 2 and 3). 
Low level of organization, i.e., 
communal groups, political 
contestants or factions 
Source: Gleditsch et al. (2002), UCDP Non-State Conflict Codebook version 2.4-2012 
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In conclusion, all these different criteria are used for coding and 
categorising armed conflicts into types of conflict. From a quantitative 
point of view, different criteria are used by different datasets. However, it 
is important to note that this study focuses on UCDP definitions and 
measurements. The UCDP data programme, besides raising the need to 
review the relationship between communal violence and other conflict 
categories, makes available datasets for both group to-group violence and 
for civil wars. Given the study objective of understanding the interlinkages 
between these twodistinct categories of violent conflict, the UCDP is an 
important one for this study. Even so, such definitions and measurements 
do little to reveal the complexities and changing dynamics and 
interconnections between civil war and communal violence, taking the 
example of Uganda.  The qualitative interpretative approach adopted is 
aimed at examining the dynamics involved over time, and draws on local 
understandings of what a civil war is and what communal violence is, and 
how these evolve and inter-connect. The next section reviews theories of 
the causes of these violent conflicts and the actors involved. This will 
contribute to opening up a discussion on the complex interconnections 
between these conflict categories.   
3.5 Conceptual strands in explaining causes of violent 
conflict 
The theories on the causes of violent conflict are grounded in specific 
ontology and epistemological traditions (Demmers 2012:15-17). A proper 
understanding of these traditions underpinning the theories enables the 
researchers to position the relevant theories they are using, as shown in 
Table 3.2.  
There is a divide in social science research with regard to 
explaining what motivates human action: agency or structure. The agency-
based theories (individualism) attribute the source of violent conflict to an 
individual level emerging as an outcome of ‘action and interaction of 
individuals’ (Elster 1989:13, Hollis 1994), while structure-based theories 
(structuralism) trace the causes of violent conflict to the way the society is 
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Table 3.2: Theorising causes of violent conflict 
Ontology/ 
Epistemology 






   Political economy 
• Contradictions in the organisation of the 




 Constructivism: Identity based explainations  
 1. Ethno-symbolism/Culturalism: Mass driven 
x Ethnic conflict is socially meaningful 
 
2. Elite theory/Instrumentalism: Elite driven 
Ethnic conflict is politically functional 
Source: Demmers (2012:52, 76). 
 
This highlights the significance of assessing the power of structures 
and their influence on human action, in line with the interpretative 
approach that the study has adopted. These specific notions, which centre 
on the structure-based traditions of explaining violent conflict, are 
elaborated upon in the sections below. These sections also review schools 
of thought from political economy and identity-related theories of violent 
conflict, which the study mainly focuses on during the analysis of the 
research results. Specific theories selected are those most suited to to be 
used in the analysis of the multi-ethnic features and conflicts characterising 
Ugandan society and reflecting the recent history of the country (Nzita, 
1995).   
3.5.1 Political economy: Structure-based approaches  
Structure-based approaches are basically about the political economy of 
violent conflict. It focuses on the interconnectedness between organisa-
tion of modern state system, global capitalism, governance and local, con-
temporary violent conflict (Demmers 2012:54-55). This approach high-
lights the issues surrounding the state-making paradox, effects of forces 
such as neo-liberalism, global governance, and how they have contributed 
to conditions that have brought about violent conflict in countries such as 
Uganda.  
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Conflict literature suggests that – historically - the causes of civil war 
were social, economic and political and arose in a context within which 
violence occurred. Each phase had its own features and specific dominant 
forces that shaped the specific environment within which the conflicts oc-
curred and changed. Specific historical phases involve changes in the na-
ture of the conflicts in each phase, and its causes and extent. From phase 
to phase of the conflict, some causal dynamics continued, persisting into 
the next phases, while other causal factors lost their significance over time 
(Hironaka 2005:01, Bujra 2002:28). 
Some conflict scholars claim that the ‘crisis’ of state formation and 
nation making is the source of most contemporary violent conflicts in the 
developing world (Demmers 2012:64, Ayoob 2007). According to Van 
Goor et al. (1996:1-28), the colonial experience and decolonisation process 
had serious implications for the domestic politics in many African states, 
characterised by instability and armed struggle throughout into the 21st 
century. Though some countries realised a peaceful power transfer, 
countries such as Algeria (1954-62), Angola (1961-74), Guinea Bissau 
(1962-74), Mozambique (1964-75), Zimbabwe (1965-80) and Namibia 
(1966-90) attained their independence through armed struggle (Francis, 
2006:72). Fearon and Laitin (2003:88) argue that decolonisation gave birth 
to weak states with inefficient administrative systems and economies 
lacking the resources and the organisational capacity to ensure smooth 
operation of the government and the civil service sector, hence bringing 
about instability.  
The argument of the state-making paradox notes that the 
expectations of post-colonial states were unrealistic since the developed 
states had taken centuries of long bloody wars to establish themselves 
(Ayoob, 2007). While referring to Mohammed Ayoob’s work, Jelle 
Demmers notes that: 
“The imaginary of the socially cohesive, political responsive and ad-
ministratively effective nation-state of the developed world became 
the standard ideal type. Post-colonial countries who failed were at 
risk of international ridicule and permanent peripherality within the 
system of states. Their states were labelled as ‘failed’, ‘fragile’ or ‘col-
lapsed’” (Demmers 2012:65). 
The desire for a western set of standards definitely aggravated the crises 
in many post-colonial states, as noted above. 
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Furthermore, the Cold War politics and intervention characterised by 
ideological conflict and competition were instrumental in laying the 
various platforms that served the interests of the two blocs and later 
continued to undermine the stability of the continent. According to some 
scholars, the wars of liberation were understood as communist/socialist 
against the capitalist west. These were ‘proxy wars’ in the sense that they 
attracted allies concerned with powerful ideological discourses. Once a 
local violent conflict was viewed through the logic of the Cold War, there 
was immediate polarization by these super powers.  
As a result of this kind of interpretation, political, military and 
economic support was rendered to anti-colonial struggles, newly 
independent states and various factions within a state (Francis 2006:72, 
Hironaka 2005:104-128, Gaddis 1997, George and Smoke 1974). These 
authors further note that even after their independence some countries 
and factions continued to receive support from these blocs based on the 
ideologies with which they were aligned. Such cases of socialist alignment 
were noticeable in Angola (MPLA Government), Mozambique 
(FRELIMO), Guinea Bissau (PAIGC) and Algeria (FLN), which partially 
explains why the armed conflict in these countries dragged on for decades 
into the twenty first century; after all, both the insurgents and the state 
received support (Francis 2006:72, Hironaka 2005:104-124). This political 
and military support cultivated autocratic leaders who owed their loyalty 
and existence to the two blocs. However, after the end of the Cold War, 
puppet regimes collapsed and conflicts that had been ‘contained’ by the 
proxy war detonated into violent conflict with some dragging on into the 
twenty first century (Wallensteen and Axell 1994:334-337, Wallensteen 
and Sollenberg 1999:593, Francis 2006:74, Van de Goor et al. 1996:1, 
Fearon and Laitin 2003:77, Hironaka 2005:104-149).  
Conflict literature suggests that, after the end of the Cold War, the 
scene of political conflict shifted and transnational ideologies such as 
democracy and capitalism took over at a rate that was unanticipated in the 
early 1990s ( Hironaka 2005:126-127). These rapid changes had serious 
implications for the political stability of various states, and often led to 
violent conflict (Adejumobi, 2001:149). The rapid transformation from 
local to global destabilised the traditional social, economic and political 
structures of the third world societies, using the imposition of neo-liberal 
economic policies – the development paradigms known as ‘Structural 
Adjustment Programmes’ - which had been adopted and used by western 
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economies and the IMF/WB for many decades  in third world countries. 
The doctrine of neo-liberal globalisation that swept the world in the 1980s, 
and has since become hegemonic, tends to encourage new and durable 
forms of division, inequality and instability. These policies have produced 
unexpected and at times unwanted outcomes, including violent conflict. 
They have deepened poverty, increased economic inequality and have 
exacerbated the division of the world into a ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ i.e., 
‘metropolitan’ and ‘borderland’ (Colletta and Cullen 2000:88, Newbury 
1988, Castells 1996 and 1998, Demmers 2012:66).  
They were instrumental in bringing about state collapse in countries 
such as Sierra Leone, Liberia, the DRC, Somalia and Côte d’Ivoire. The 
weakened economies failed to respond to the basic, crucial duties of a state 
and maintain institutions that would preserve law and order and promote 
economic development. This sparked off uprisings against the 
government in many African states that had adopted the Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (Ali and Mathews 1999, Francis 2001). The 
instability in countries such as Angola, Algeria, Burundi, Congo-
Brazzaville, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Somalia, 
Rwanda, Sudan, the Central African Republic, Zaire and Uganda was – at 
least in part – the result of these policies (Allen 1999:368). 
The implications highlighted here are that neo-liberalism led to an 
erosion of state structures worldwide, undermining the political 
(centralized modern state structures) and economic (shifted from the state 
to the market) decision-making powers of these developing countries. 
Consequently, the inability of states to impose rules and policies to 
regulate their markets has posed problems for independent political 
legitimacy and accountability. This has left the cultural field as the main 
battleground and fostered the emergence of identity-based politics, 
exclusionary discourses for political constituency building (Castell 1996, 
Cox 1995) and network wars (Duffield 1999, Keen 1998). This levies the 
motion of neo-liberalism to bringing about ethnic conflicts (Appadurai 
2006, Kaldor 1999). 
Furthermore, besides contributing to the emergence of identity 
politics, neo-liberalism has also triggered a new form of resource 
competition referred to as ‘War economies’ (Keen 1998). The illegal trade 
in i.e.., arms, drugs, diamonds, oil and timber, perpetuated by war lords, 
local business men, global network producers and corporations, has been 
referred to as ‘network wars’. This has also been linked to globalisation 
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and liberalisation, which have fostered the development of multiple 
centres of authority other than the state (Duffield 1999, Keen 1998). The 
structural violence brought about by the way society is connected to global 
systems is organised in several ways and linked to conditions that lay 
ground for direct violence. It seems that structure-based approaches are 
ontologically grounded in a more interpretative epistemological stance 
(Demmers 2012:73-76).  
3.5.2 Identity and violent conflict 
Most countries in Africa are multi-ethnic societies and social identity is a 
significant factor that has shaped the politics of developing countries. 
Social identity is about “categorical characteristics – such as nationality, 
gender, religion, and ethnicity – that locate people in social space” 
(Demmers 2012:21). Identity factors have been attributed to bringing 
about violent conflict and some of the theories looking into ideas about 
the connection between identity groups and violent conflict draw their 
arguments from Primordialism and constructivism views.  
 According to Fearon and Laitin (2000:848) primordialists have 
belief in the naturalness of social identities such as gender, race, ethnicity 
and religion among others. In relation to ethnic conflicts, ethnicity has 
been regarded as a natural, hereditary communal bond. The primordialist 
approach to violent conflict rests on the premise that groups are essentially 
different, so ethnicity breeds violence and identities are inherently 
conflictual (Demmers 2012:25).  And since this approach focuses on 
predetermined human action, it has been highlighted as the positivist 
approach to understanding causes of violent conflict (Demmers 2012:35). 
This has been greatly rejected by some scholars (King 2004:435, Brubaker 
and Cooper 2000), in favour of the constructivism theory. 
Unlike the primordialists, constructivists argue that ethnicity is not 
inborn, hence fixed, and should be understood as dynamic and 
changeable. They further claim that ethnic groups are constructed from 
social interaction and processes of boundary drawing; hence, they are 
contextual (Smith 1996, Baumann 1999, Barth 1998, Eriksen 1993). There 
are two explanatory approaches to ethnicity and violent conflict under 
constructivism, namely: the ethno-symbolism/culturalism approach and 
the instrumentalist or rational action approach.  
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The culturalism/ethno-symbolism approach stresses the significance 
of emotional power of ethnic attachments and the depth of their historical 
meanings, which is at the core of culture-oriented approaches relating 
ethnicity and violent conflict. In this strand of thinking, it is argued that 
ethnicity identities are socially meaningful, hence significant on their own 
terms, and that this naturally draws people to their ethnic group and 
culture. Groups, by drawing on these deep ethno-symbolic resources, in 
turn have high mobilization capacity (Kaufmann 2006:47, Smith 
1996:446-7, Smith 1986:13).  
In contrast, the instrumentalist/rational action approach argues that 
ethnic identities are politically functional and they are mainly used as 
political purposes to acquire power by manipulative elites. This theory 
places emphasis on the role of violence and how violence is strategically 
instigated to create or affirm boundaries between groups of people. This 
is said to be masterminded by predatory elites that instigate collective fears 
and aggressive mass attitudes ( Demmers 2012:29).  
This approach further argues that elites use ethnic violence to build 
support for themselves, which has the effect of constructing more 
antagonistic identities, which favours more violence. Some of the scholars 
note that group making here is effectively done because people are afraid 
of violence. As soon as people are targeted because of their alleged 
identity, they start to act and feel collectively (Fearon and Laitin 2000:853, 
Gagnon 1997:138). 
As discussed above, ontologically the instrumentalist theory is an 
individualist rational actor approach. The individual agent in pursuit of his 
or her strategic interests is the source of conflict. Ethnic identity is 
essentially viewed as influential, as a means to rally a support base, or as a 
cover up of strategic private interests. In contrast, ethno-symbolism and 
culturalism place the actor as “the sum of his roles in the normative 
structure of society” (Demmers 2012:34-36). All in all, these social 
constructivist theories argue that violent conflict is usually a political 
strategy to make and maintain group boundaries which are essentially 
political purposes and are socially significant. 
With that in mind, other theories of violent conflict that the re-
searcher would like to briefly highlight are the grievance and greed thesis, 
which have a lot of debates on the causes of contemporary violent con-
flicts.  
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According to Frances Stewart, what motivates groups to engage in 
violent interaction are horizontal inequalities. As she aptly notes: 
“inequalities among groups in political, economic and social dimensions 
provide the basis for inter-group animosity” (Stewart 2000:245). Using this 
unequality as a point of departure, various studies have been undertaken 
to explain violent conflict (Stewart 2000, 2002, 2008, Cederman et al. 
2013). Consequently results have shown that uneven distribution of 
resources, and services and opportunities fuels processes that lead to 
violent confrontations. 
However, proponents of the motive-oriented ‘greed thesis’ argue that 
opportunistic/materialistic motives driven by greed are a key issue for the 
instigation of violence in Africa (Collier and Hoeffler 2004:589). 
Proponents of the greed theory have disregarded the role of grievances 
emerging from inequality as a key factor in bringing about civil war (Collier 
and Hoeffler 2004, Collier and Hoeffler 1998). This notion has been 
related to natural resource control by the state or rebels in various studies 
(Ross 2004, Dunning 2005, Franke 2007, Duffield 2001:14).  
The argument is based on the claim that the presence of abundant 
natural resources in a country increases the risk of war, and combatants in 
civil war are driven by the desire to do better for themselves. Natural 
resources can be a looting target for rebel groups, and can also be used by 
the state to finance its operations. Some of the civil wars linked to natural 
resources between 1990 and 2000 were in countries such as Angola (1975-
2002), the Congolese Republic or Congo Brazzaville (1997), the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (1996-99), Liberia (1989-96), Sierra Leone 
(1991-2000) and Sudan (1983) (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004:565, Ross 
2004a: 337, Ross 2004b:48). However, Addison et al. (2002) argue that 
both greed and grievances as a motivation for conflict are inseparably 
intertwined in fuelling it.  
There are scholars who claim that these structure-based traditions of 
explaining violent conflict independently are not statisfactory in shedding 
light on the causes of violent conflict (Jabri 1996:01). Furthermore, it is 
noted that: 
“… structuralist approaches are seen as too static. They leave out a 
theory of individual action, and fail to explain how inherent contra-
dictions eventurally transform in to actual violence” (Demmers 
2012:119).  
509974-L-bw-isimon
Processed on: 1-5-2017 PDF page: 83
 Conceptualisation of Violent Conflicts 67 
They claim that structure and agency traditions complement each other, 
they have a dialectical relationship to one another in explaining violent 
conflict, and as they stand opposed to the others, they are inadequate 
(Giddens 1984, Demmers 2012:120). With regard to the individualist ap-
proach, it is accused of being:  
“…mono-causal, and as too objective regarding human rationality. It 
fails to examine the origins of people’s desires and beliefs and does 
not explain how social sturctures condition actors to choose war” 
(Demmers 2012:119).  
Demmers further suggests that a researcher can take up these ideas, ac-
knowledging their underlying differences in perceptions, and use them in 
“finding your own voice” (Demmers 2012:142). 
Nonetheless, the theories discussed above, mainly the political 
economy and Constructivist identity based theories on the causes of 
violent conflict, will be used to examine the causes of the civil war and 
communal violence in Uganda. These theories not only provide lenses 
with which to look at these conflicts, but also help in understanding 
conflict development, as mapping the causal factors can highlight the 
interest in the actors involved and their role in conflict development. This 
brings us to the section that elaborates more on the actors in violent 
conflicts. 
3.6 Theoretical strands on actors in violent conflicts 
The nature of actors in violent conflicts plays a significant part in the 
politics of classifications. And as conflicts emerge and evolve, various 
actors get drawn into these conflicts for various reasons. According to Ho-
won Jeong, these actors have goals, motives, interests and values; tangible 
goals may include territorial, political and economic advantages, 
whereasless tangible ones include prestige, honor and respect (2008:24-
26). Whatever their goals may be, these actors play a significant role in 
how conflicts come about and get protracted. There are various theories 
about the nature of actors involved in violent conflicts. And some of the 
ones highlighted below are drawn from a collection of theories on the 
causes of violent conflict. 
According to Mail (1992), parties to a conflict always have 
incompatible interests and objectives in a conflict. Primary parties have 
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been defined by their objectives/interests, especially the non-state parties. 
Conflict literature notes that the disadvantaged groups or formerly 
privileged groups in a country usually led rebellions against the 
government for the injustice inflicted upon them (Stewart 2002, Cederman 
and Girardin 2007, Cederman et al. 2013). There are different categories 
of those who are relatively advantaged or disadvantaged, and can easily 
indulge in violent conflict. Stewart (2002:3) quotes them as the “backward 
groups in backward regions, advanced groups in backward regions, 
backward groups in advanced regions, and advanced groups in advanced 
regions”. 
In addition to the above, Cederman and Girardin (2007:176,178) use 
a classification to highlight this issue when they refer to the privileged as 
the “Ethnic Group in Power’ (EGIP) and the marginalised as the 
‘Marginalized Ethnic Groups’ (MEG). The same is noted by Cederman et 
al. (2013:58), who refer to them as “included or incumbent” groups and 
“excluded or marginalised” ethnic groups with the latter being the ethnic 
groups that are systematically excluded from power structures, while the 
former represent the privileged ethnic groups with unlimited access to 
state opportunities and resources and full representation in government 
decision making organs. Since the excluded groups experience what 
Cederman et al. (2013:59) refer to as ‘alien rule’ from ‘foreign’ ethnic 
groups, the aggrieved ethnic groups tend to protest through violent means, 
thus resulting in an ethno-nationalist civil war.  
Stewart 2008 and Cederman et al. (2013:117) also point out that both 
disadvantaged (poorer) and advanced groups are more often involved in 
violent conflict compared to groups closer to the country’s average. This 
is because the advanced struggle to retain their status quo while the poor 
struggle to overturn the injustice inflicted upon them.  
In relation to the ‘included’ groups, Williams (2003:150) notes that 
wars are also waged by ‘included’ groups who have full access to state 
resources but are still dissatisfied due to the state’s inability to fulfil their 
policy preferences, or fear to lose their privileged positions to the 
unprivileged. So, the privileged indulge in state terrorism and sponsor 
violence to suppress opposition groups, especially if the privileged group 
is a minority (Stewart 2000:248-50 and 2008:20). This has occurred in 
countries where an ethnic minority is in power, undermining the majority, 
and vice versa (Peterson 2002:51-52), or in situations where a previously 
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privileged group has lost power to another group (Rothchild 1981:217, 
Gellner 1983:1, Cederman et al. 2013:205-7). 
The characteristics of a rebel group (disadvantaged or formerly 
privileged) matter because some scholars argue that larger, disadvantaged 
groups are more likely to pressurise the government to come up with 
acceptable offers for their demands or otherwise resort to violence and 
large groups are known for fighting longer wars (Cederman et al. 2013, 
Cederman and Gleditsch 2009:493). However, in most cases, governments 
are reluctant to negotiate with rebel groups (Harbom et al. 2006:622, 
DeRouen et al. 2010:334).  
Smaller, but well-organised groups can also put up a good fight but 
usually engage in brief conflicts and are much more likely to yield to 
concessions by the government much faster than larger groups. These 
rebel groups usually stop fighting if given a ‘legally accepted political wing’, 
which they often view as a channel for better future negotiations ( 
Cederman and Gleditsch 2009:493). Apart from the size of the excluded 
group, history also matters, especially history related to the number of 
previous conflicts. This is said to have a positive influence on conflict risk, 
as history can influence the direction of present events, especially if the 
involved parties are strongly linked to it (Cederman et al. 2013:205). 
Political elites, above all, have been highlighted as the most significant 
actors in relation to disadvantaged/excluded groups; their actions are 
instrumental in manipulating or highlighting grievances and fostering 
group identity, thus enabling effective mobilisation against the ‘other’ 
group (Stewart 2000, Gurr 1993, Cederman et al. 2013). Frances Stewart 
also further emphasizes that in these groups there are leaders and 
followers, i.e., those who initiate conflict, construct group identity and 
mobilise members, and those who actually engage in the physical fight, 
though there could be intersections between them (Stewart 2000:246). 
Some scholars who attribute group militancy to group inequality due to 
limited peace or economic opportunities also note that there are two 
categories of participants: the rich and poor, the perpetrators and looters. 
The indirect participants are usually the ‘rich’ who fuel the tensions by 
funding the direct participants, the ‘poor’.  This suggests that even within 
the disadvantaged groups there are people with different roles (Mitra and 
Ray 2010:721, Esteban and Ray 1994:849). 
Apart from the above, civilians in the local territory are actors as they 
can support the rebels if the conflict is popular locally, which would feed 
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the conflict especially if they regard themselves as disadvantaged and view 
the conflict as a solution to their deprived situation. However, Murshed 
(2002:392) notes that these civilians are usually targeted by rebels and 
governments as well, especially those in rebel areas who are targeted and 
terrorised by governments with intentions of weakening rebel armies. 
To be added to the picture are warlords and militia groups; they 
remain major actors in aggravating civil wars in many war-torn countries. 
According to Hills (1997:36), warlords control certain territories and the 
people within those territories. They are present in conflicts and strive to 
ensure the continuation of volatile situations in a state or region for 
exploitative interests, using personal militias. These characters flourish and 
operate in a state of chaos rife with corruption, inefficiency and 
opportunistic looting, by seizing resource-endowed regions possessing 
diamond, gold, copper and timber and by levying taxes in the territories 
they control (Hironaka 2005: 152). Collier and Hoeffler (2004:589) 
attribute it to ‘greed’ as an opportunistic factor. Furthermore, globalisation 
has facilitated and opened up opportunities for trans-border legal and 
illegal trade between warlords, national elites, multinational corporations, 
mineral industries, weapon traders and drug dealers (Francis 2001, Allen 
1999:371, Keen 1998, Reno 1993) in countries such as Sierra Leone, 
Liberia and the DRC. This has perpetuated civil wars in many African 
states. 
Militia groups have also been noted for their role in drawing out 
violent conflict. According to Hill (1997:40), ‘militias’ is a term “applied 
to recognisably armed mobile groups operating either under the umbrella 
of a factional leader, clan or ethnic group, or on their own after the break–
up of previously recognised forces”. Militias operate in a fragile state and 
their existence is largely attributed to waning state power and its 
institutions that cannot avail security to the communities and their 
property (Salih and Harir 1994:188, Mazrui 1986:11-18, Hills 1997:36). 
There are three types of militias’ categories: (i) the personal militias, who 
operate under the command of an ideological leader or warlord, clan or 
ethnic group: (ii) the group militias, who watch out for the interests of 
their members or communities; and (iii) The freelance militias, who loot 
and bring about instability, with opportunistic interests. Though militias 
are not directly defined in relation to warlords, they operate and multiply 
in most conflict-ridden situations. Warlords such as Charles Taylor in 
Liberia and General Aideed in Somalia were some of the people noted for 
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their role in perpetuating violent conflict, using private militias (Hills 
1997:40-41). 
According to Ali and Mathews (1999:217), Liberia and Sudan 
officially legalised the existence of militias. In Sudan, militias were granted 
legal status to fight alongside the army under the Popular Defence Act of 
1989 (Salih and Harir 1994:186-202). Militia groups have been very 
instrumental in perpetuating civil war and communal conflicts in Burundi, 
Sudan, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia and Sierra Leone, to mention but a few 
(Hills 1997:39).  
At an international level, conventionally, intra-state conflict was a 
phenomenon handled by a sovereign state by law.  But this has been 
undermined by the huge level of decisive intervention in the affairs of 
independent states by the international community (Brownlie 1963). Their 
interventions have led to the infiltration of the state structures and 
institutions from below and above. This has resulted in suppression and 
erosion of state autonomy, which has serious implications, and 
exacerbated violent conflict in these states. According to Hironaka 
(2005:126-149) and Kaldor (1999:2-4), contemporary local conflicts 
cannot be understood without reference to international and regional 
intervention. The international presence is evident through international 
reporters, international organisations such as the United Nations, non-
governmental organisations such as the Red Cross, continental 
organisations such as the African Union (AU) and regional organisations 
such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Inter-
Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (Omeje 2008:81-85).  
Diplomatic peace missions from the United Nations have been 
launched in war-torn countries such as Somalia (Adam 1999:169) and 
Sierra Leone (Gberie 2005) and regional organisations in Africa have 
intervened in civil wars in Liberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Somalia 
and Uganda (Omeje 2008:81-85). During these interventions, peace 
process agreements, comprehensive and partial agreements, in which 
parties to the conflict agree to hold negotiations covering all issues or just 
a few issues surrounding their incompatibility, have been pursued 
(Harbom et al. 2006:622). These peace accords usually contain military, 
political, territorial, and judicial implementation provisions and their 
content determines the success or failure of the whole intervention 
(DeRouen et al. 2010:334).  
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3.7 Conclusion 
Though conflict scholars have tried to propose ‘flexible’ definitions to 
capture what a civil war and communal violence is, the researcher argues 
that there are some contextual limitations to their acclaimed flexibility. 
Though the quantitative aspects of these definitions are significant for 
mapping conflict intensity and the typology, they are of little use in reveal-
ing the dynamic nature of some of these intra-state conflict categories. 
This study hopes to shed some light on this matter.  
The theories of the causes of and actors in violent conflicts dis-
cussed above offer insights on how the complex dynamics and interlink-
ages between these violent conflicts can be examined. These theories try 
to offer a rationale for the birth of these conflicts and their continuation. 
The theoretical strands highlighted above will be taken into consideration 
in the research data analysis in this study, to assess whether they are rele-
vant in explaining the violent conflicts in north and north eastern Uganda. 
The following chapters will contextualise the violent conflicts in these re-
gions. 
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This Chapter presents the historical background and field findings which 
highlight a conflict with deep historical connection to the political 
upheavals that engulfed Uganda since its independence. The Chapter 
covers the colonial era, the post-independence era, and the rise of the 
NRA government and the emergence of rebel factions that later all levelled 
the ground for the establishment of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a 
rebel group led by Joseph Kony which fought the Government of Uganda 
for over two decades. Contextualising the civil war is significant as it 
highlights issues that will be used to establish the interconnections with 
the communal violence in the north eastern region. 
4.2 The Colonial era  
Many participants could not explain their realities without relating to the 
history of the northern region, including that of the colonial era. 
According to field findings, the British colonial administrative policies are 
still to blame for the fragmentation of society in Uganda, and the political 
instability that later emerged across the country during the post-
independence era. As a former LRA rebel commander stated: 
“The war started a long time ago. If you want to get the real picture of the history 
of this Conflict, you will have to refer back to the colonial era. War started a long 
time ago” (Anonymous Former LRA Commander, Bungatira, Gulu 
District, 25/01/2015). 
To some of the participants, the tensions between northern and southern 
Uganda were initiated when they were divided into economic zones, and 
the colonial policies favoured the development of the southern region. 
People from the south and centre were selected to work in industries, 
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involved in cash crop growing, and a majority of them were employed in 
the civil service or in other white collar jobs. The northern region, 
however, was treated as a labour reserve and those that were hailed from 
the region were employed mainly in the uniformed or security services 
(Mazrui 1975, Doom and Vlassenroot: 1999:7-8). 
“The Acholi were mainly soldiers, perhaps because they thought they 
were strong and like fighting, not fighting as such, but because of their 
physical appearances as strong men” (Mrs. Christine Langol, Former 
Gusco Reception Centre Administrator, 2/12/2014). 
During the colonial era, the British massively recruited them for policing 
and army jobs. They were considered strong and meant for tough jobs, 
and according to some participants’ claim that was the reason the majority 
of the soldiers recruited in the King’s African Rifles to engage in World 
War II combat were from the northern and eastern parts of the country. 
This is reaffirmed by Omara Otunnu in his 1987 publications “Politics and 
the Military in Uganda in 1890-1985”, when he notes that: 
“…the African sector of the Army was not very representative of the 
ethnic composition of the country as a whole. The largest contingent 
was recruited from the north, especially from the people of Acholi… 
By 1914, Acholi had become the main recruiting ground for the KAR 
(King’s Africa Rifles), a pattern which was continued in the post-co-
lonial period (Omara Otunnu, cited in Gersony 1997:6). 
And when asked what the implication of this strategy was, a former LRA 
rebel commander said that it was the origin of conflict among the people 
of Uganda- 
“By giving that attitude to the people, you know people begin feeling…oh we are 
strong. That is where the war started from. Most of the people recruited in the army 
were from the north and east” (Anonymous Former LRA Commander, 
Bungatira, Gulu District, 25/01/2015). 
This may imply that it created a mentality of superiority over other ethnic 
tribes in the country. One respondent was very proud in saying: 
“Yes, most of the Acholi of those days were energetic, you would just see a lot of 
energy. They were tall and they had this rough kind of nature. That is why the 
Acholi are called ‘Kodi pa lyeci’, which means “seeds of elephants”, “descendants 
of elephants”. That is why our emblem or totem is an elephant, you see the Lango 
have rhinos, but for the Acholi it is the ‘Lyeci’, and that is why you always see that 
in the district council hall there is this big elephant. And then you go to places like 
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big hotels, like Bomah in the Acholi sub-region, and you will see elephants statues. 
That is our emblem, that is our tribe!” (Solomon Okongo Oola, 8/12/2014, 
Gulu District). 
As a proud son of a father who participated in the Second World War, 
Oola was keen to point out that, as a show of gratitude for their hard work 
in the World War II, the colonialists built Pece Stadium for the people of 
Acholi.  
However, these policies had repercussions as they brought about 
economic discrepancy between the North and the South of the country, 
with the South becoming relatively more developed. This is because the 
Southerners later dominated the civil service and generated more elites 
than other ethnic groups, while the Acholi and other northern and eastern 
tribes dominated the army; this brought antagonistic sentiments between 
the South and the North, as the Baganda, who are Southerners, were used 
as colonial agents in the North and other parts of the country. This further 
widened the divide between the North and South, laying a foundation for 
tensions among the ethnic groups in Uganda (Pratt 1961, Mamdani 1984, 
Mazrui 1975, Omara-Otunnu 1987). Apart from the economic policies 
that fostered uneven development, the distribution of schools was 
disastrous as well to the development of the northern region:  
“As colonial education was dominated by missionaries, areas with 
more schools (and often better schools), leading to uneven ac-
cess…of the 36,850 children in school in Uganda between 1909 and 
1910, 26,890 were in Buganda, 7,395 in northern and western Uganda 
and 2,565 in the eastern part of the country” (The Monitor, 20 June 
2012) 
The article in The Monitor further noted that the figures for the 
northern region had to be combined with those from the west of the 
country because on their own they were too insignificant. In 1920, 
Buganda had 368 schools, the western region had 44, and the northern 
region (including Karamoja) had none. 
4.3 The early post–Independence era 
As noted above, these divisions came to be reflected in the country’s 
politics, with politicised cleavages emerging among groups from the north, 
the north west (West Nile), the south and the south west. According to 
Mathew Kustenbauder, the “militarisation of politics” in Uganda was 
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started in 1966 by a Luwo-speaking Langi prime minister from the North, 
Milton Obote, after he had ousted the first president, Kabaka Muteesa II, 
when power sharing arrangements had failed. This introduced a political 
philosophy where violence was central, as he points out, and where:  
“…the battle for control over public life in Uganda was increasingly 
waged with the understanding that the political kingdom suffers vio-
lence, and violent men take it by force” (Kustenbauder 2010:458). 
Violence had come to be a prime tool in politics from at least the time 
of colonisation, and when the Buganda regional council for the central 
government ordered Milton Obote to leave Buganda soil after he had 
ousted Kabaka Mutesa II, this marked a turning point.Since he had taken 
over as head of state and commander-in-chief of the national army, Obote 
responded by dispatching military forces that killed a number of palace 
guards and civilians and burnt down the Kabaka’s palace, forcing Kabaka 
Muteesa II into exile. After this, Obote enacted a new Constitution that 
dissolved the federal state, forcing all kingdoms in the country to come 
under central rule. From then onward, the post-colonial leaders of Uganda 
increasingly resorted to military coercion in the settlement of private and 
state disputes. A series of military coups and persecutions followed, in 
1971, when Idi Amin Dada ousted Milton Obote, in 1979, when the 
UNLA ousted Idi Amin Dada, in 1985, when Milton Obote was ousted 
by Tito Okello Lutwa, and in 1986 when the NRA ousted Tito Okello 
Lutwa and replaced him by Yoweri Kaguta Museveni (Kustenbauder 
2010:455-6, Byaruhanga 1998:186-187, Karugire 1980). 
There were events the elderly community was not able to forget, such 
as the persecution of mainly Acholi and Langi soldiers and elites by Idi 
Amin when he took power in 1971. The Paramount Chief of Acholi claims 
that: 
“… in Acholi especially, there was a targeted killing of the most prominent people 
of  Acholi, whether it was someone employed in the government, someone doing their 
own business, or someone popular within the community – an opinion leader or 
anyone who was prominent was targeted” (Rwot Onen David Acana II, Gulu 
Municipality, 09/01/2015). 
 
He further goes on to say that, after the incident, Idi Amin went ahead 
to recruit a large number of new soldiers from the West Nile region, where 
he hails from, into the national army. Omara-Otunnu (1987) affirms this 
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when he notes that the West Nilers replaced the ethnic Acholi, especially 
the Kakwa and the so-called Aringa people from the northern part of the 
Arua District, who were believed to be of Sudanese descent but had settled 
as migrants in Uganda.  
Participants stated, however, that Idi Amin, in his pursuit, claimed the 
life of a very prominent religious leader, Bishop Luwum, who was the head 
of Church of Uganda. Bishop Luwum was accused of treason and aiding 
rebels in exile: 
“Now there was some recruitment that those who went outside were doing internally 
here using the churches because there were some people who were taken from here to 
Madiple, then from Madiple they would just go as missionaries, as people of the 
church so that they could be transported outside. They had been carrying out that 
illegal recruitment just to come back and fight the Amin regime” (Anonymous 
Former LRA Commander Bungatira, Gulu District, 25/01/2015). 
 
In 1980, when Obote II came back to power, many Northerners who 
were persecuted by the Idi Amin regime rejoined the army. At the same 
time, there was widespread outrage over election malpractices. Some 
candidates who lost in the 1980 presidential elections to Dr. Milton Obote 
decided to fight against the government, and one of them, Yoweri Kaguta 
Museveni, launched a guerrilla war in the Luweero triangle. 
According to a report by Caryle Murphy, “New Ugandan Crackdown 
said to Kill Thousands”, on 5 August 1984, the UNLA had little support 
among the local communities in the Luweero triangle, and the NRA was 
paving a way ahead of them. In retaliation, the UNLA is said to have 
exerted pressure on the unarmed local communities who were mainly of 
ethnic Bantu origin, the ‘Baganda’. This was done through mass murders, 
destruction of farms aimed at starving the communities, looting, execution 
of prisoners and NRA collaborators, and abduction and rape of civilians. 
The report stated that, by 1984, “between 100,000 and 200,000” people 
had been killed in the Luweero triangle. The U.S. Ambassador, Alan 
Davis, in his text “An Assertive Public Denunciation and the Human 
Rights Advocacy”, is quoted to have lamented that: 
“...the UNLA conducted its operations with little regard for the rules 
of warfare. As a result, terrible human rights abuses occurred against 
pro-NRA communities in the Luwero Triangle. In January 1983, 
Obote launched “Operation Bonanza” in this area, during which 
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UNLA troops destroyed small towns, villages, and farms and killed 
or displaced hundreds of thousands of civilians...After the war ended 
in 1986, the International Committee of the Red Cross claimed that 
at least 300,000 people had died in the Luwero Triangle and that of-
ficials had failed to account for almost half to a third of the region’s 
population” (Ofcansky 1996, cited in Gersony 1997: 6). 
It is important to note that, according to several scholars, the public 
considered the UNLA forces as predominantly Acholi, which was, 
however, not the case because the army was comprised of many other 
ethnic groups from within Uganda as well. But in public opinion, the 
Acholi were responsible for the atrocities in the Luweero triangle (Otunnu 
1987, Ofcansky 1996, Gersony 1997). 
Robert Gersony notes that those who acknowledged responsibility 
always offer explanations and some allege that some of the atrocities were 
committed by NRA forces disguised as UNLA forces. He also highlights 
that, despite the one-sided view of blame, the UNLA was composed of 
many ethnic groups, and the powerful and influential officers in the 
security apparatus were largely from other ethnic groups, such as Chris 
Rwakasisi, and many prominent Lango officials were from Obote’s ethnic 
group. He notes that; 
“Acholi forces in the army appear to have been generally subordi-
nated to senior officers of President Obote’s Lango tribe, a source of 
continual friction within the military” (Greyson 1997:9-10). 
In the situation existing at that time, further tensions developed within the 
UNLA army. There were rumours that President Milton Obote wanted to 
do away with General Tito Okello Lutwa, an Acholi and replace him with 
a Langi. The Local Council chairperson II of Iriaga Parish, Ouma P’olum, 
claimed he was part of the meeting that was called in Acholi Inn in Gulu 
where a coup against Milton Obote was planned and agreed upon.  
In July 1975, President Milton Obote was overthrown and President 
Tito Okello Lutwa took over. This complicated the relationship between 
the Langi and Acholi, and shattered the military alliance they had 
maintained between them for decades. When Tito Okello Lutwa took 
power, there was various armed faction fighting against the government 
of Milton Obote, which pushed him to call for peace talks. President Tito 
Okello was successful in convincing some rebel factions such as the 
UNRF (Uganda National Rescue Front), the FUNA (Former Uganda 
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National Army), mainly comprised of ex-Idi Amin’s soldiers, anti-Obote 
elements and the Federal Democratic Movement, comprised mainly of 
Baganda combatants, and the NRA from the Luweero region, into joining 
his government. Within that period, peace negotiations had been initiated 
by President Moi of Kenya. The NRA, however, was still at large within 
the Luweero Triangle. The peace negotiations culminated in an agreement 
in December 1985, holding the signatures of President Tito Okello, 
President Moi of Kenya and NRA leader Yoweri Museveni.  
According to Robert Greyson (1997:12), the agreement comprised 
the installation of a “17-member military council”, with 7 members from 
the UNLA and NRA and representations of other, smaller factions that 
had agreed to work with Tito Okello’s government. This arrangement 
would see NRA leader Yoweri Museveni serve as Vice Chairman. He 
further notes that the army would have 44% soldiers from the UNLA 
(3,700 soldiers), 42% from the NRA (3,600 soldiers) and 14% from other 
factions (1,200 soldiers).  
However, despite having agreed on the above arrangement, NRA 
leader Yoweri Museveni abrogated the power sharing agreement and 
overthrew the government of Tito Okello Lutwa after it had been in 
power for six months, in January 1986. This led to combat between the 
former UNLA soldiers and NRA forces, pushing them out of the capital 
city towards the north. (Nsubuga 1999, Otunnu 1996, Jackson 2002). 
What is significant to note is that this loss of political and economic 
power by the Acholi is said to have had implications that led to the flow of 
events leading to resistance against the NRA government. The Acholi, 
though they were the back bone of the army, had, according to Gersony 
(1997:14), for decades endured subordination to the Lango senior officers 
in the army, throughout Obote’s regimes. So, when the first Acholi 
President, Tito Okello Lutwa, was put in power, they were overjoyed as 
they:  
“…had finally begun to enjoy some power and privileges of more 
senior rank, political and civil service appointments – and the homes 
and vehicles which attain to them” (Gersony 1997:14). 
This partially explains why the former LRA commander claims that his 
former boss Kony does not take peace talks with Museveni’s Government 
seriously. In his own words: 
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“That is why you see Kony telling people that it is a ‘peace joke’, not peace talk, 
that people are doing in Uganda. Because he was blindfolding people through the 
peace talk and yet on the other hand he had a different plan” (Anonymous 
Former LRA commander, 25/01/2015). 
 
After realising what Museveni had done, the UNLA soldiers 
withdrew as the NRA captured the capital city, and thousands of 
Northerners, including the Acholi, fled back home, with their guns, fearing 
any act of vengeance that may be inflicted upon them by the new 
government. Jackson (2002:37) notes that the NRA was mainly composed 
of Southerners, due to its operations that were based in the Luweero 
Triangle, which possibly made the Acholi feel very uncertain about their 
situation after the takeover. Ouma P’olum claims he was in Kampala in 
that chaotic moment when the NRA captured the capital city, and said: 
“… all of us ran, I was in Kampala. If you were found in Kampala and you were 
an Acholi: ‘no survival’. So we took the direction of Jinja …we found there the 
blood of people who were butchered. A lot flowing on the road. So…all of us became 
military men” (Ouma P’olum, LC 2 Iriaga Parish, 22/01/2015).  
 
According to Robert Gersony, this “…was the largest single source 
of cash employment, the equivalent of a major industry”, throughout the 
northern region of Uganda (Gersony 1997:15). An estimated 10,000 
Northerners had lost their jobs almost overnight with the take-over of by 
NRM in 1986, as most of them fled their posts as soon as the NRA took 
control. And that is why a friend and visiting professional at the 
International Criminal Court, hailing from Lango, claims that the Acholi 
will never trust Museveni: “They always view Museveni as a betrayer 
because he did not live up to his gentleman’s agreement” (Tom Ogwal, 
Executive Director SUTCO, Lira district – Interview in The Hague, 3 
April 2016).  An informant mirrors this: 
“So we had to fight to make sure that we are not dominated by such a weakling 
kind of tribe. So basically that gave us the impetus to start fighting Museveni. So 
we felt our jobs were being taken. I talked about our descent, how far we have 
come…look at us from world war; our ancestors were fighting the world wars and 
the rest. Acholis were the guards! They had the guns! Now how do you come and 
want to take away our jobs? So the Acholi also fought to protect. They wanted their 
jobs as guards to remain with them” (Solomon Okongo Oola, Abera, Aswa, 
Gulu District 08/December/2014).  
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However, as noted above, even though the NRA forces were composed 
of numerous tribes, as a national army, it was viewed in tribal and ethnic 
terms by ex-UNLA soldiers, as Solomon recounts.  
Some key informants claimed that what triggered the rise against the 
NRA in the northern region was a combination of fear and panic, mixed 
with feelings of regret on the part of ex-UNLA soldiers. This view is 
shared by various scholars who have written about the conflict (Jackson 
2002, Gersony 1997:16, Behrend 1999). They attribute this to the history 
of ethnic violence and settling scores that perpetuated distrust, escalated 
conflict, and put the Acholi on the defensive. After the NRM ousted Tito 
Okello, the propaganda on the radio and the print media levied all the 
country’s troubles on the Acholi. This propaganda may have served the 
interests of the ex-military leaders in panicking the public into joining 
them in exile. Besides, Gersony (1997:16) notes that the former Acholi 
UNLA soldiers may have feared the reoccurrence of what Idi Amin did to 
them in 1971 and may have also feared that the NRA soldiers might 
revenge the atrocities committed against them during the insurgency in 
the Luweero triangle. In relation to that, Heike Behrend notes that: 
“The bloodshed and violence of Uganda’s post-independence dec-
ades made many Acholi fear that it was kill or be killed: if Museveni 
was not overthrown, they believed his soldiers would destroy the 
Acholi” (Behrend 1999:19). 
This argument is also noted by Jackson (2002:37) when he suggests 
that out of fear of retaliation witnessed in the past by other ethnic groups, 
the UNLA soldiers fled home northwards. What is significant is that he 
suggests that the rebel factions that emerged in that period did so out of 
fear. The Acholi ‘feared their own extinction’. These fears were confirmed 
when the local communities began being mistreated by the NRA forces, 
notably the 35th Battalion, that was posted to the region, and was 
comprised of Buganda soldiers from the FEDEMU faction that had 
formed an alliance with the NRA government after it had seized power. 
In relation to the above:  
“…the struggle initiated by the NRA in Luweero in the early 1980s 
has never been concluded. It continued in Luweero through 1985. In 
early 1986 it was fought in Kampala and has continued in Guluand 
Kitgum since that time” (Gersony 1997:17). 
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Proud of their identity as fierce fighters and able professional soldiers, 
the ex-UNLA soldiers proceeded to wage armed struggle against the 
government of Uganda. The field findings reveal that many of the ex-
UNLA soldiers felt terrible about having surrendered and withdrawn from 
the capital city prematurely. They expressed the view that if had they 
exerted a little more resistance, they could have overrun NRA forces. They 
assumed NRA soldiers were an ill-prepared and alien group of 
unprofessional military, who had humiliated the ex-UNLA, and taken 
control of their home areas. Because of this: “A profound sense of military 
humiliation pervaded the Acholi, especially among the professional 
soldiers” (Gersony 1997:14).  
That is why some Acholi soldiers and leaders even believed that, with 
their forces combined, they could easily flush the NRA out of the northern 
region within 30 days. This indicates, however, that they certainly 
underestimated the military ability of the NRA, overestimating their own 
(Gersony 1997:16). As Mrs. Christine Langol aptly notes:  
“…a Munyakore from western Uganda took over power, the Acholi over-rated 
their strength and under-rated the strength of the Banyankore. They thought they 
were stronger and these were weak and could not fight like them…so they thought 
they would fight them to the end and just crush them” (Mrs. Christine Langol, 
Former Gusco Reception Centre Administrator, Gulu District 
2/12/2014) 
4.4 The rise of the NRA 
In addition to the above, Gersony (1997:13) notes that, while the earlier 
phases of NRA occupation of Gulu and Kitgum were mostly peaceful, 
with NRA forces reported to be very respectful of civilians, and civilians 
surprised by the new army’s peaceful nature, soon tensions arose. In 
particular, an identity conflict arose within the NRA forces themselves, 
when the NRA/FEDEMU 35th Battalion of the NRA, comprising mainly 
Baganda combatants, was integrated into the NRA units that had fought 
in the Luweero triangle. The Baganda had been part of FEDEMU (Federal 
Democratic Movement) and were now integrated with troops that had 
committed a lot of atrocities when they were dispatched to the Acholi 
region. This Battalion was seen as acting and looking suspicious according 
to residents of Namukokora from where Tito Okello hailed. This 
particular unit’s conduct was seen as much more ill-mannered, and they 
were reported to be recklessly killing civilians and looting private property, 
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among others things. Robert Gersony notes that, “Most people understood 
that FEDEMU was at that point an integral part of the NRA, but also appeared 
to recognize that it had a previous separate identity” (Gersony, 1997:22). Ruddy 
Doom and Koen Vlassenroot also noted that some actions resembling those 
of previous regimes put the ex-UNLA Acholi soldiers on the defensive: 
“…the undisciplined behaviour of parts of the NRA in both Gulu and Kit-
gum districts during the first months of the NRA takeover, served only to 
fuel this anxiety. When the NRA High Command issued a directive over 
Radio Uganda urging all former UNLA soldiers to report to Mbuya army 
headquarters within ten days, the memory of a similar order after Amin's 
coup, that had resulted in the massacre of many Acholi soldiers, convinced 
many UNLA (Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999:13). 
Developments like these encouraged several civilians as well to join the 
rebel factions against the NRA forces that began launching attacks in Mid-
August of 1986. Caroline Lamwaka notes that: 
“Some former UNLA soldiers were arrested and mistreated, and tor-
ture was alleged to be widespread. Killings were reported, although 
the number of those who died is not known. Some former soldiers 
were taken away for ‘political re-education’ and never seen again. 
Fears in Acholi land were further fuelled by the order on 10 May 1986 
for all former soldiers to report to NRA military headquarters in 
Kampala. Few could forget a similar order during the Idi Amin era 
that led to the massacre of Acholi soldiers.  Many believe that the 
NRM Government was determined to victimize the Acholi people 
and some began to mobilise to fight the Government. Many Acholis 
supported them” (Lamwaka 2002:28). 
According to the participants, such events reminded them of what Idi 
Amin had done to them in the past, raising suspicion among the former 
soldiers and the populace.  
 
Some of them withdrew to places like Karuma, Kamdini, along the Gulu-Kampala 
highway. And when Museveni moved and intercepted some of those groups from 
areas of Minakulu then the people had to withdraw and started operating as 
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Since the NRA was said to be targeting families of former UNLA 
soldiers, those who had settled back in the villages took up their arms 
against the new government. Without proper co-ordination, they 
mobilised themselves in groups of 5 or 6, according to their location at the 
initial stages, and began defending themselves and their communities 
against the NRA soldiers. This is said to have marked the beginning of 
armed conflict between NRA and armed factions in northern Uganda as 
well as in other parts of Uganda. The Paramount Chief of Acholi noted: 
 
“…that made the soldiers who had run and who had been defeated, and had settled 
in the villages [come out again]. You know they had gone with their guns, they had 
hidden them there and when this havoc started, and looting of people’s property, like 
the things that were looted in the past started happening. Then this former UPDA 
organized themselves into fighting forces in 1986” (Rwot Onen David Acana 
II, Gulu Municipality, 09/01/2015). 
 
Some participants claimed that the havoc the NRA soldiers were causing 
in the communities in Acholi was an act of revenge, as they were torturing 
civilians or former soldiers to a point of them being paralysed or to death, 
killing all livestock, defecating in food stuff, raping both men and women, 
among other things. (FGD 3, 7 elderly men, Bungatira, Gulu district, 
14/01/2015). Furthermore, to inquiries aimed at establishing why it was 
perceived in this way, a Former LRA commander’s response was that 
immediately after the NRA soldiers arrived in Gulu they began persecuting 
everybody: 
 
“Those who were sent to the North came and started doing (committing) atrocities. 
Immediately you see that it was revenge, because they were saying during the 
operation of UNLA in their area, the UNLA were killing people, raping people, 
they were a lot of atrocities. And that is what they came and started doing after 
defeating the UNLA. They started raping people …when they got information 
that one of the members of this particular family was a UNLA they would come 
and arrest all the family members. They tortured them. That brought to the mind 
of those ex-soldiers the thought that this was revenge and they went to the bush and 
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However, amidst the anxiety, the local communities and elders back 
home made it difficult for the former UNLA soldiers to settle in, as they 
mocked them over their loss and branded them as cowards. This was 
because the: 
“Generational conflict between Acholi elders and young men (sol-
diers) and the failure to incorporate ex-soldiers into civilian life cre-
ated a situation of internal terror” (Kustenbauder 2010:457-458).  
According to the elders, they believed the atrocities that had been com-
mitted made them unclean and the spirits of those communities would be 
dragged into their communities.  
This brought about internal strife between the elders and the ex-
soldiers, as some soldiers are said to have resisted undergoing important 
cleansing rituals (Van Acker 2004:339-340, Doom and Vlassenroot 
1999:10-12, Branch 2007:155-158). Important rituals had to be conducted 
to cleanse the ex-UNLA soldiers of spirits of those they had killed to be 
able to be welcomed back in to society. However, Heike Behrend notes that 
with tensions in the region, soldiers turned into 'internal strangers' within 
Acholi society because of their reckless behaviour. Many soldiers refused to 
submit to purification rituals carried out by Acholi elders, and this left the 
‘cen’ unreconciled. He notes that: 
“They had become alien to those who had remained at home. During the 
civil war, they had plundered, tortured, and murdered, primarily in Luwerp, 
and had become of ‘impure heart’. Because they had killed, they brought cen, 
the spirits of the killed, to Acholi, thus threatening the lives of those who 
had stayed at home” (1999:28). 
This caused villagers to fear and shun such people who had not been 
cleansed ritually. Amidst internal strife within the Acholi community, many 
ex-soldiers felt they had little option but to take up arms, as many people in 
the community blamed them for the mistreatment by the NRA. Army 
abuses were interpreted as revenge for atrocities committed by the ex-
UNLA soldiers who in turn were blamed for the calamity befalling Acholi 
society. 
The former LRA commander noted that amidst all these tensions, 
those that were in exile began recruiting not only the ex-UNLA soldiers 
but civilians as well to join since the NRA had not yet taken full control 
of the countryside. They formed a faction known as the Uganda People’s 
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Defence Army/Movement (UPDA/M), with a political and military wing, 
and locally known as ‘Cilil’, which means ‘go and tell’. They lobbied for 
help from the Sudanese government, which offered military support, and 
had the support of the local population as well (Behrend 1999:26, Branch 
2007:156).  
4.5 The rise of rebel factions vs the NRA in the Acholi 
sub-region 
There were several phases of insurgency within the period between 1979 
and 1985. Some conflict scholars claim that the defeated Uganda National 
Liberation Army (UNLA) re-organised itself into the Uganda People’s 
Democratic Army (UPDA) rebel faction (Lamwaka 2002:28-33, Jackson 
2002:37, Branch 2005:10-11). However, Jackson (2002:37) suggests that 
this UPDA was composed of several ‘anti-NRA elements’ such as “the 
defeated UNLA, some of Amin’s West Nilers, and former supporters of 
Obote”. Jackson notes that some of the attacks on NRA detachment 
points at the initial stages even enjoyed some popular support from local 
people.  
 It was around the same time that Alice Lakwena Auma emerged, 
claiming to be possessed by the Holy Spirit and in possession of spiritual 
powers in Kitgum. With several volunteers and absconding remnants of 
the UNLA that joined in willingly, she created the Holy Spirit Movement 
(HSM) (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999:16-19, Lamwaka 2002:28, Behrend 
1999). The Paramount Chief of the Acholi, Acana David Onen II, claims 
that Alice must have identified the weaknesses among the UPDA 
commanders who regularly consulted her as a witchdoctor about the 
future of their struggles, and thus decided to take advantage of the 
situation to lead the people against the NRM government using her claims 
of possessing spiritual, supernatural powers. 
 Alice Lakwena was defeated in November 1987. Some of Alice 
Lakwena’s followers fled to exile in Kenya with her, others decided to join 
the NRA, while others joined the Severino Lukoya’s Lord’s Army, Alice 
Lakwena‘s father. After Alice was defeated, Severino Lukoya took it upon 
himself to complete his daughter’s mission. He absorbed the remaining 
HSM soldiers and took up command in January 1988. He established 
continuity of the daughter’s activities with promises of healing and 
spreading the word of the spirits earning him over 2,000 followers 
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(Behrend 1999:175-7). Behrend further notes that his supreme position 
within the community was well known evident with the limited number 
of patients in medical hospitals: 
 
“He purified the people by drawing crosses on their fore-
heads with a mixture of shea butter oil and ochre, and he 
declared that those who refused to receive this sign would 
not be spared at the last judgement day” (Behrend 1999: 
175). 
 
He further notes that: 
 
“Like Alice, Severino was also possessed by the holy spirit 
Lakwena, who claimed leadership of all the other spirits. 
But while Alice’s spirit called himself God the spirit, Sev-
erino called himself God the father” (Lukermoi 1990:62 – 
Quoted in Behrend 1999:176).  
 
According to Okumu –Alya (2009:5), Severino Lukoya referred to him-
self as “Rubanga Won”, which means “God the Father” and he decided to 
take over the mantle of the struggle after his daughter’s defeat. Okumu 
further notes that Lukoya, after joining forces with Kony, was captured by 
the NRA in 1989. The result of a face-to-face interview with Severino Lu-
koya by the researcher at his prayer venue in Gulu town tallies with what 
is noted above, in that he repeatedly referred to himself as “God”. 
On the 18th March 1988, when trying to capture Kitgum Town, Sev-
erino Lukoya and army were defeated by the NRA (Behrend 1999:176, 
Gersony 1997:29).  Some participants highlighted tensions between the 
HSM and the UPDA, as some commanders declined to merge their forces 
with those of Alice Lakwena. The ones who declined did not believe in 
Alice Lakwena’s war strategies or tactics. As a result, both parties declined 
to join hands. The HSM and the UPDA are said to have clashed on several 
occasions when they met. They would generally unite their forces to fight 
NRA soldiers but sometimes their mutual belligerence would persist even 
when faced with the NRA, as one informant pointed out: 
 
“So some of them took their forces and surrendered them to Lakwena and they 
started together under the command of Alice Lakwena, but those who refused to 
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join Lakwena remained like that… whenever they would meet, when each of them 
was going for their operation because they called themselves enemy; that is where the 
clashes would come in. Alice was not supporting the UPDA and the UPDA also 
did not support the work of Alice Lakwena. So those commanders kept on clashing 
whenever they would meet. Even when they encountered the NRA they would 
clash…the operation continued like that” (Anonymous Former LRA 
commander, 25/01/2015). 
 
 After a series of clashes with the NRA, some UPDA members 
surrendered to the government on the 17 March 1988 after signing the 
Peace Agreement in Gulu. Caroline Lamwaka noted that this called for 
“cessation of hostilities between NRM and the UPDM/A, integration of 
the UPDM/A into the NRA/NRM, and release of prisoners of war” 
(Lamwaka 2002:32, also noted by Doom and Vlassenroot 1999:15, 
Gersony 1997:26). She further notes that, however, not all of the UPDA 
forces surrendered; some of them stayed at large and continued with their 
operations.  
 Though some UPDA commanders, such as Col. Ochora Walter and 
Okello Okeno, signed a peace accord with the NRM government, not all 
of them surrendered. Some UPDA commanders, such as Vincent Otti and 
Odong Latek, stayed and later merged with Kony’s army, due to the 
pressure the NRA soldiers were exacting on them (Timothy Kalyegira, 
The Monitor, 12/12/2012). 
 Jackson (2002:38) notes that, although Alice Lakwena was in exile, 
her warfare style remained significant to the development of the LRA. The 
field findings suggest that Kony was more into his healing and prayer 
missions which attracted a lot of people to him. This was pointed out by 
many elderly participants. Several participants strongly believed Kony had 
supernatural powers and was indeed led by a spirit. How he obtained that 
spirit was quite interesting, as one respondent claims that: 
 
“It all started when Kony went to bathe in some well or spring “kulu”. So he started 
hearing some sound like drums and voices coming from around the spring. …, some 
birds came forth in great numbers. …He has healing powers, so people would come 
to him, seeking for that healing power, and they would get healed. These are real 
stories. They would use oil and water to sprinkle on people and people would get 
healed instantly. And these people, instead of going away, they wanted to serve the 
gods and decided to join him..at a certain point they were supporting him because of 
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that healing power which they believed he inherited from his sister Alice Lakwena. 
…he is capable of sitting right next to you and you would not even know 
(Margaret Rose Oyela, (aged 90+), 22/01/2015, Gulu District). 
 
 According to Paul Jackson (2002:41), in earlier phases, the nature of 
Kony’s activities was mainly spiritual. Jackson notes: “Kony donned white 
robes and spoke in tongues for the initiation of recruits. This process 
involved the familiar shear butter oil, sprinkling with holy water and 
cleansing sorcery and witchcraft” (Jackson 2002:41).  
 Some scholars claim that Kony’s aim for war against the NRA 
government was ambiguous (Jackson, 2002:41, Van Acker 2004:349).  
However, in a special report, The Monitor newspaper published a 
statement made in June 2006 by the Lord’s Resistance Movement (LRM), 
the political wing of Joseph Kony’s LRA, spelling out its reasons for taking 
up arms against the Museveni Government. This gave a background to 
the atrocities committed by the NRA in Acholi in 1986 as a reason for 
their struggle as noted below: 
“Many defeated UNLA soldiers were tricked and lured to hand over 
their guns and surrender to the NRA with a false promise of amnesty, 
while in fact, there were well-coordinated plans to arrest and kill all 
of them. When the pattern of killings and disappearances became 
clear, shock waves and fear spread among the soldiers, who had no 
alternative but to save their own skins by running away…. When the 
UPDA [Uganda People’s Democratic Army] led by Lt Gen Bazillio 
Okello was finally destroyed, the NRA continued with atrocities, 
which they carried out with arrogance and a sense of revenge. The 
marauding NRA soldiers killed our fathers and mothers, raped our 
sisters in the open, and sodomised our brothers while we looked 
on… As if these were not enough, our homes were torched and 
razed, livestock and produce looted. This has been one of the most 
miserable periods in our history and many people were greatly terri-
fied” (Timothy Kalyegira, The Monitor, 12/12/2012). 
 
 This could possibly explain why a considerable number of the 
returnees spoke with so much confidence against the Government of 
Uganda. To them they were fighting rebels as well. The NRA was 
considered a rebel faction that overthrew the government of Tito Okello. 
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“The government refers to us as rebels, we also refer to them as rebels” (Former LRA 
CommanderBungatira, Gulu District, 25/01/2015). Similar sentiments 
and views were shared by some participants who were ex-rebels.  
 The former LRA commander also noted that due to the great 
resemblance of Kony’s work to Alice Lakwena’s previous work he was 
attacked by the NRA soldiers while he and his people were praying, 
forcing Kony to abandon his original prayer base in Lacekocot and move 
to Cwero. Since he had been joined by remnants of the HSM and the 
UPDA who had some guns with them, they were forced to fight back 
marking the beginning of warfare between Joseph Kony and his followers 
and the NRM government. The former LRA commander claims that at 
this point “Kony said the spirit had given him power to start fighting the 
government” (Anonymous Former LRA commander, 25/01/2015). 
 After this statement, he started his faction as the Holy Spirit 
Movement IHSM), while others say it was founded as the Uganda 
Christian Democratic Army (UCDA), and later retitled the Lord’s 
Resistance Army as well. After the attack, he was forced to return to 
Lacekocot, and later to the Gulu District. In 1988, Kony began launching 
attacks on army detachments to obtain guns and ammunitions. He also 
began abducting people from villages (Okumu-Alya 2009, Jackson 2002). 
According to the former LRA commander, this was solely because 
government soldiers were torturing families whose relatives had 
voluntarily joined the faction: 
“What they were saying was that of those who had been joining them voluntarily 
the family members were being arrested by the government and tortured seriously to 
go and bring back their sons. So they put in place for that matter, a new mechanism 
of enlisting, meaning that if they wanted to recruit they would do it forcefully, so that 
those who remained at home would not be held accountable for the situation. This 
would also sway the government into abolishing the torture meted on them. They 
abducted so many people, they started recruiting them and they started attacking the 
government forces, not the civilians. They went and attacked these NRA where they 
gather and took some guns” (Anonymous Former LRA Commander, 
25/01/2015). 
 
During these earlier phases, the LRA is said to still have had the support 
of the local populace, and recruitment was the only reason for any 
abduction. This was even more due to the brutality of the government that 
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involved torturing the local population into cooperating with them 
(Jackson 2002:41). 
 Some Acholi participants were of the view that, within that same 
period, the state masterminded the impoverishment of the Acholi people, 
using the Karamojong indirectly to raid their cattle. They believe, even to 
this day, that this was done with the help of senior government officials.  
Thus, Solomon is again furious as he notes in his own words that:  
“Museveni never liked the Acholi. If you read Museveni’s book ‘Sowing the 
Mustard Seed’. …and how he narrates how the Acholi lost their cattle, you would 
see clearly that Museveni purposely wanted it, because our cattle were taken within 
a duration of about six months. Six months and the region was swept! How do you 
explain that? That is crazy! Museveni says that he was too busy trying to fight these 
other rebels groups. And before he could realise our cattle were gone and he could 
not protect them! That is a total lie. How do you not see Karamojong moving with 
cattle when you are able to know where Kony or Alice Lakwena is? The government 
used the Karamojong. They know what they did. But it was the government of 
Museveni and the Karamojong. And of course they must have connived… Yes! 
Museveni wanted the Acholi to be punished, to be incapacitated because he knew 
that if the Acholi still had wealth and the rest, it would always be hard to deal with 
them. Get them poor, get them desperate, then he could stay long in power. But if 
they are not poor, they are not desperate, they will fight you and you go, you cannot 
stay for long, (banging the table)” (Solomon Okongo Oola, Abera, Acwa, 
Gulu District, 08/December/2014). 
 
 Much academic research notes that the Karamojong were allowed to 
own guns by the incumbent, new government and were indeed, as 
Solomon claims, offered more guns by the NRM government. After 1986, 
these extra guns were ostensibly meant to protect themselves from cross 
border raids by hostile ethnic groups (such as the Turkana and Pokot) 
from Kenya (Gersony 1997:15: 27, Doom and Vlassenroot 1999:12).  As 
Solomon also claims, the Acholi did have a lot of livestock and much of 
their wealth and savings had been invested in cattle and other livestock. 
They were therefore vulnerable to cattle rustling. Between 1979 and 1985, 
the Karamojong could not so easily access livestock in Acholiland, as the 
Police Tracking Force was still in place to monitor the border between the 
Kitgum and Karamoja districts.  
 Robert Gersony notes that this Force was removed in 1986.  Between 
1979 and 1986, after the Barracks had been abandoned and the 
Karamojong had got guns, there was some cattle rustling by the 
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Karamojong, but once the NRA took power in 1986, gun ownership in 
Karamoja was sanctioned, and the Acholi – as Solomon reports – soon 
had little to no livestock left and found out that farming was their last 
resort (Gersony 1997:15, Doom and Vlassenroot 1999:12). 
 In the interview, Solomon referred me to a book, Fate of the Banished, 
by Ugandan author Julius Ocwinyo. In this book, the author claims that 
government officials were killing civilians after 1986, and the book also 
recounts how cattle in the region were stolen and ferried using TATA 
Lorries. This kind of account was accepted by most Acholi informants. 
One informant suggested that Karamojong cattle rustling usually involved 
only a few cattle, not the whole herd as had happened in 1987-90. The 
interviewee believes state agents and government soldiers, must have been 
involved, directly or indirectly, in the rounding up and disappearance of 
Acholi livestock, and not the Karamojong on their own:   
 
“The Karamojong could not have done this! Karamojong have always been with us 
in the region, they are in the north eastern part. This people had been living in the 
same region for long. Not even at any point have we found it recorded that the 
Karamojong were capable of taking…even a quarter of the cattle in Acholi [of 
the]…livestock that we had. This could be like a miracle which could not happen 
without proper backing by a force. Because Karamojong had guns but the Acholi 
were in power and had guns as well. So this was a different case that we witnessed 
Museveni actually backing them up and using them to take as they were taking 
their part. But maybe also who knows where those cattle ended up” (Onen 
Nelson, Kitgum District, 18/January/2015). 
 
4.6 The brutal campaign against the Acholi and the 
move towards peace talks  
In 1991, the NRM government launched “Operation North”, under the 
leadership of the – then - State Minister for Defence and NRA chief 
military strategist, Gen. Tinyefuza, to eliminate the LRA Operation North 
was unsuccessful. However, according to the participants, the initiative by 
the Minister for the North, Betty Bigombe, and other local and 
government officials, to create ‘arrow groups’ or local defence forces to 
protect the communities, greatly upset Kony. This campaign was designed 
to deny the LRA support in the North and to arm the civilian population 
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with bows and arrows, known then as the Arrow Group. According to 
Adam Branch, Betty Bigombe was the brainchild of this arrow group. She: 
“…spearheaded the most significant aspect of Operation North 
which involved the formation of new expanded system of militia 
known as “Arrow Boys” to assist the NRA in fighting the re-
bels…Thousands of men, armed with arrows, spears, machetes, and 
sticks, were mobilized against the rebels with the support of the RCs. 
The Arrow groups reaching much further than the LDUs (Local De-
fence Units) ever had, were seen by the rebels as an intensified grass 
roots paramilitary extension of the NRM government” (Branch 
2007:178). 
 The local population decided to take up this initiative against Kony 
and went armed with pangas, knives, axes, bow and arrows. This angered 
and upset Kony as he felt he had lost the support of the local population.  
He believed that the local people were now collaborating with the 
government, and included government spies. In retaliation, he sent out his 
forces to set villages ablaze, amputate limbs and kill anyone found with a 
bow and arrow, machete or axe. His forces also started to abduct civilians 
(OCHA/IRIN 2004:10, Finnstrom 2008:90, Doom and Vlassenroot 
1999:26, Gersony 1997:38-44) 
 Still the operation failed (Dagne 2011, Barbara Among 11/08/2008, 
The New Vision), because, according to Sverker Finnstrom, after they 
were mobilised, the NRA forces withdrew leaving the Acholi population 
unprotected as the LRA intensified their attacks, as a form of collective 
punishment. The LRA switched from having battlefield confrontations 
with the NRA forces to abducting civilians and mutilating them by cutting 
off their ears, lips, mouth, nose, hands, among other body parts (2008:90-
91).  
 A significant number of former rebel participants denied any claims 
of deliberately killing innocent civilians. A former LRA commander was 
bitter when he narrated how a boy who escaped from the rebels straight 
back to his parents was instead hacked to death by his own parents, 
highlighting why the LRA levied atrocities on its own people.  
 
“…some people who had instructed the civilian to hold spear, arrow, and knife 
simply because they were told that the rebels that are moving around with empty 
guns. So they were told that whenever they see a rebel, they should kill him and 
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bring the gun or bring the report. So Civilians involved themselves in fighting the 
rebels” (Anonymous Former LRA commander, 25/01/2015). 
 
Some of the former rebels claimed their search for more manpower and 
for food left them with no option but to attack IDP camps and homes, 
not to kill but to acquire food and get new recruits. Starvation would force 
them to attack camps and the problem was that they found it hard to 
distinguish a soldier from a civilian, hence the mistaken killings. According 
to them, the government was using civilians as human shields by putting 
army detachments units in the middle or centre of an IDP camp. To reach 
the army unit the soldiers had to first encounter frightened civilians whose 
reactions and alerting response would give the rebels no option but to kill 
them since their response would automatically alert the government 
soldiers in the vicinity:  
 
“To get food, there was a camp and before food there are soldiers. What could we 
do when there was a soldier but we wanted food? What could we do, but we needed 
the food! It was difficult. Before you fought the soldiers, there were very many civilians 
fighting together with the soldiers. Even running, the civilians ran together with the 
soldiers. Now how could you tell the difference? What could we do? The gun does 
not know the difference between a soldier and a civilian. It does not know. The 
rebels needed food only” (Former LRA fighter (anonymous), 24/01/2015). 
 
 He strongly emphasized that civilians were victims of the 
circumstances, caught in the crossfire. With the proverb “When two 
elephants fight, it’s the grass that suffers” he illustrated his point. No 
reckless killings were committed even at their bases. In fact, he attributed 
some of the killings to the government soldiers, who would use them as a 
strategy to make the LRA unpopular. Since some of the civilians were in 
camps, those that went out into their villages to search for food would 
also be caught and detained by soldiers or even killed under suspicion of 
being a spy. In other instances, when trying to follow-up on an abductee 
who had escaped, they entered ambushes that would have them killed in 
large numbers, out of vengeance. They would trace where you were 
abducted from, and retaliate by killing all your family members and 
neighbours. Killings were used only as examples to teach others not to do 
what their fellow people had done, such as acting as a government spy or 
escaping captivity. Those who defected and were recaptured were caned 
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200 strokes, for instance, so that they could not sit on their buttocks for a 
couple of days or even weeks.  
 According to some arguments, this brutality had political aims and it 
provided Kony with the opportunity to continue as a significant power or 
image in this armed conflict. Doom and Vlassenroot note that Kony’s 
activities “…seem to be based on blind terror. They appear, at first glance, 
counterproductive and unrelated to long-term political aims (Doom and 
Vlassenroot 1999:390), but were very significant, and had political aims. A 
report by Amnesty International notes considers several factors to explain 
this violence: 
“LRA leaders appear to regard violence as a way of purging society 
of impurity; those who die, whether civilians, Government troops or 
LRA child soldiers, are those who are believed to have broken spir-
itual or religious commands” (Amnesty International report, 17 Sep-
tember 1997). 
The report further elaborates on why the LRA had institutionalised 
violence: 
“The LRA has institutionalized physical and psychological violence, 
including killings, rape and other forms of torture. The effect on ci-
vilians is to breed fear and force acquiescence; the consequence of 
being found to have informed the authorities about LRA activity is 
simple and brutal. However, the violence is not just directed “out-
wards” at the civilians’ population or captured UPDF soldiers. It is 
also used in a calculated and deliberate way to enforce discipline 
within the LRA itself. The abuses described below are a fundamental 
method of organization aimed at the destruction of individual will 
and morality. It begins with forceful abduction to be a soldier or por-
ter” (Amnesty International report, 17 September 1997). 
In the same light, Kamper Olsen argues that the LRA’s violence against 
the people regarded as their own has several purposes, as this violence 
served:  
“…as a form of threat to the population designed to scare the civilian 
populace away from working against LRA interests…This popula-
tion threat is exercised both against individuals and against whole 
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communities as a form of “collective punishment”. As such, the vio-
lence of the LRA serves specific purposes in the group’s attempt to 
avoid defeat in a highly asymmetrical war” (Olsen 2007:01). 
 
 In line with the above, some participants argued that Kony turned 
against his own people because they were betraying him, and had 
withdrawn their support, which made him very angry. So, by brutalising 
them, he would be effectively punishing them.  
“Sometimes when something is done and you are blamed for it, there is a feeling 
that... I could say, the LRA felt they were being betrayed by their own people. 
Because we agreed on this and now we realize that when we move around, 
government soldiers are following us promptly, which could probably mean that 
someone is tipping them off” (Obwona Byron, a teacher, Bungatira, Gulu 
District, 02/11/ 2014). 
 
 According to Doom and Vlassenroot (1999:26-28), despite the LRA 
having no clear and sustained articulation of political demands, the use of 
violence against civilians indirectly had a “political rationale”, directed 
ultimately at self-preservation. This was made possible through terrible 
abduction tactics that forced the abductees to kill, or witness the killing of, 
friends and family members, identifying them with murder and preventing 
them from leaving the LRA.  The threat of violence was also used by the 
LRA to expand its ranks from within, by strategically abducting and 
indoctrinating young people, and training them to be part of a whole new 
society. 
  
“They had that thought that they would win, and many of the ladies I must say 
those who were given to Kony, did not see or find any fault in Kony and whenever 
we were talking to them they would refer to Kony as the “the boss”, the boss is 
innocent, the boss had nothing to do (in an imitating tone)…it was “Weri” referring 
to Yoweri, the president. It is “Weri” to blame. So they were indoctrinated while in 
captivity, first of all to hate the president and the government, as much as possible. 
Second] they were prepared to fight to the bitter end. Because they used to say, the 
boss used to tell us that “our bodies are like leaves of trees, once they fall down they 
get dry, so why should you worry? And then [thirdly] they believed Kony had some 
magic. And they would cite examples that Kony would talk to them that “tonight, 
some foreigners are coming to attack us, so we had better move”. So they would 
move and those that would stay behind would confront government soldiers” (Mrs. 
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Christine Langol, Former Gusco Reception Centre Administrator, 
Gulu District, 02/12/2014). 
  
 Furthermore, the threat of violence was used to control the majority 
of the population in Acholiland where over two million civilians were 
living in the so-called “protective villages” or IDP camps. Importantly, the 
result was not only fear of the LRA, but also widespread criticism of the 
government’s inability to provide security for its citizens (Branch 2007:40). 
There were claims that the state disguised itself as the LRA and committed 
various atrocities, and laid blame on the LRA so as to win over the Acholi 
people since they had lost trust in the NRA government: 
 
“Being a young government at that time, the government wanted to win people over, 
and of course killing people cannot win people over. But at the end of the day, they 
used propaganda. They would kill and say your brothers have done it. Your brothers 
are killing you. That is what is being said. People strongly believe it 
happened…staged as a form of propaganda, why not our men dress in their 
uniforms and kill them. After all, they are all Acholi. Then tomorrow they speak 
the same language, so it is very easy to play a trick...some foul play on them. They 
believe that that happened. And so people started saying...oh...our own 
brothers...why our own brothers...this is different from what we agreed on. This is 
not what we thought would happen. We thought you would help us, but if you have 
turned against us. Then I think this has to stop. So people started saying, we are 
not going to support this, this needs to stop. This is madness. That is the way, yes, 
the government tried to win over the Acholi through foul play” (Obwona Byron, 
a teacher, Bungatira Sub-county, Gulu District, 02/ 11/ 2014) 
 
 Many claim the state was also involved in committing atrocities, 
throughout much of the course of the armed conflict. Others emphasised 
that both were involved in committing atrocities against the civilian pop-
ulation: 
 
“If Kony comes, it is the same thing. If UPDF comes it is the same thing. If Kony 
comes you have to hide. If UPDF comes you have to hide. Because if Kony passes 
here and the UPDF asks “Did they pass here? If you said yes, they would come 
back and kill people in the whole area. The UPDF soldiers also did exactly the 
same things. If they came to a place Kony has attacked, they also do the same thing 
whether to rape or steal. It is the same thing” (Ajok Alice, Naguru Suburb 
Kampala, 30/01/2015). 
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 According to Pham et al. (2007:4), the Berkeley-Tulane Initiative on 
Vulnerable Populations, compiling information on formerly abducted per-
sons, noted that the numbers of people abducted usually shot up during 
and after massive campaigns against the rebels. According to triangulated 
data from UNICEF, Community Canvassing Database and Reception 
Center Databases, about 24,000 to 38,000 children and 28,000 to 37,000 
adults (estimations as of April 2006) had been abducted by the LRA, as 
clearly illustrated in the figure below. 
 These figures do not account for the whereabouts of those still in 
captivity; their number is estimated to be close to 1,000-3,000. The figures 
also exclude those who died attempting to escape and those who returned 
in their thousands but never reported at reception centers for registration 
(Pham et al. 2007:22). The Berkeley-Tulane Initiative based their conclu-
sions on database information from eight reception centers in northern 
Uganda which collaborated with the database project, excluding those 
who declined. A report by Amnesty International recounts numerous in-
cidents in schools: 
“Between 1993 and July 1996, 70 teachers were killed by the LRA in 
Kitgum District. In Gulu District, in July and August 1996, 11 teach-
ers and over 100 children were killed, 250 primary school children 
abducted and 59 primary schools burnt down, leading to the closure 
of 136 out of 180 primary schools. On 25 July 1996, 23 girls were 
abducted from St Mary's College and on 21 August 39 boys from Sir 
Samuel Baker School, two secondary schools in Gulu. On 10 Octo-
ber 1996, in an incident that has since galvanized public awareness of 
child abduction, 139 girls were abducted from St Mary's College, at 
Aboke in Apac District” (Amnesty International Report, 17 Septem-
ber 1997:07). 
 The continuous violence led to an unprecedented rise in the numbers 
of IDPs within Acholi land, with hundreds of thousands of people moving 
to the camps. IDP research in northern Uganda revealed that there were 
202 IDP camps in northern Uganda, with actual figures estimated to be 
close to 2 million IDPs, which represented over 90% of the Acholi popu-
lation and about 8% of the national population, according to CSOPNU 
(2005:7:11). This made northern Uganda, according to the Global IDP 
Project (2005), the world’s fourth largest IDP calamity after Sudan, the 
DRC and Colombia. Chris Dolan argues that this counter insurgency strat-
egy was “…a form of comprehensive retribution for atrocities the Acholi 
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were alleged to have carried out in the early 1980s, particularly in Luwero 
triangle” (2009:109).  
Figure 4:1: Internally Displaced Persons in Northern Uganda 
 
Source: CSOPNU (2005:11) 
 
  Of the 202 IDPs, over 75% were located in the Kitgum, Pader and 
Gulu districts of Acholi and others were located in other districts in Teso 
and Lango in the northeastern part of Uganda, which were also later af-
fected by LRA incursions (Pham et al. 2007:14, Boas and Hartley 2005:12-
16). 
 Much earlier, in 1993, Betty Bigombe made contact with the LRA, 
which had expressed interest in negotiating with the government of 
Uganda. On 25 November 1993, at Pagik in Palaro sub-county, Aswa 
County, Gulu, the two sides held their first meeting, attended by members 
of the LRA’s high command, the LRA director of religious affairs, Jenaro 
Bongomin, Jackson Achama, Kony’s personal secretary and LRA 
commanders, Yardin Tolbert Nyeko and Cirilo Jurukadri Odego. 
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“In this first meeting the LRA declared that it was ready to return 
home and did not want to be referred to as rebels but as people. They 
demanded that a cessation of hostilities be declared to allow it gather 
its troops in Kenya and Europe. They also demanded that the Gov-
ernment treat their sick under joint supervision. Bigombe in-turn 
promised them that the existing general amnesty and presidential par-
don would cover them. Such was the confidence built by the initial 
meeting that the LRA later sent their representatives to the Gulu 
army barracks, where Bigombe lived, to discuss the steps forward. At 
the second meeting, a month later, Kony explained his reasons for 
fighting. In a four-hour speech, he held the Acholi community largely 
responsible for the war that had backfired with horrendous results 
that everyone now blamed on him.Two months later on February 2, 
1994, a larger meeting took place at Tegot-Atto, Gulu. Senior LRA 
commanders and NRA’s Col Wasswa and Lt Col Tollit attended. A 
ceasefire deal was signed, but soon, the rebels broke away from the 
negotiations, claiming that theNRA was trying to trick them” (Bar-
bara Among, 11/08/2008, The New Vision). 
 There were even reports, during this period, of LRA troops mingling 
with government soldiers (Jackson 2002:41, Doom and Vlassenroot 
1999:24, Branch 2007:180). However, Kony withdrew from the peace 
talks in 1994. Some scholars attribute it to the 7-day ultimatum issued by 
President Museveni to the rebels, to capitulate or face the danger of being 
wiped out. President Museveni made some utterances that angered Kony. 
He called the war “a senseless war” and gave Kony a 7-day ultimatum to 
surrender or risk being dealt with. Kony retaliated by giving the 
government 3 days to come and attack him. This and a number of other 
threats were announced by the President and senior military army officials, 
in vain (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999: 24, Gersony 1997 34-35, Branch 
2007:181). 
 Apart from these threats in public, some inner issues greatly upset 
and escalated tensions within the LRA. According to the former LRA 
commander, Betty Bigombe secretly convinced Otti Lagony, who was 
third in command, and flew him to the state house without Kony’s 
knowledge (he later learnt about it). During the peace talks, LRA leader 
Kony had sent an envoy of representatives to lobby for support from the 
government of Sudan. They were able to establish some contacts and 
granted conditions which they had to fulfil to be able to acquire a base in 
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Sudan. One of the conditions was that they should fight the SPLA rebel 
faction and dislodge them from certain locations, to take over the base. 
So, when the crossfire between government soldiers continued, Kony and 
his forces shifted and established their base in southern Sudan in 1994.  
4.7 The LRA in Sudan  
According to several scholars, serious allegations of aiding rebel factions 
were levied and revealed against the government of Sudan and Uganda. 
Uganda was accused of aiding the SPLA rebel factions against the 
Sudanese government and, vice versa, the Sudanese government was 
accused of aiding the LRA rebels against the Ugandan government 
(Branch 2007:182, Dolan 2005:77-89, Greyson 1997:68, Dunn 2000:53). 
Furthermore, according to The New Vision newspaper “If you support my 
enemy, I will support your enemy” (President Museveni has never supported 
the SPLA), by an anonymous writer from the East African Advisory 
Board, 16/06/2010, The New Vision), Sudan offered to help the LRA in 
retaliation for Uganda’s support for the SPLA rebel faction in southern 
Sudan. The war resumed with renewed intensity, with hollow mistrust 
between the parties and a new dimension to it: a regional one. A report by 
Amnesty International noted that: 
“In 1994 arms were reported to be channelled through the SPLA-
United, an SPLA breakaway faction led in Eastern Equatoria by Wil-
liam Nyuon Bany. However, by August 1994 Sudan army regular sol-
diers were directly involved. Children abducted in 1996 and 1997 re-
port seeing Sudanese soldiers off-loading arms and ammunition from 
army vehicles at the LRA base camp in Aru. The weapons included 
AK47 and G3 assault rifles, anti-tank weaponry (including B10 re-
coilless guns), 81mm and 82mm mortars and landmines, which were 
not a common feature of the war until the Sudan Government began 
to support the LRA” (Amnesty International report, 17 September 
1997: 8-9). 
 This simplified attacks on civilians in protected villages as the rebels 
would retreat to their bases in Sudan. This frustrated national army efforts 
to contain the armed conflict. With support from the Sudan government, 
the LRA continued its ambushes and surprise attacks on villages and town 
centres. In the Atiak massacre of 20 April 1995, over 200 residents were 
killed and hundreds abducted. On 12 and 13 July 1996, an LRA unit 
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attacked Sudanese refugees’ camps at Agago and Achol-Pii in the Kitgum 
District, killing more than 115 refugees. Seventy-eight Ugandan villagers 
were killed in Kilak County on 28 and 29 July 1996. In January 1997, 
during the Lokung and Palabek massacre between 7 and 12 January 1997, 
with no government troops within the vicinity, many villages in Lamwo 
were combed through by the LRA. An estimated total of 412 children, 
elderly, men and women were hacked and clubbed to death (Gersony 
1997:38-42). Because of the endless attacks, the UPDF requested all 
civilians to vacate their homes and live in central camps as a protective 
measure, and even went ahead to use aggression on those that declined. 
In 2002, due to the increasing levels of violence, the UPDF gave an 
ultimatum of 48 hours to civilians to vacate their homes and move to 
camps or risk being labelled as rebels or collaborators of the LRA 
(Gersony 1997:48-50, Dolan 2005:77-85, Branch 2007:200, Jackson 
2002:43).  
 One of the key informants during the field exercise claimed that even 
before the peace talks, Kony had been trying to establish contact with the 
Sudan government. According to him, that happened in 1993, when the 
Arabs in Khartoum got a chance to fight SPLA leader, Garang, towards 
the border with Uganda. Those alongside him, like Riek Machar and Lam 
Akol, surrendered to the Sudan government. They were put as militias on 
the side of the Sudan government, to fight the mainstream SPLA. This 
breakaway faction was referred to as ‘SPLA Uunited. It was with this 
breakaway faction that Kony was able to establish contact with the Sudan 
Government through Lit. Col. Paul Omoya an Acholi of Sudanese origin, 
under the command of Martin Kenyi. Their first contact was through Riek 
Machar, through whom they were able to acquire audience with the 
Sudanese Government. In Machar’s words: 
 
“Now Kony sent those 3 commanders to Sudan so that they could collaborate and 
get grounds to continue his operation.Those ones went and penetrated the SPLA 
United and the SPLA United took them to the Khartoum Government… So the 
Khartoum Government agreed to give support, they agreed to work with Kony… 
the SPLA United. And they were the ones feeding them and they were the ones 
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“When I was in Sudan, on the 15th of every month Kony would get supplies from 
the Sudan government. Sometimes they would bring oil in drums; they would even 
bring flour, uniforms and guns” (Okello Charles, ex-LRA, Awach, Gulu 
District 26/01/2015). 
 
 This event triggered fighting between the UPDF andSPLA against 
the LRA and the Government of Khartoum. In The New Vision of 
10/17/2005, in an article entitled ‘Uganda, SPLA Fight Kony’, Frank 
Mugabi noted that the Ugandan national army (UPDF) and the Sudanese 
People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) had launched a combined operation 
against the LRA rebel group. 
 However, after a series of clashes and accusations in 2000, a peace 
agreement was signed between the Ugandan and Sudanese government. 
They signed the ‘Protocol for Operation Iron Fist’, meant at levelling out 
LRA activity. This cross-border cooperation crippled LRA’S military 
capacity and led to the loss of a base for the LRA rebels, as the peace deal 
granted the Ugandan government permission to pursue the LRA in Sudan.  
And in 2002, a joint operation entitled ‘Operation Iron Fist’ between 
Uganda and Sudan was launched to expel the LRA out of Sudan (IRIN, 
UPDF clashes with LRA inside Sudan, 04/06/2002).  
 The operation was termed as atrocious, as many abducted civilians 
were killed, including soldiers at the LRA bases in Sudan. However, 
neither Kony nor his senior commanders were captured. The operation 
led to unprecedented attacks and abductions, as well as intensified 
violence and insecurity in the region, resulting in the displacement of 
thousands of people who sought refuge in Internally Displaced Persons 
(IDP) camps.Consequently, the LRA retaliated by committing horrendous 
atrocities on civilians in both Sudan and Uganda (Dolan 2005:89, Atkinson 
2009:8, Okumu-Alya 2009:6-7). However, the defeated groups were 
usually quick to retaliate, so as to make theirs enemies victory symbolic 
and short-lived (Tainter, 2007:77). In 2003, the LRA incursions in the 
neighbouring districts of Teso and Lango began again, as they prepared to 
proceed and reposition themselves in the Garamba forest in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo.  
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4.8 LRA Incursions back into Teso and Lango 
According to Lomo and Hovil (2004:51-59), in June 2003, the LRA were 
disorganised in Sudan, but they launched well-coordinated, simultaneous 
attacks in eastern Uganda, in the districts of Lira, Apac and Katakwi, on 
what has been referred to as “their September 11” by the Itesots. Other 
areas, such as Adjumani, were also attacked, and the assaults intensified 
further, especially in Kaberamaido and Katakwi in the Teso region, as well 
as the Soroti districts, leading to the abduction of hundreds of children, 
especially school children (Ebong Patrick, The Monitor, 25 June 2003, 
“Uganda: Rebels abduct 100 lwala girls”.  Some participants had various 
reasons to explain why the LRA decided to cross over to Teso and Lango: 
 
“If it is just the Acholi fighting and the whole group is predominantly Acholi, then 
it becomes a very simple thing and other people will of course say the Acholi are 
killing themselves. I think they got other ethnic groups involved because they felt they 
would actually make it a wider concern, a national concern. If Lango and Iteso 
have joined, then it is not just the Acholi so it becomes a bigger concern for the 
government. So I feel that…raises dust and it is not referred to as only Acholi 
because they are more than Acholi only. But I also think they needed more recruits, 
so they felt the Acholi alone may not be enough, let us get more people” (Obwona 
Byron, a teacher, Bungatira sub-county, Gulu District, 02/11/ 2014). 
 
 The civilians were aware of the location of the LRA rebels but could 
not do much, and despite the fact that the UPDF was informed by them 
about the presence and location of the rebels, nothing was done to protect 
them when attacks were launched eventually. This situation led to the 
initiation of para-military factions in Teso and Lango. In Teso, led by Musa 
Ecweru, more than 2,000 veterans of the defunct rebel faction UPA 
(Uganda People’s Army) formed a local militia known as the ‘Arrow Boys’ 
and in Lango the ‘Amuka (or Rhino) Boys’ (Lomo and Hovil 2004:50-57 
Atkinson 2009:7). 
 Among the paramilitary groups who volunteered, the Arrow Boys 
were much more effective in resisting the LRA than the Rhino Boys. This 
was due to inadequate military equipment of the Rhino boys.  However, 
rather than operate as independent militias, the Arrow boys were deployed 
alongside the UPDF to fight as “zonal forces”, to protect civilians in rural 
areas (Lomo and Hovil 2004: 54-56). 
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 After Operation Iron Fist, the LRA repositioned themselves in the 
Garamba forest in the DRC, which gave the conflict another international 
dimension, as it had shifted from being situated in Uganda and Sudan to 
being a regional conflict covering the DRC and the Central African 
Republic too. This setting led to the Juba Peace talks in 2006, which went 
on for two years, hosted by the Government of South Sudan. Though a 
compromise was reached for a possible peace accord, the LRA leader 
thrice declined to appear for the official signing of the accord. When 
Joseph Kony declined to turn up, on the 14 December 2008, the UPDF, 
SPLA and DRC army forces merged in an operation labelled ‘Operation 
Lightning Thunder’, apparently meant to kill or capture him and force him 
to sign the peace agreements. However, this operation also failed to 
achieve its objectives (Atkinson 2009:6-13, Okumu-Alya 2009:15-24). The 
LRA and their leader Joseph Kony are still out there, somewhere.  
4.9 Conclusion 
As described above, the conflict has a series of events that are linked to 
the historical background, throughout the post–independence era and the 
political upheavals of the country. This created conditions that helped 
shape the course of events that unfolded in the post-independence era, 
leading up to the civil war in northern Uganda. The armed conflict, as 
shown above, evolves, taking on local, national, regional as well an inter-
national dimensions, and bringing in new issues and new actors through-
out its course. The next Chapter (Chapter 5) contextualises the communal 
violence in the north eastern part of Uganda. This will later be followed 
up by Chapters assessing both conflicts to critique their categorisation and 













This chapter contextualises the communal violence in the north eastern 
region of Uganda, popularly known as ‘Karamoja’. It presents a historical 
overview of how conflicts in this region morphed from the colonial era 
through the post-independence era and the time periods of successive 
governments of Uganda. This presentation combines the empirical field 
findings with views of conflict scholars and reports from local and 
international organisations that have written about the conflict in the 
region. Contextualising the communal violence in Karamoja is significant 
as the dynamics involved in the development of conflicts in this region 
will be used to examine its complex connection with the civil war in 
northern Uganda.  
5.2 The origin and development of conflicts in 
Karamoja 
The Karamoja region of north eastern Uganda has suffered a variety of 
conflicts among different groups in the region. Violent conflict in this 
region dates back to the pre-colonial and colonial period and has been 
present during the time periods of the successive governments of Uganda 
(Muhwereza and Otim 2002:160-163, Gray 2000:408-412, Knighton 
2003:433-439).  The groups living in the region have been involved in 
cycles of cattle rustling and counter-raids, not only against neighbours 
across the border, but also among their own groups and other ethnic 
groups across other districts, and the conflicts have involved the state 
army as well.  
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The Karamojong are the inhabitants of the north eastern region, 
occupying the former Karamoja District, which, after independence, has 
over the years been partitioned into seven districts, i.e., Abim, Amudat, 
Kaabong, Kotido, Moroto, Nakapiripirit and Napak. However, field 
findings suggest that the inhabitants of these districts are not all referred 
to as Karamojong. According to the Chairman of Local Council Five, the 
traditional Karamojong sub-groups are the Matheniko, the Bokora and the 
Pian, referred to as the ‘three cooking stones’. 
 
“Traditionally, the Karamojong are the three main groups: the Matheniko, Bokora 
and Pian. These are the ones traditionally known as the ‘NgiKaramojong’... Now 
Karamoja is a concocted name that was made up by colonialists to bring in all the 
people living in north eastern Uganda, who have similarity in language, are generally 
homogeneous in nature, but may have some differences in cultures and even 
intonation. Therefore, Karamoja is the name/noun that has been used to bring 
together all the 8 or 7 ethnic groups that occupy the extreme north eastern Uganda” 
(Mark Aoel Musooka, LC 5 Moroto District, 10/10/2015). 
 
 The elderly participants emphatically confirmed this as well. In his 
book “The Karamojong, some aspects”, Father Augusto Pazzaglia also notes 
that the term ‘Karamojong’ means the tribal group of the ‘Ngikaramojong’, 
who are distinct from any other groups living in the region such as the Jie, 
Dodos and Labwor, among others (Pazzaglia 1982:13). According to the 
field findings, the Karamojong trace their origin to Nakandanya on the 
Apule River, which they refer to as their cradle land and from where they 
dispersed to occupy their present locations. The local council chairman 
further noted: 
“…that is why you note that everywhere where you see people who identify themselves 
as Karamojong when they have a function or when someone is being buried. They 
have to locate the direction of Apule, because that is where Nakandanya is, where 
we came and dispersed from to the present sub-counties that we now occupy” (Mark 
Aoel Musoka, LC 5 Moroto Ditrict, 10/10/2015). 
 
How much they hold dear this ancestral land is also highlighted by 
Pazzaglia (1982:15) when he points out that: 
“…peaceful years at Apule led to territorial initiatives which in the 
long term effected some change in the inner consistency… For this 
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reason they have always thought nostalgically of it, and in their cere-
monies, always face north…to turn towards it as their dispersal point 
and sacred centre” (Pazzaglia 1982:39). 
 According to field findings, they were forced to migrate from 
Nakandanya due to population pressure as a result of high birth rates and 
an increase in the size of their herds as well. Besides that, they experienced 
pressure from cattle rustlers, the Turkana, who possessed more 
sophisticated weapons:  
“There was a gun that was passing behind the mountains. It ambushed us at 
Apule, it entered and began killing people” (Elderly man, Moroto 
Municipality, 24/09/2014). 
They claimed they could not match up to the weapons of the cattle rustlers 
since they themselves were using clubs, spears, bows and arrows. This 
forced them to disperse. The tribal sub-groups moved forward, but in 
more recognizable ways, and scattered all over the Karamoja region. This 
movement is said to have had a decisive impact in Karamojong territorial 
and political history. As tthe Matheniko (Maseniko, Mogos, Kosowa) 
settled in what became Maseniko county, the Bokora (Bokora, Tome, 
Mosingo and Muno) settled in what was later named Bokora county and 
at the same time, the Pian settled in another area, then known as Pian 
county (Pazzaglia 1982:39, Barber 1968).   
 Despite their re-settlements, they still had pressure from enemies. 
The participants claimed that they had constant attacks from ‘traditional’ 
enemies, with some emphasising a specific enemy and others highlighting 
a number of them; 
 
“Am now 55 years, I was told the enemies of the Karamojong were the Jie, the 
Turkana, the Pokot and the Yala. The Yala are the people of the mountain, the 
Sabiny” (Bishop Abura, Moroto District, 2/09/2014). 
 
 In a Focus Group Discussion, elderly men insisted they had one 
specific enemy:  
 
“We always had one enemy, and those were the Turkana” (FGD 2, Elderly       
men, Rupa sub-county, 24/09/2014). 
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These elderly men claimed that, even after they had been dispersed and 
had resettled, they were still united and used to organise raids as one unit. 
They would meet at the River Omaniman, and each group would send a 
kraal leader to represent them. Two elderly women, who were in their 
nineties, also confirmed this, aptly noting that “we were one” (Two elderly 
women, Rupa sub-county, 25/09/2014). When they would organise cattle 
raids, there was always a purpose attached to it. The elderly men in Rupa 
sub-county noted that the raids were done for re-stocking cattle after loss 
from cattle diseases, phenomenal drought or famine, and, most 
importantly, as a cultural practice that involved acquiring cattle for dowry, 
prestige and their tradition of warriordom.  
 The two elderly women cited above, with their failing memory, 
nonetheless strongly emphasised that the original relationship between the 
Karamojong sub-groups was one of togetherness. This togetherness is 
said to have lasted until December 1973 when the Lokiriama peace accord 
was signed between the Matheniko and Turkana. As allies, the Matheniko 
were used by the Turkana to raid the other sub-groups, creating 
resentment and animosity among them. However, before drowning into 
what the implications of this alliance were, it is important to note that, 
some scholars claim that the successive governments of Uganda, from the 
colonial era onward, were also responsible for the tensions in the region.  
5.2.1 Colonial era (1894-1962) 
The relationship between the successive governments of Uganda and the 
Karimojong has been noted as one of isolation and hostility, explaining 
the communities’ resistance towards state policies. This mistrust is said to 
have originated from the colonial government, which had a significant 
impact on the Karamojong’s social and political lives (Odhiambo 2003:27-
8, Gray 2000:408-9, Muhwereza and Otim 2002:118-122, Markakis 
2004:7-10).  
 Anyone who is not a Karamojong is referred to as a stranger, in the 
local language known as ‘Aryan’ and in plural’ Ngaryanya’ (Bishop Abura, 
Moroto District, 02/10/2014). Currently, these terms are also used to 
describe fellow elite Karamojong. Father Pazzaglia goes on to point out 
that: 
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“Under the Protectorate Government, this meant its officials, includ-
ing African collaborators, chiefs, and other office bearers. After in-
dependence, it meant, and means, the Ugandan Government.” (Paz-
zaglia 1982:16).  
 In 1952, under the British conservation policy, huge chunks of 
pastoral land were converted into game reserves for tourists (Kidepo 
national park, Matheniko game reserve).  This is said to have disrupted 
rotational grazing systems and restricted the endogenous people from 
hunting for survival. Hostility towards the colonial government was 
mainly due to the fact that the focus of the governments of Uganda since 
the colonial period had been on the development of commercial livestock 
ranching. This disregarded the significance of the traditional livestock 
production sector (Muhwereza 2001:100-124, Muhwereza and Otim 
2002:119, Markakis 2004:02). They were of the view that the ways and 
practices of the traditional pastoralists are environmentally and 
economically unsustainable. Mkutu (2006:61) also claims that colonial and 
post-colonial governments gazetted large tracts of pastoral land, which 
forced the pastoralists to compete over smaller areas of pasture and scarce 
sources of water. As John Markakis notes:  
“Freedom of mobility over large tracts of land is essential to pastor-
alist production, and it was a prized prerogative of the people in the 
pre-colonial period…Colonialism deprived pastoralists of autonomy 
and freedom of movement by enveloping them within the bounda-
ries of states established in a new geopolitical pattern” (Markakis 
2004:02) 
 The Karamoja areas, which were used for dry-season grazing, were 
given to the agricultural Teso people of Katakwi, Soroti, Amuria and 
Nakapiripirit, because they were considered suitable for agriculture. The 
implication is that, even before demarcations were made, the Karamojong 
did not settle on that land but used it during the dry season, and because 
of this use, the Karamojong believe they still have some ancestral claim on 
that land (Muhwereza and Otim 2002: 164, Markakis 2004:02). Mamdani 
et al. (1992:23) alleged that the Karimojong lost an estimated total of about 
5,000 square kilometres in all. This, in turn, heightened the conflict 
between the different groups within the region (Muhereza and Otim 
2002:119, Gray 2000:408). 
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 Territorial boundaries, both internal and international, were drawn 
during the colonial period, and these boundaries denied claims to specific 
territories by each group in the country (Muhwereza and Otim 2002: 163, 
Gomes 2002:254-5). Hence, the movement of people was constrained by 
the informal restrictions of strong ethnic identities and formal restrictions 
of national (and internal) borders. According to Leftwich (2008:218), there 
was almost no indigenous definition of geographical boundaries, nor were 
any major ‘national’ movements, or ‘nationalist’ sentiments, involved in 
establishing the boundaries of modern African nation-states. Collier et al. 
(2008:343) note that, as Africa is sub-divided into ethnic identities, these 
borders have created barriers to movement of people even within a 
country, which is the case in Uganda, where district borders have been 
drawn according to dominant tribal identity at the moment of 
demarcation, ignoring historical precedents.  
        The marking of the boundaries around the region included the 
marking of internal boundaries. This, as elsewhere in Uganda, was done 
along perceived tribe or clan claims. The marked-off areas were to become 
counties, in which the land and the administration thereof was allocated 
to particular groups. Although the Karimojong local system of herding 
was characterised by non-formal institutions for sharing resources, the 
government demanded that the herders get written permission from the 
pastoral chiefs to move from one area to another. These boundaries 
interfered with the seasonal movement of the Karimojong that enabled 
them to access water and pasture within their region (Muhwereza & Otim 
2002:119). Earlier studies among the Karamojong indicate that grazing 
was a tribal right, that one was free to graze anywhere within the tribal 
land, subject to mutual agreements (Rhada & Dyson-Hudson 1969:79).  
 For the Karamojong these restrictions were not livelihood-
sustainable because they ran out of the resources necessary for the survival 
of the herds, such as water and pasture during the dry seasons (Muhwereza 
and Otim 2002:163). Collier et al. (2008:343) affirm this when they note 
that, in most of Africa, land rights still reflect some ancestral claim. Gray 
(2000: 408) further suggests that the territorial boundaries of these districts 
were both ambiguous and inconsistent with the geo-political realities of 
pastoral people. From the outset onward, colonial governance was at odds 
with the ecology and politics of subsistence pastoralism, and by 1921, the 
range of seasonal migrations had been contained within newly delineated 
boundaries, a situation that may have had far reaching ramifications for 
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the evolution of violence in Karamoja after the 1950s.  This may have 
played a role in changing the structure and function of violence in the 
region.  
 The creation of administrative units/counties under the divide and 
rule policy, where counties bore the names of sub-groups, was completed 
in 1910 (Barber 1968: 19, Pazzaglia 1982:59, Muhwereza and Otim 
2002:116). This restricted human as well as cattle mobility and instilled a 
sense of belonging between the groups, erasing the larger Karimojong 
consciousness, according to Benedict Lokiru (Employee of Danish Aid, 
Moroto, interviewed on 16/10/2014). At the district level, the creation of 
boundaries caused the loss of access to vital grazing land in Teso and 
Sebei, and also disrupted trading relations. 
 Though the main aim of the Protectorate Government was to do 
away with the ivory hunters and merchants, who were considered 
poachers. Pazzaglia (1982:59) notes that in 1911 Karamoja became a 
closed district on orders of Sir Federick Jackson and a special permit was 
required to visit it. This prohibited the Karamojong from interacting with 
their neighbours. This was also highlighted during the field findings, where 
many informants claimed it would be difficult to explain the flow of events 
without tracing it to the colonial era, as one respondent noted: 
 
“…they carved this place out as a ‘Human Zoo’. So first of all for anyone to get 
inside here, you have to get a permit or visa. Now that was the beginning of neglecting 
Karamoja” (Benedict Lokiru, NGO Danish Church Aid, Moroto 
District 16/10/2014). 
 
 The rulers were very harsh and enslaved the locals. Father Pazzaglia 
notes that the colonial government, notably District Commissioners 
Tufnell (1912-1916) and Turpin (1916-1919), were harsh in the 
administration of the Karamojong. He signals:  
“…recruiting porters and other labourers compulsorily, fining those 
who resisted, demanding large numbers of cattle, and even setting 
villages on fire and ordering the execution of particular individuals” 
(Pazzaglia, 1982:61). 
 The Karamojong, apart from being subjected to forced labour, were 
also forced to pay taxes, and failure or delay in doing so would lead to 
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confiscation of livestock, which stirred high emotions and led to the 
murder of colonial government representatives by the warriors (Pazzaglia 
1982:72). He further notes that they confiscated livestock under the 
pretext of curbing cattle rustling and also attempted disarming the 
Karamojong. These policies are said to have affected these communities’ 
attitude towards a ‘foreign’ government and successive governments of 
Uganda, laying a foundation for hostility towards government actors.  
 The Protectorate Government appointed chiefs as they believed that 
the elders in Karamoja were an obstacle to progress and civilization. When 
the chiefs proved ineffective, the blame was levied on the elders, and to 
curb their influence initiation ceremonies were banned in effort to 
undermine the continuity of the age grade system that initiated elders 
within Karamoja. However, after independence the age grade system was 
revived immediately (Quam 1997, Dyson-Hudson 1966, Barber 1968). 
5.2.2 The Obote 1 era (1962-1971) 
From the early 1950s onwards, the Karamojong were frequently raided by 
the Turkana, Toposa and Didinga and even after independence, cattle 
rustling among the Karamojong and their neighbours continued (Gray 
2000:409-11, Knighton 2003:433-6, Muhereza and Otim 2002:120,163). 
However, some scholars claim that even the successive governments of 
Uganda did little to curb violent conflict between the Karamojong and 
their neighbours. This only further deepened the mistrust the Karamojong 
had towards the state (Muhereza and Otim 2002:113-114, Knighton 
2003:427, Odhiambo 2003:28-29).  
 According to Odhiambo (2003:29), the post-independence 
governments of Uganda treated Karamoja as an unstable zone in which 
only crisis management policies but not policies based on democratic 
principles of governance were applicable. This situation can explain why 
hostility and resentment continued to characterise the government’s 
relations with the Karamojong, and why government efforts to transform 
society over the years, largely failed.  
 He further notes that this unfair treatment and isolation of the 
Karamojong by the political leadership has created a feeling of bitterness 
in the Karamojong communities. This feeling projects itself in the way 
they relate to the communities living in the neighbouring districts: “These 
communities treat the Karamojong as if they originated from a different 
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country” (Odhiambo 2003:29). Odhiambo notes that the widespread 
rumours about the Karamojong as a community consisting of marauding 
warriors, have left the Karamojong with little regard for their fellow 
countrymen, and for their nationality as Ugandans. One of the informants, 
Lokiru Benedict, noted that the local people have a tendency of referring 
to a journey to the next district as a trip to a foreign land when they say “I 
am going to Uganda” (Benedict Lokiru, NGO Danish Aid, 16/10/2014), as 
though they are not part of it.  
 Ben Knighton in the same light also reveals the level of distrust and 
disassociation the Karamjong have towards Uganda and its government 
when he also says: “Indeed…Karamojong have never identified 
themselves as Ugandans nor trusted the government of strangers (ngimoe) 
(2003:448-9). And indeed, Sandra Gray agrees that neighbouring districts 
in Uganda: “Karimojong were regarded as illiterate and brutal savages” 
(2000:410). Harsh treatment and disregard of the communities meant they 
felt insecure, as the state could not protect them from their enemies, the 
‘Turkanas’, on top of having little regard for their voice as a community 
within a state. This could partially explain their effort to protect 
themselves later by acquiring guns and ammunition.  
The participants said that, during the Obote I regime, they were 
severely terrorised by the Turkana who left them with virtually no 
livestock at all. The government, instead of providing them with the 
necessary support and protection, disarmed and imprisoned them. 
According to the Resident District Commissioner of the Moroto District: 
 
“When one was got with a spear, he would be jailed for 4 years. And if 2 or 3 
Karamojong were got together, they would be imprisoned because they are planning 
a raid or are from one” (Sam Abura Pirir RDC, Moroto District, 
09/09/2014) 
 
 In addition to the above, a group of elders remember that period as 
“the year of the spear” or ‘‘Ekaru a mukuki’ (FGD1, Elderly men, Moroto 
Municipality, 19/09/2014). They said they remember that period so 
vividly because, as Obote’s soldiers were disarming them, they raped their 
women in the process, and that is how venereal diseases such as gonorrhea 
were introduced in the region. One of the participants in the FGD, 
remembered how one day soldiers stopped besides them when they were 
509974-L-bw-isimon
Processed on: 1-5-2017 PDF page: 131
 Communal Violence and Beyond in Karamoja 115 
young boys and ordered the eldest among them to climb onto the vehicle 
‘Panda Gari’, and that was the last they ever saw of him.  
 The participants also mentioned the harsh tax collection procedures, 
which also involved the confiscation of livestock. And since a lot of 
mistrust existed towards the state, the forced vaccination of livestock was 
also not welcomed by the Karamojong. They believed the government-
ordered vaccination was meant to harm their livestock. This created even 
more mistrust towards the government and this mistrust was ultimately 
cemented by Idi Amin’s regime. 
5.2.3 The Idi Amin era (I971-1979) 
After Obote 1 was overthrown, Idi Amin took over. The participants, 
especially the older generation, spoke of this era with so much bitterness, 
recalling how the government forced them to take their children to school 
against their will. The participants said that the forced introduction of 
formal education by the government of Idi Amin was not received well by 
the Karamojong community because they felt it would disrupt their social-
cultural way of life.   
 The 1971 Dress Up Decree was mentioned by many participants 
because those who resisted were shot at Nawaikorot in Kangole. These 
executiones are widely remembered by the Karamojong community as 
what the Bishop Abura of Moroto Diocese referred to as the “Nawaikorot 
massacre”, after which those killed were buried in a mass grave. The LC 5 
Chairman of the Moroto District referred to the victims as “Martyrs of their 
Culture”, who deserve to be remembered on a specific date in the calendar, 
every year (Mark Aoel Musooka, LC 5 Chairman, Moroto District, 
10/10/2014). As some participants pointed out: “Amin removed our clothes 
and gave us these leaves. He undressed us, took our beads. We had naked necks” (Two 
old women (aged 90+), Rupa sub-county 25/09/2014). And: “Our parents 




Processed on: 1-5-2017 PDF page: 132
116 CHAPTER 5 
 
 
Photo 6: Photo showing the researcher and the guide beside the mass grave of the 1971 
incident at Nawaikorot, Kangole, in the Napak District.  
 
The victims’ traditional attire which was skins and hides were set on fire 
and their beads forcibly ripped from their necks. Women were forced to 
remove their special wedding bands and break them. The traditional 
hairstyles comprising of heavily fortified clay head gears decorated with 
feathers was forbidden as well and their heads were shaved. One of the 
members of the Karamoja Cultural Association in an informal 
conversation noted that to President Idi Amin, the dress code of the 
Karamoja was a disgrace to his idea of a modern Ugandan State. So most 
of those who marched to seek audience with the County chief at 
Nawaikorot to protest against this decree were gunned down. 
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 The District education officer Mr. Oputa Paul also noted that Amin’s 
regime deployed military people as chiefs, as district commissioners, and 
yet they were indisciplined and recklessly killing people. They would 
behead cattle rustlers in front of their own people, i.e., at the county 
headquarters in Kangole. This was also highlighted by one of key 
informants, the Bishop of the Diocese: 
 
“Now when Amin came, he deployed military people even as chiefs, even as district 
commissioners and these people were so much indisciplined. And again this caused 
our people to be killed, as cattle rustling warriors were beheaded before their own 
people. You are just arrested and taken to the district headquarters in Kangole. 
That is where most of them were killed with bayonets. There was an assistant DC 
who would kill and even lick blood, to show them that he was not an easy man 
(Bishop Abura, 2/10/ 2014, Moroto District).  
 
 As noted earlier, amidst all this turmoil, the Karamojong also 
experienced continuous attacks from neighbouring ethnic groups. The 
participants claimed that the Karamojong were forced to locally 
manufacture guns, due to the continuous raids by the Turkana, Jie and 
Pokot. According to the participants, especially the Turkana continued to 
exert a lot of pressure on the Karamojong. The proximity of the 
Matheniko was disadvantageous to them, forcing some of them to 
disperse and abandon their sub-counties, scattering to other counties. The 
LC 5 chairman claimed that, after he was born, according to his parents, 
the Lotisan sub-county was abandoned completely, due to Turkana cattle 
raids.  In this precarious situation, the Karamojong were forced to upgrade 
their weaponry, from clubs, spears, bow and arrows to one-bullet, locally 
manufactured, guns, ‘Amatida’, made out of wood, a pipe and a string.  
 
“The Turkana terrorised virtually the whole region, and as it happens, when 
somebody meets a challenge, the person tends to think a lot and look for ways of 
mitigating this. Ten years later, that is in 1973, and by the God’s grace I had 
attained the age of reason, some people in Rupa concocted a locally made gun, known 
as ‘amatida’. It was made was made out of these water pipes, like these ones leading 
water to the sink. Some tyre tube, some rod which would be made into a trigger. I 
even do remember the name of the man who invented it , ‘Lodukamoi’, he concocted 
Amatida and the technology was adapted very fast, virtually by the whole region, 
and this Amatida operated in such a way that you put a bullet in, then you shoot, 
then you add a small rod, the size of this pen to remove the cartridge. Then you put 
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another bullet. Suprisingly, 5 years later, by 1978, this Amatida has reached some 
level of automation...” (Mark Aoel Musooka, LC 5 Moroto District, 
10/10/2015). 
 
Barber (1968) claims that gun ownership and gun-related violence 
in the region are nothing new. The Karamojong were already armed by 
the time Europeans scrambled to control Africa. They had previously 
bartered ivory and cattle for weapons from gun owners operating from 
the sprawling gun market in Maji, in south-western Ethiopia. An even 
earlier source of guns were the Arab and Swahili slave traders coming from 
the East African coast. 
Barber (1968) further notes that early, armed violence was the 
result of raids among and between the Karamojong and their neighbours 
and the presence of private armies erected by competing traders in ivory. 
Abyssinian merchants competed with Swahili traders coming from the 
East African coast and both trained and armed elements of the Turkana, 
and Karamojong. These were to protect ivory caravans moving through 
the Karamoja Cluster from their commercial rivals and local populations 
that might attack them. These private armies were quite sizable and, in 
some cases, were deemed to pose a threat to the British who in 1911 sent 
military expeditions to defuse the tension caused by their presence on the 
border of Turkana land, Sudan and Ethiopia.  
 According to Sandra Gray, in 1973, the Matheniko concocted their 
Amatida and the technology was adapted very fast. The Karamojong 
repulsed the Turkana, and by the autumn of 1973, on 18 September, the 
Matheniko and the Turkana signed a peace accord, popularly known as 
the Lokirimia peace accord, with which they promised each other never 
to fight again (Gray 2000: 411, Muhereza and Otim 2002:120).  This was 
also highlighted in an interview with Mark Aoel Musooka, the LC 5 of the 
Moroto District on 10 October 2014. Some other participants claimed that 
gradually the Matheniko and other sub-groups managed to acquire some 
guns as well, which affected the balance of power. The Turkana saw this 
as a danger and decided to ally with the Matheniko. After they had allied, 
the Turkana used the Matheniko against the other sub-groups in the 
region as well as in neighbouring districts.  
 
“The little cattle that was left in Nakapirit, the Pian, the Bokora people, the 
Matheniko brought the Turkana …and then they finished the cattle. This partially 
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explains the divisions, because one of our brothers in the family has decided to ally 
with an enemy. That enemy was attacking all of us, but now they have decided to 
ally and that explains the exclusion of the Matheniko; we began calling the 
Matheniko: Turkana.” (Benedict Lokiru, NGO Danish Church Aid, 
16/10/2014). 
With these divisions created, violent conflict emerged between the 
Karamojong sub-groups. However, since one of them, the Matheniko, had 
decided to ally with the enemy, it as well was branded an enemy.  
 Participants claim that, in 1979, following the fall of Idi Amin’s 
regime, it was mostly the Matheniko who looted the armoury, carrying 
away all kinds of ammunitions. According to Paul Wangoola, the 
Karamojong had suffered suppression and oppression from the state for 
a long time, and, finally, they also had a say in the conflict when they 
acquired guns:  
“Their chance of a lifetime came with the defeat of Idi Amin’s army 
in 1979. The army fled, leaving unattended armoury of sophisticated 
weapons, which Amin had been proud of. It took weeks before 
UNLA and TPDF reached Moroto; by which time the armoury had 
been emptied. All together 12,000 guns (mainly G3) are estimated to 
have been looted. (Wangoola 1999:03).  
The looting of the barracks, police and prison armoury provided guns and 
ammunitions to the Karamojong, which completely altered the situation 
in the region; the Karamojong were now well-armed and this led to a 
different kind of relationship with their neighbours and even among 
themselves. Michael Odhiambo notes that:  
“With the gun, these conflicts have assumed a different dimension 
by reason of the violence, loss and destruction that come in their 
wake. In this connection, the gun may be said to have its greatest 
impact on cattle rustling, dramatically changing the character of a cul-
tural activity that is as old as the pastoral system itself” (Odhiambo 
2003:40). 
5.2.4 The Obote II, Tito Okello Lutwa, regime (I980-1985) 
The Moroto District Information Officer noted that the result of this shift 
in armament was a chaos:  
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“They vandalised everyone…vandalised the whole region, even crossing over to other 
districts …since they had an upper hand of acquiring these guns, with lots of 
ammunitions, they now become terrorists of the neighbours… people were 
traumatised, there was a scare. They did not only torture the Bokora, but also any 
other neighbours like the Pian because they had guns and they were the superpowers. 
So they even extended the torturing to the Pian, even the Jie, even everywhere, even 
beyond to the neighbour districts like Teso, because they had guns and all these 
people did not have guns” (Mr. Mike Kidon, District Information Officer, 
Moroto District, 11/10/ 2014). 
 
And since the other groups had no acquired guns, after the looting of the 
armoury, the Matheniko exerted a lot of pressure on the other groups in 
the region, mainly the Bokora, forcing a large number of them to migrate 
to Iganga, Mbale, Masindi and Busia, among other places: 
 
“The Pian and Bokora suffered most out of this… the Bokora were splashed out, 
they went to Teso, they went to Mbale, Jinja, Busia, Tororo…the Bokora were 
everywhere. (Eko Edward, Assist. CAO, Moroto District, 05/10/2014). 
 
According to Mzee Juma, those onto whom pressure had been applied 
were forced to flee, and those who stayed behind were forced to buy guns 
from the Matheniko. He remembers that “1 gun was exchanged for 30 to 40 
cows” (Mzee Juma, Businessman, Moroto Municipality, 11/10/ 2014). It 
should be remarked that, between 1979 and 1986, the political unrest that 
prevailed in Uganda under the successive regimes provided further 
opportunities for the acquisition of guns.  
 The acquisition of firearms gave a new dimension to the conflict in 
Karamoja (Gray 2000:410-412, Muhereza and Otim 2002:163-164, 
Kaduuli 2008:4, Odhiambo 2003:40-41). It sparked off massive and 
unprecedented cattle rustling, which intensified and altered the nature of 
the conflict, as each sub-group fought against the other. Indiscriminate 
killings of both young and old took place. The aim would be to kill twice 
the number of relatives killed and more (Kidon Michael, DIO Moroto 
District, 11/10/2014).  
 
“Reckless killing when these people would come to raid, someone would come to 
inform them…, and what they would do is to shoot towards that house. Killing 
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everybody, even if there are about 6 or 7 people inside” (FGD 1, elderly women, 
Rupa –Lorikumo Village, 24/09/2014). 
 
 In the old days, killing a fellow Karamojong was not allowed and 
highly punishable by the elders. Taboos concerning the killing of unarmed 
vulnerable groups were understood and respected. There was minimal loss 
of life as cattle raids would be announced in advance, and preparations 
involved moving the women, children and elderly to safety (Stites et al. 
2007:57). Two elderly ladies in their late 90s shared their views about 
clashes in earlier times. 
 
“Those days when they would fight in the bush with spears, and if they had killed 
like 2 of them they would stop, because they would say: if we continue fighting like 
this, the women will become widows, so the moment they saw 2, 3 people had died, 
they would stop the fight.  The group would split, depending on who had raided the 
other” (Two old women (aged 90+), Rupa Sub-county, Lorikumo 
Village, 25/09/2014). 
However, as the historical back ground and field findings suggest, other 
groups also struggled to acquire guns:  
“The contest finally was equalized in the early 1980s. When the Bokora also 
acquired automatic weapons in an ambush on Ugandan military transports 
sent to Karamoja in response to an outbreak of hostilities with the Teso. 
Between 1983 and 1994, Karamoja experienced recurring outbreaks of vio-
lence that far surpassed levels of brutality observed since the colonial era” 
(Gray, 2000:411).  
After acquiring guns. Then they also repulsed the Matheniko as Bishop 
Abura notes;  
 “And so after these people had got enough guns, they revolted against the 
Matheniko and fought them back…The Matheniko were the enemy of the Bokora, 
and the Bokora were the enemy of the Jie, of the Pian, and of the Pokot and of the 
Dodoth….everyone!. Everyone was fighting everyone else” (Bishop Abura, 
Moroto District, 2/09/2014). 
There was a lot of insecurity, as ‘guns became walking sticks’ (District 
Education officer, Mr. Oputa Paul, 13/10/2014). Every corner of 
Karamoja acquired guns. This era was characterised by raids and counter-
raids among the Karamojong, other ethnic groups across the districts and 
across the border as well. It was an unstable period in Uganda, 
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characterised by a lot of insecurity. The proliferation of guns was linked 
to political instability in the country in the early 1980s.  
Curtis Abraham notes that, with the proliferation of guns in the 
region, the the power of the elders, who could control unnecessary and 
reckless cattle raids in the region, was undermined. Without their power, 
there was no control in the region at all. This is illustrated by the following 
quotes: 
“The gun has also caused a dramatic shift in the political and eco-
nomic authority of Karamoja’s elders, the decision makers, and their 
sons, the warriors who traditionally executed the decisions made by 
their fathers. For example, in the not so distant past custom dictated 
that when planning a cattle raid, warriors had first to consult with a 
diviner or receive the blessings of some of the very important elders. 
In contemporary Karimojong society, however, the gun has made the 
warriors both the decision makers and executors” (Curtis 1997, 
quoted in Odhiambo 2003:44). 
“The other thing is the elder, what we call an elder ceased to be an elder because the 
elder who would say “do not do this” would be pointed a gun at by these young 
people and even killed. Women were killed by these young people. The elders lost 
power completely. Their hands were like tied behind, they had no authority at all.” 
(Mr. Oputa Paul, District Education Officer, 13/10/2014). 
 
In relation to the above, the traditional power structures had been eroded, 
social norms that once moderated raiding were dissolved. Conflict 
scholars who have written extensively about the region noted as well that, 
previously, raids were controlled by elders, and the raids were used for the 
benefit of the community such as for the acquisition of a dowry, or for 
obtaining food in times of scarcity. But with the emergence of the gun, 
the youth increasingly took on the raid practice for personal gains. With 
the gun, the character of the conflict in the region changed, not only 
among the Karamojong themselves, but also between the Karamojong 
and their neighbours, within and outside Uganda (Gray 2000:411, 
Odhiambo 2003:40-45, Muhereza and Otim 2002:120-164, Mkutu 
2006:61).  
 Some scholars blame the elders as well for the violence that engulfed 
the region. In the old days, the elders organised and blessed the raids, and 
would even participate in them as well. Their role was so significant that 
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no raid would be carried out without their blessings. They as well through 
their tales of bravery and youthful adventures during the old days they 
encouraged the younger generation to engage in raids, with the hope of 
maintaining that prestigious tradition of bravery. Stories of bravery were 
passed on, but this, according to Augusto Pazzaglia, had huge 
consequences: 
“…without sufficient care for the consequences of their words. The 
elders, telling tales of their youthful adventures, how their spears were 
drenched with blood, incite the younger ones. Perhaps, the latter, lis-
tening to them with awe, and never tiring of hearing such stories, are 
absorbing them in the hope of imitating them and maintaining the 
tradition of bravery” (Pazzaglia 1982:74). 
Furthermore, cultural practices that brought prestige to the people, such 
as the warrior phenomenon and high bride prices were also highlighted as 
some of the reasons for raiding and killing the enemies, the ‘ngimoe’.  
Indeed, during the field exercise the youth warriors spoke of bravery and 
prestige as some of the major drives for them to engage in cattle rustling. 
 The alarming years, during which the elders lost their authority, were 
the 1980s and 1990s, all the way through to the 2000s, up to the point of 
disarmament (Mr. Oputa Paul, District Education Officer, Moroto 
District 13/10/2014). This era introduced new major players, who were 
youth under the leadership of kraal leaders, according to the field findings. 
With so many guns in the hands of the community, the customary 
restraints against unnecessary or excessive raiding and violence could not 
be dealt with. The elders lost their voice (Odhiambo 2003, Gray 2000). 
The elders lost their place in society, which ushered in reckless violence: 
  
“When an elder wants to talk to a youth, they would just point a gun to him…if 
the elder tells a youth to stop raiding, the youth would say, I have not killed someone, 
I have not got any cow and now you are telling me…for you, you already have your 
cows.They would challenge the old men” (FGD 3, elderly men, Rupa sub-
county). 
 
Even the mayor of the Moroto Municipality shared this view. He said that 
whenever an elder would caution the youth, all they would do was put a 
gun to his head and ask him “what are you saying?” The elder would then 
just let them be (Alex Lumu, Mayor of Moroto Municpality, 19/09/2014). 
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Nevertheless, the elders played a significant role in passing on traditions, 
educating the communities about their traditions and blessing raids.  
 The omnipresence of guns also brought about new forms of conflict, 
manifesting themselves in robberies and roadside thuggery. The District 
Information Officer  of the Moroto District claimed that all this road side 
thuggery was out of lawlessness and some of the youth would just do it to 
“practice target shooting” (Kidon Mike Onyang, District Information officer, 
Moroto District, 11/10/2014). He said he had survived several attacks and 
had endured as the only journalist in the region who had chosen to stay 
and document the flow of events. He stressed that the violence was 
bizarre, as it even occurred within a family unit:  
 
“If… the brothers and father is shot dead, the brother can shoot the other brother! 
What next [they move] to the neighbouring villages, the neighbouring whoever… 
They [considered themselves] superpowers because they had guns, so they were free 
to go anywhere, to do anything, [wreak]…any havoc. If all was to be considered, 
they were actually becoming rebels in a way, except their only interest was in the 
animals… What pushed them was to exercise that power, because they had got the 
guns.” (Kidon Mike Onyang, District Information officer, Moroto 
District, 11/10/2014). 
 
Ochieng Odhiambo also in the same light notes that:  
“…raids and counter raids have persisted, and in recent raids, the warriors 
on each side have ended up killing their own kin, including sisters and broth-
ers in-law. It is when relatives cross over to ‘enemy territory’ to bury their 
kin that the absurdity of these killings sinks in” (2003:54).  
The field findings reveal that, apart from the multiplication of guns, 
drought and famine were responsible as well for the intensification of 
violence in the region. The participants said that they had nothing much 
to eat, and the recurring famine and drought seasons would claim their 
livestock, leaving them with no choice at all but to try and survive through 
cattle raiding. These findings are supported by conclusions reached by the 
Mercy Corps (2011:06), which noted that the majority of the locals in the 
region claim that hunger and poverty left them with no alternative 
throughout the years: 
“After 1979, when the guns were raided, the worst hunger in the history of 
Karamoja hit the region and killed so many people. The 1980 hunger, people who 
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are living now are remnants of that hunger. If you ask the elders they will never 
forget this event, that thing (famine) finished people. Now it is because of the 
Turkana having finished all the livestock of the people. And the Matheniko also 
decided to migrate, part of them to join the Turkana since they had already allied 
And remember this was a time of takeover, there was no functional government. 
But at that time for the Turkana the government of Kenya was distributing food to 
them, it is anyway throughout the year, those people depend on relief food. Our 
people survived on local herbs, roots, but many also migrated to Sironko…Teso 
and so on.” (Benedict Lokiru, NGO Danish Aid, Moroto District 
16/10/2014). 
 
Famine and drought were also highlighted as major factors in the 
cattle rustling between the Karamojong and their neighbours. Cattle was 
used for meat, milk, cheese and blood as well; “…their whole economic 
and social life centres on one reality only, that of cattle” (Pazzaglia 
1982:15). During famine periods, blood could be extracted from the cows 
and mixed with milk (the researcher witnessed this during the field work). 
“When famine strikes, the women go into the bush looking for fruits and 
vegetables, from which to make a soup on which to survive” (Pazzaglia 
1982:15). Pazzaglia talks extensively of several droughts in the 19th century 
that were so severe and even threatened the very existence of the people. 
Theyled to an estimated loss of 70% to 90% of the cattle (Pazzaglia 
1982:42, Gray 2000:411, Stites etal. 2007:35-36). 
 The region is a semi-arid area and is, as such, prone to severe 
droughts. Such droughts have frequently occurred (Muhwereza & Otim 
2002:119).  Mkutu (2006:61) also notes that pressure on land and other 
resources had increased in pastoral regions since the independence, partly 
because of the regularity and severity of droughts which the people had to 
endure within the territorial dry lands marked out for them during the 
colonial era. The State of the Environment report (2008:73) acknowledges 
that indeed the rains in this part of the country have become more 
unreliable, heavier and more erratic, affecting agricultural production and 
causing destruction. The dry seasons have become hotter, causing severe 
drought and famine. Although the governments of Uganda, since the 
colonial era, have been against pastoralism. They have labelled it backward 
and primitive, but they have over the years been unable to offer an 
alternative sustainable means of livelihood according to the field findings. 
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 Some scholars argue that the Karamojong are pastoralists out of 
necessity rather than by choice and that pastoralism is the most 
appropriate land-use system in the region (Odhiambo 2003:35, Markakis 
2004:2). They also note that no change has taken place in the region 
because, though the intentions of the governments of Uganda had been 
good, ready-made solutions for the Karamoja region have not been 
successfully applied. The reason for this is that they have been 
manufactured without taking the local people’s values and perceptions 
into account and, worst of all, were meant to be implemented by 
foreigners. As Odhiambo Michael notes, these ideas are: “…conceived 
outside the region without much consultation with the local population, 
and then brought to Karamoja to be implemented by non-Karamojong” 
(Odhiambo 2003:36). This failure of letting the Karamojong own their 
own development could further explain why the region has lagged behind, 
leaving its inhabitants with no option but to engage in cattle rustling.  
 Some informants claimed that these solutions were not implemented 
because of utter laziness on the part of the Karamojong, especially the 
men. According to a business man in Moroto town:  
“The Karamojong are very proud, they dislike cheap labour jobs such as attending 
to a shop. Their work is sleep under a tree, bathe for 2 hours, plan raids and sell 
the loot, polish their gum, drink and eat. Even to date, it is the women who do most 
of the workload of burning charcoal, building tents and huts and doing domestic 
jobs to earn something to feed the family” ( Business man, Moroto 
Municpality, 11 October 2014).  
 
 However, some participants were of the view that women were to 
blame as well for the violent conflict in the region. Bishop Abura argues 
that:  
“The role of women has been indirect, but in one way or another they could be the 
initiators of the fire. You know fire, if you want to make a fire here you get sticks, 
so in one way or another they have been the fuel that makes the fire…The woman 
can coax you when they say: ‘why are you here, others are there. For you, you are 
here looking at me all the time, here on me all the time, when your fellow men are 
out there’, and when the man hears such a thing from his own wife he would rather 
disappear and die there, other than being riddled. Women indirectly have ridiculed 
men and sent them off” (Bishop Abura, Moroto District, 2/09/2014). 
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Some participants noted that rivalry over a girl would sometimes lead 
to murder. Some youth also cited instances in which the elders snatched a 
young man’s wife and that this created rivalry. One of the youth 
participants claimed that: “…if a woman has produced more girls, in the future, 
these girls will get him more cows” (FGD 4, youth, 19/09/2014, Moroto 
Municipality).  
 Some elders would – afterwards - double a woman’s original bride 
price, especially if she had produced many girls, in the hope that the bride 
prices for these girls would bring him more cattle in the future. The field 
findings revealed that women would indirectly coax a man to go raid, 
especially in times of famine or droughts. The male participants claimed 
that the women/wives would bless their sons/husbands before they 
would depart for raids, and would even prepare meals and pack them some 
food for the journey such as maize, sorghum and local alcohol brew. When 
their sons or husbands were away, they would put on special beads or 
clothes and when they returned from the raids, they would ululate, dance 
and sing praises in celebration. The women, however, stressed that such 
festivities were only meant to celebrate their return alive and not to 
encourage them to go raid cattle.  
 Some participants noted that during periods in time when the region 
was extremely insecure, their relatives, who were married to people in 
other clans, would act as spies and help locate the cattle. However, in 
consultations with the women participants, the majority of them denied 
any involvement in such matters and some claimed they would be kept in 
the dark about their spouses’ plans. At times, they would get to know their 
husbands went for a raid when those who return from cattle raids tell the 
wives that: “your husband remained behind or the cows have killed the man” (Akol 
Anne, 18   September 2014, Moroto District). This usually meant that their 
husbands or sons had been killed during the mission. Sometimes they 
would only tell his from a raid when he returns home with cattle.  
Some women participants insisted that they had never encouraged 
their husbands to go on raids and if raiding came up in a woman’s 
conversation with her husband, she would forbid him to take part in it, 
and hold on to him tightly (literally). She would not let go of him, even if 
beaten up by him. According to the women, the reason for this behaviour 
was that some had lost partners and sons and would be afraid to lose 
another, hence they held on to them. Gray et al. (2003:s7-s8) states that, 
more than 70% of male between the ages of 30 and 39 had died as result 
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of raids. They further note that, between 1998 and 1999, more than 300 
women in Karamoja had lost a male child or a husband due to the violence 
involving cattle rustling within the region.  
 Instability continued in the region, providing more opportunities for 
the acquisition of arms. Some Karamojong joined the various armed 
factions, and then from them, returning home with the guns. Mkutu 
(2006:52) notes that further acquisition of SALW occurred in 1985, when 
Karamojong warriors were recruited into the Uganda National Liberation 
Army (UNLA) to fight for the failing Obote II regime. When the National 
Resistance Army defeated the UNLA in 1986, the demobilised 
Karamojong soldiers fled back to Karamoja with all their arms. Lokiru 
Benedict remembers that when he was a young boy in fifth grade of 
primary school, his elder brother was taken for training by the government 
and later taken to fight the NRA government:  
 
“Karamojong were taken there in their thousands to help fight. In thousands, I am 
telling you, and when they had to come back, they came back with their guns. I 
could see them in every village” (NGO Danish Aid Employee, 16/10/2014). 
 
 Thousands of Karamojong are reported to have joined the UNLA in 
1985, after the overthrow of Obote II. The NRM/NRA took over, and 
the Karamojong withdrew, this time with even more modern weapons, 
particularly AK47 guns. In the meantime, there were other opportunities 
as well to get hold of small arms: from the Lord’s Resistance Army, from 
the SPLA, during the the insurgency in Teso among others. It is estimated 
that, in 1998, some 15,000 – 35,000 guns were in civilian hands in 
Karamoja (Wangoola 1999:03). 
From 1980 onwards, the raids intensified and crossed over to other 
districts, like Sebei, Teso and Lango. These communal clashes and cross-
border / cross-district raids continued throughout the time of the regime 
of Tito Okello Lutwa regime (which, in 1985, lasted only 6 months) 
(Mkutu 2006). During this era, the number of arms in Karamoja increased 
further, as soldiers deserting the army sold their guns to the Karamojong. 
Since the Matheniko had exerted a lot of pressure on the other sub-
groups, they too were forced to acquire guns from soldiers desserting the 
army and neighbouring tribes, or getting hold of them by ambushing 
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soldiers. This exacerbated the conflict in the region, as revenge raids and 
counter-raids were carried out. 
 A study carried out by the Mercy Corps (2011:05) concluded that the 
cattle raids during that era were mainly driven by economic interest and 
were conducted for the raiders’ own personal needs. However, during the 
field exercise, the youth warriors cited a number of other reasons for 
which they raided cattle, not only form neighbouring ethnic groups or 
clans but also from within their own clan. Apart from the ubiquitous 
presence of guns, which gave them a motive to raid whenever they wanted 
to, they cited reasons such as ‘petty’ unsettled quarrels, jealousy/envy of 
wealthy relatives, and inability to pay debts or dowries.  
 If, in cases of murder, the murderer would fail to pay a fine of 60 
cows (‘blood cows’), the relatives would demand compensation and a 
failure to give this compensation would lead to raids on even the closest 
relatives of the murderer (Youth warriors, FGD, Moroto Municpality, 
19/09/2014). Some elderly women noted that these youth would go out 
of their way for various reasons, such as vengeance or retaliation for stolen 
livestock;  
“Since they have also stolen cows from my father, what am I doing? I should also 
go and steal and revenge… The youth of those days would get angry because if the 
cows are stolen, the calves would die, forcing them to go and raid (FGD 3, women, 
Rupa – Lorikumo village, 25/09/2014). 
5.2.5 The NRA/M - Museveni era  
Participants claimed that, when the NRM took over, the government 
allowed them to keep their guns for protection against other ethnic groups 
and for protection of their livestock. Since gun ownership had been 
authorised, the sale of guns as well as bullets was done openly, and even 
missions to raid were discussed openly without fear, leading to increased 
tensions in the region. During this period, traditional authority, hijacked 
by the gun, further collapsed. So, also the time period of 1987 to 1999 was 
one of total chaos, characterised by lawlessness, reckless killing and 
insecurity, until NRM government launched the disarmament (Muhereza 
and Otim 2002:120-164, OPM 2007:7, Mkutu 2006:63-64, Mkutu 
2008:103-104). 
 The majority of the participants trace the emergence of intra-commu-
nal violence to after Amin’s downfall from 1979. After the acquisition of 
guns, lawlessness prevailed. This worsened the local security level as raids 
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reached the level of sub-county versus sub-county. One respondent said 
that it was safer for a stranger to move about than for a native of the 
region. The participants also highlighted that the violence at the commu-
nity-level was not of just recent times, but that with the introduction of 
the gun it was reshaped in nature and lethality. 
 As discussed in earlier sections, the relationship between the 
Karamojong and the successive governments of Uganda has been one of 
mistrust – with the governments opposed to their pastoral way of life and 
its implications. However, judging from the participants’ views, the 
conflict between the governments of Uganda and the Karamojong has not 
had a political agenda. One of the key respondents noted this, when he 
said; 
“…the Karamojong have not had a political agenda against the Government of 
Uganda at any one time. But they are only provoked to war when their stakes are 
challenged. For example, when you want to grab their animals or when you tend to 
be a stranger who is aggressive to them” (Bishop Abura, Moroto District, 
2/09/2014).  
 
  Any coercive approach/policy from foreigners that infringes on their 
usual, everyday life, putting them or their livestock at stake, meets 
resistance. Over the years, this contributed to the failure of the 
Karamojong to identify with the successive governments of Uganda. This 
was also influenced by coercive disarmament approaches that were 
adopted by the state actors and forced the communal groups to retaliate. 
During an FGD in the Napak District, in Lokopo Sub-county, one of the 
participants shared his experience during the disarmament: 
 
“They tied me to a tree using my hands and legs. My stomach was facing the ground. 
I just wanted to die. For the whole day! Some people, the ropes cut off their hands 
and legs.They are lame now” (FGD 2, Papa Abia, Napak District – Lokopo 
sub-county, 7 October 2014). 
 
The participants constantly referred to the soldiers as ‘snakes’ and 
attacking them was “going were the snake is”. Participants claimed they would 
clash with the soldiers so as to get their guns and uniforms, to be used 
during raids, as one participant noted. They also mentioned that, whenever 
community members would hear of a clash between soldiers, they would 
run towards them, in the hope of acquiring a gun during times when guns 
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were scarce: “One bullet, one head. Aim to shoot the head so that the combat outfit 
is not destroyed” (FGD 4, youth 4, 19/09/2014, Moroto Municipality).  
With the disarmament programme, meant to help curb the insecurity 
in the region, the NRM government significantly increased its engagement 
in the region. The state violence against the Karamojong, during the 
implementation of its coercive disarmament strategy known as ‘cordon 
and search’, has been cited in the region as alleged human rights violations 
by the UPDF. During these exercises, UPDF soldiers took part in 
unlawful killings, random detention and torture, and theft and destruction 
of civilian property. A report by Human Rights Watch noted that: 
“…in December 2006 and January 2007, UPDF soldiers shot and 
killed 10 individuals, including three children, as they attempted to 
flee during cordon and search operations. Only one of the individuals 
killed was reported to have fired on the soldiers… In four armed 
confrontations with Karamojong communities between October 
2006 and February 2007, at least two of which were preceded by cor-
don and search operations, dozens of civilians were killed, while the 
lives of an unknown number of UPDF soldiers were also claimed” 
(HRW, September 2007: 3-4).  
Furthermore, the UPDF was noted for randomly shooting at 
unarmed civilians, according to that same report by Human Rights Watch:  
“I heard the army vehicles and just ran out. I was trying to run but I 
saw that the soldiers were already there surrounding the (homestead). 
I didn’t even know I was shot until I laid down and saw the blood” 
(B.P., young girl shot during the disarmament operation, Kaabong 
District, December 2006; quoted in HRW, September 2007: 2).  
Ben Knighton also criticizes the actions of the UPDF in Karamoja. He 
claimed that the crude disarmament approach: “…will accomplish the eth-
nocide of the nomadic pastoralist culture of his forefathers, if not their 
genocide” (2003:450). 
 “…an army contingent went in to all the homes to flush out the 
whole population with batons, including a woman whose umbilical 
cord had not yet been cut from childbirth. Children were beaten; 
small girls, a harmless, mentally-ill girl, the old, the blind, the lame, 
and infirm bore the scars nineteen days later. Bones and skulls were 
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broken. Tweleve women were raped. A six –year old-boy was killed, 
but hidden with grass on the hill. A young man was bayonetted and 
hidden under a rock at the top of the hill…A youth was stabbed in 
the groin. The army stopped the LC5 Chairman, the senior locally 
elected representative, from going there. All were made to lie in the 
dry-season sun from 6 a.m to 4 p.m” (Knighton 2003:440).  
Tracking the state policies and actions of government troops in Karamoja 
from the Protectorate Government to the current NRM Government. 
Ben Knighton concludes that that the UPDF army, views the Karamojong 
as “an old enemy unworthy of respect” (Knighton, 2003:449). He also 
notes that some elements within the army were using the disarmament 
exercise as “an opportunity to exact revenge on the feared and despised 
pastoralists, taking their cattle, persecuting, and killing” (Knighton 
2003:447), because of the distress they had inflicted on the neighboring 
ethnic groups of Lango, Acholi, Teso and Sebei among other. This distress 
has been as a result of cross district conflicts for decade’s involving series 
of cattle raids, looting, rape, reckless killing and consequent displacement 
of thousands of people in to IDPs in these regions (Global IDP database 
report 2005:42-5).  
5.3 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this historical account and the field findings reveal that the 
region experienced various kinds of conflict; conflict between the Kara-
mojong and cross-border ethnic groups such as the Turkana and Pokot, 
conflict within Karamojong ethnic groups such as the Bokora, Matheniko, 
Pian and Jie, conflict between the Karamojong and state actors as well as 
cross-district conflict between Karamoja and neighbouring-district ethnic 
groups such as the Iteso, Sabiny, Langi and Acholi. The following chapters 
will synthesize both cases to understand the interconnections between the 
communal violence in Karamoja and civil war in northern Uganda.
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6 A Critique of the Conceptualisation: 




The structure of this chapter is as follows. The next section revisits the 
UCDP conceptualisation of civil war and communal violence. This is 
followed by a discussion on how this conceptualisation aligns with conflict 
progression models, in relation to the course of the armed conflict in 
Northern and North eastern region of Uganda. This, in turn, is followed 
by a discussion of the interlinkages and direct spillover effects of either 
type of conflict on the other. Finally, this is followed by a discussion about 
state intervention in communal violence, an issue quite significant as the 
state is one of the key differentiating features in the conceptualisation of 
these conflict typologies.  
6.2 A critique using UCDP datasets 
According to the UCDP conflict data programme, the conceptualisation 
of civil war and communal violence is specific, simple and clear. What is 
important to note is the distinction in the specific features of each conflict 
typology. These two conflict categories are both intra-state typologies of 
conflict, but differ at various levels, as discussed in Chapter 3.  
 As defined earlier, the way ‘civil war’ has been defined, it involves the 
state while ‘communal violence’ does not at any level. What is also signif-
icant to note is that, these definitions assume a sort of linear conflict stag-
ing, which, however, does not capture the dynamics involved as these con-
flicts become protracted, and change form and direction over time, as 
highlighted in Chapters 4 and 5. These violent conflicts have various var-
iations in their development as well as in the actors involved. They do not 
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evolve with a clear series of proceeding stages as suggested by the linear 
conflict progression model.  The pathways of these conflicts are full of 
uneven, transformative, non-linear events. Their transition from one stage 
to the next cannot be subjected to predictable models and conceptualisa-
tions that suggest a specific form, direction and duration for each stage. 
Each stage has varying degrees of complexities as the conflict unfolds. 
These diverse ‘passages’ do not follow a prescribed trajectory. The violent 
conflicts, in all their messiness, do not fit into a simple stage-by-stage 
model that is within any particular actor’s control. These conflicts advance 
from stage to stage with varying markers signaling a change in form and 
direction. These complexities engender numerous variations from a 
straight progression model.  
 As earlier noted, conflict progresses through a number of phases. 
From a latent stage, they can be triggered off by particular events leading 
to the beginning of violent conflict. As presented in the historical 
background and field findings, cattle rustling was a cultural practice by the 
Karamojong since the pre-colonial era, so clashes with neighbouring 
pastoral groups were nothing new. Even after the resettlement of the 
Karamojong in the Karamoja region within specific/recognisable counties 
such as the Matheniko, Pian, or Bokora County, they still continued to 
experience and practice cattle rustling from and to neighbouring, cross-
border ethnic groups within the vicinity (Barber 1968, Muhwereza and 
Otim 2002:160, Gray 2000:408-412, Knighton 2004:433-9). The 
communal clashes between the Karamojong and the neighbouring groups 
can be categorised as communal violence, which falls under the non-state 
conflict category.  
 In the northern region, the latent stage from which tensions emerged 
is traced to 1986, when panic and fear among ex-UNLA soldiers triggered 
off rebel activity under the UPDA against the NRA, after the latter took 
over power in 1986. This happened when NRA forces, deployed in 
Acholiland, began committing atrocities against the Acholi population 
(Gersony 1997:22, Lamwaka 2002:28). These were the early phases of 
both conflicts. However, the nature of the traditional conflict between the 
Karamojong and their neighbours changed significantly after the 
overthrow of Idi Amin in 1979, as the historical account and field findings 
suggest as discussed in details in Chapters 4 and 5. 
 Attempts to resolve the conflicts in their initial stages were made; a 
case in point is the 1988 Pece Peace Agreement in Gulu between some 
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UPDA rebel faction members and the NRA government. However, not 
all faction members gave up; people like Vincent Otti, and Odong Latek 
proceeded to join forces with the LRA and continued to fight against the 
NRA government (Lamwaka 2002:31-33, Doom and Vlassenroot 
1999:15). Even in the Karamoja region, when the Turkana from Kenya 
exerted a lot of pressure on the Matheniko, the latter were literally forced 
to betray their fellow tribesmen and ally with the Turkana in 1973, in what 
is still celebrated as the ‘Lokiriama Peace Accord’ (Gray 2000:411, 
Muhereza and Otim 2002:120), but – instead - worsened the tensions in 
the region among the Karamojong. Even when violence further engulfed 
the region, peace meetings were held between elders, but those were never 
binding and always short-lived and would be broken whenever the need 
for cattle would arise. 
 As noted above, in the absence of immediate resolutions, these 
conflicts dragged on and escalated further. This negatively affected the 
relationships between the conflicting parties and shaped their next moves 
and actions. As noted earlier, the escalation point of the communal 
violence in north eastern Uganda is traced to the overthrow of Idi Amin 
in 1979, when the armoury was looted in the Moroto Barracks. The 
acquisition of guns and ammunition from the armoury triggered an open 
sub-group conflict amongst the Karamojong (Mkutu 2006:61, Odhiambo 
2003:40, Muhwereza and Otim 2002:163-164).  
 The field findings gave the impression that, after that incident, all hell 
broke loose as retaliation led to counter-raids and reckless killings among 
and within the Matheniko, Bokora, Pian and other ethnic groups in the 
neighbouring districts and across the border in Kenya and Sudan – 
sparking off massive, unprecedented cattle rustling and indiscriminate 
killings of both young and old within the region (Odhiambo 2003:54, 
Kaduuli 2008:4, Gray 2000:410-12).  
 The looting of the armoury evolved into clashes between the 
Karamojong and cross-border ethnic groups, conflict between the 
Karamojong and neighbouring ethnic groups; cross-district conflicts, 
conflict among the Karamojong sub-groups and conflict within specific 
sub-groups (Gray 2000:411, Odhiambo 2003:51-58). Nathalie Gomes 
refers to the clashes between the Karamojong themselves and other ethnic 
groups as intra and inter-ethnic conflict (Gomes 2002:245).  
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Table 6.1 UCDP non-state conflict dataset for communal violence 
in north eastern Uganda 







Karimojong Pokot  1998 134 134 134 Uganda 
Bokora(K’jong) Matheniko 1999 352 352 572 Uganda 
Matheniko 
(K’jong) 
Pokot 1999 36 36 36 Uganda 
Jie Turkana 1999 40 40 40 Kenya 
Karamojong Pokot 2000 60 60 60 Uganda 
Dodoth Turkana 2000 70 70 70 Uganda 
Bokora(K’jong Jie, 
Matheniko 
2000 48 48 48 Uganda 
Bokora (Kjong) Jie, 
Matheniko 
2000 213 213 213 Uganda 
Bokora(K’jong) Matheniko 2000 60 60 60 Uganda 
Dodoth Jie 2000 135 135 135 Uganda 
Dodoth Toposa, 
Turkana 
2000 43 43 43 Uganda 
Dodoth Jie, 
Matheniko 
2000 33 33 33 Uganda 
Iteso Kara-
mojong 
2001 32 32 32 Uganda 
Pokot Sabiny 2003 30 30 50 Uganda 
Bokora(K’jong) Pian 
(K’jong) 
2003 30 30 30 Uganda 
Bokora (K’jong) Jie 2003 102 102 102 Uganda 
Karamojong Pokot 2003 53 53 53 Uganda 
Pian(K’jong) Pokot 2003 34 34 34 Uganda 
Jie Matheniko 2005 26 26 26 Uganda 
Dodoth Jie 2005 30 30 30 Uganda 
Bokora(K’jong) Pian 
(K’jong) 
2005 28 28 28 Uganda 
Bokora (Kjong) Jie 2007 34 34 34 Uganda 
Jie Turkana 2008 57 57 57 Kenya 
Dodoth Jie 2009 38 38 38 Uganda 
 
  Source: UCDP Non-state conflict dataset v2.5-2014 
http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/replication_datasets/ 
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All these violent conflicts, involving the different groups mentioned, 
encompass what the Uppsala conflict code book classifies as non-state 
conflicts, or more specifically, communal violence. However, the reckless 
killings of unarmed civilians within the Karamojong sub-groups and 
against other ethnic groups, that later emerged, take up the classification 
of one-sided violence. Though this is highlighted by the key informants 
and several scholars who have written about the conflict in the region, it 
is not noted and coded in the Uppsala conflict data programme for non-
state conflicts. 
 Tables 6.1 and 6.2 show the various conflicts among the Karamojong, 
with other ethnic groups from neighbouring districts and with groups 
from across the border in Kenya. 
 With regard to the course of the armed conflict in northern Uganda, 
the escalation and entrapment phases were characterised by the LRA as 
well as the NRA forces launching campaigns of one-sided violence against 
the local population of Acholiland from 1989 onwards. This brutal 
campaign involved abducting civilians, setting villages ablaze, ambushing 
vehicles, and mutilating people by cutting off their lips, nose, arms and 
legs, etc. (OCHA/IRIN 2004:10, Doom and Vlassenroot 1999:26, Dolan 
2009:57-63). What is important to note is that the UCDP one-sided 
dataset codes one-sided violence by the government of Uganda only in 
1990/91 and codes the LRA against the civilians from 1989 throughout 
the whole course of the armed conflict. It codes high and low fatalities 
varying over the years committed by solely the LRA against civilians in 
Uganda, southern Sudan, and later stretching out to the DRC and CAR 
(UCDP One-Sided Violence Dataset v1.4-2014, 1989-2013, see also Table 
6.2). Yet, according to the field findings, the state was one of the main 
perpetrators of violence against unarmed civilians throughout the course 
of the armed conflict in the north (Dolan 2009:61-62). 
 As noted in Chapter 5, some of the participants mentioned that the 
number of people who died as a result of attacks from rebels and UPDF 
soldiers did not match up to the number of people who died as a result of 
insufficient services provided by the government in the camps in which 
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Table 6.2 UCDP one-sided violence in Uganda 
 







GoU 1990 80 80 80 Uganda 
GoU 1991 59 59 59 Uganda 
UPA 1990 40 40 40 Uganda 
LRA 1989 26 26 36 Uganda 
LRA 1990 63 63 63 Uganda 
LRA 1991 102 102 102 Uganda 
LRA 1995 275 275 285 Uganda, Sudan 
LRA 1996 586 586 666 Sudan, Uganda 
LRA 1997 452 452 452 Uganda, Sudan 
LRA 1998 105 105 105 Uganda,Sudan 
LRA 1999 33 33 56 Uganda, Sudan 
LRA 2000 94 94 104 Uganda, Sudan 
LRA 2001 60 60 69 Uganda, Sudan 
LRA 2002 1054 1054 1077 Uganda, Sudan 
LRA 2003 635 635 922 Uganda, Sudan 
LRA 2004 957 916 1050 Uganda, Sudan 
LRA 2005 304 304 308 Uganda, Sudan 
LRA 2006 47 47 62 Uganda, DRC, Sudan 
LRA 2007 62 62 62 Sudan, Uganda 
LRA 2008 732 732 1065 DRC, Sudan, CAR 
LRA 2009 1352 1316 1422 Sudan, DRC, CAR 
LRA 2010 434 424 462 Sudan, CAR, DRC 
LRA 2012 64 64 64 CAR, DRC, South Sudan 
LRA 2013 45 45 49 DRC, CAR, South Sudan 
Source: UCDP one-sided violence dataset v1.4-2014  
GoU – Government of Uganda  
LRA –Lord’s Resistance Army  
http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/replication_datasets/ 
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 Chris Dolan argues that the state should be held accountable for the 
enormous number of people who died in the IDP camps, which he refers 
to as ‘social torture” and likens these ‘protected villages’ to concentration 
camps (Dolan 2009:109-110). He notes that for the people of northern 
Uganda with the alarming number of death these so called protected vial-
lages, “…were nolonger just a feature of the war zone for the majority of 
the population, they were the war zone” (Dolan 2009:109). The architec-
ture of IDP camps put civilians more at risk, with poor living conditions 
and diseases; the number of deaths documented were higher than battle-
related ones. Jan Egeland, the United Nations Chief Humanitarian officer, 
after touring the camps, described the situation as “the biggest neglected 
humanitarian emergency in the world” (The Guardian, 22 October 2004). 
 The “Health and Mortality Survey among Internally Displaced Persons in 
Gulu, Kitgum and Pader District, Northern Uganda”, carried out by the World 
Health Organisation and the Uganda Ministry of Health argue that it was 
an extreme case of structural violence. According to their findings, an es-
timated 1,000 excess deaths a week, was due to the appalling conditions in 
the camps and diseases such as cholera, Ebola and Aids (WHO, MOH 
2005). In an Unobtrusive way, these situations produced far greater num-
ber of deaths compared to those caused by the LRA.  
 Another survey, carried out by a team of British and Ugandan psychi-
atrists from the London School of Tropical Medicine and Makerere Uni-
versity’s Faculty of Medicine, established that “the prevalence of post-
traumatic stress disorder in northern Uganda is higher than that ever rec-
orded anywhere in the world” according to the New Vision Newspaper 
article “Northern Uganda has Most Depressed in the World” (Saturday Vision, 
16 August 2008).  The report noted that IDP conditions produced trau-
matic stress rates among the people that were much higher than those 
registered in Darfur or Iraq. And were attributed to the lack of essential 
basic services such as food, water, and shelter. Such indirect deaths are not 
captured by the UCDP, as they do not fall in the categories of direct battle 
fatalities. 
 After the unsuccessful peace negotiations in 1993/94, the armed con-
flict acquired yet another level, when it moved beyond the borders of 
northern Uganda into Sudan. The LRA obtained support from the Suda-
nese government and a base from which to continue its activities. With 
the loss of formal communication channels, the parties to the conflict got 
entrapped in a retaliatory and counter-coercion cycle, which deepened the 
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conflict. The LRA and UPDF were entrapped in an action-reaction cycle. 
The LRA also engaged in battle field confrontations with other rebel fac-
tions such as the SPLA and also carried out attacks on villages and town 
centres in southern Sudan and northern Uganda. After a series of clashes 
and accusations in 2000, a peace agreement was signed between the Ugan-
dan and Sudanese government. This agreement culminated in a joint op-
eration of the rebel faction SPLA and the Ugandan army (UPDF) against 
the LRA (Atkinson 2009:8, Okumu-Alya 2009:6-7, Kustenbauder 
2010:468). This event introduced different conflict categories within what 
was a single conflict. The LRA and SPLA were highly organised rebel fac-
tions and the combat between them is in a non-state conflict category: 
Organizational level 1 (Sundberg et al. 2012: 353). As the conflict pro-
gressed, both rebel factions were receiving support from their allies, state 
actors Sudan and Uganda. 
  The conflict transformed to an inter-state conflict since both gov-
ernments deployed active troops to engage in combat alongside the rebel 
factions that were fighting against their respective governments. In addi-
tion to that, the situation could also be categorised as an extra-state armed 
conflict, since the Ugandan army was fighting the LRA outside its own 
territory (Gleditsch et al. 2002:619). However, though events unfolded the 
way they did, according to the field findings, only a civil war was coded in 
northern Uganda. And it was not until 2005 that any internationalised con-
flict wass coded by the UCDP data programme, as shown in Table 6.3 
below. 
 As noted earlier, this cross-border cooperation crippled the LRA’s 
military capacity and led to the loss of a base for the LRA rebel faction. 
The peace deal granted the Ugandan government permission to pursue 
the LRA into Sudan.  In 2002, a joint operation, entitled ‘Operation Iron 
Fist’, between Uganda and Sudan, was launched to expel/level-out the 
LRA from Sudan. Consequently, the LRA retaliated by committing hor-
rendous atrocities on civilians in both Sudan and Uganda. This ushered in 
unprecedented attacks and abductions as well as intensified violence and 
insecurity in the region, which led to the displacement of thousands of 
people who sought refuge in Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps 
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Table 6.3 Uppsala Conflict Data on armed conflict in northern 
Uganda 
 
Year Parties Intensity 
Level  
Type  
1986-1989 Government of 
Uganda vs HSM, 
NRA, UPDA, UPA, 
Lord’s Army, LRA 





Uganda vs LRA, UPA 
Minor  Internal armed conflict 
1996  ADF, LRA, WNBF War Internal armed conflict 
1997 – 2001 
*1999 ADF 
ADF, LRA Minor Internal armed Conflict 
2002  ADF, LRA War Internal armed Conflict 
2003 LRA Minor Internal armed Conflict 
2004 LRA War Internal armed Conflict 
2005 LRA Minor  Internationalised armed 
conflict 
2006 LRA Minor Internal armed conflict 
2008 - 2014 LRA Minor  Internationalised armed 
conflict 
Source: UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, V.4 – 2015, 1946 -2014 
http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/replication_datasets/ 
 In 2003, the LRA incursions into the neighbouring districts of Teso 
and Lango in the northern and eastern part of Uganda, in the districts of 
Lira, Apac, Katakwi, Soroti and Kaberamaido, resulted in several hundred 
deaths and abductions of (mainly) children, and also pushed thousands 
into IDPs (Lomo and Hovil 2004:51-58). Due to the UPDF’s inability to 
cope with the events, this development led to the formation of paramili-
tary groups / local militias, known as ‘Amuka’ or ‘Rhino Boys’ in Lango 
and ‘Arrow Boys’ in the Teso region.  
 The UCDP non-state conflict datasets code only Arrow Boys vs LRA 
as seen in the table 6.4 (below). The government, against the idea of them 
operating as independent militias, for security reasons, since most of the 
recruits were former rebels from the Teso-based defunct Uganda people’s 
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Army (UPA), opted to deploy them with UPDF units, to protect civilians. 
The spread of the war was articulated by many as occurring along ethnic 
lines; it created antagonism as well along those lines, since it was regarded 
as ‘an Acholi war’ (Lomo and Hovil 2004:58). However, the clashes be-
tween the LRA and these paramilitary groups are classified as a non-state 
conflict: organizational level 1(Sundberg et al. 2012:353), and this was be-
fore they were assigned to fight alongside the Ugandan army. 
 
Table 6.4 UCDP non-state conflict between LRA and SPLA 
 







LRA SPLM/A 1995 36 36 36 Sudan 
LRA SPLM/A 1996 152 152 152 Sudan 
LRA SPLM/A 1997 100 100 100 Sudan 
























Source: UCDP Non-state conflict dataset v.2.5-2014 
http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/replication_datasets/ 
 In addition to the above, after the Operation Iron Fist and its incur-
sions in the north eastern districts of Uganda, the LRA relocated to the 
Garamba forest in the DRC, which gave the conflict another international 
dimension, as it expanded from Uganda and Sudan to the DRC, and to 
the Central African Republic as well (Atkinson 2009:13, Dunn 2010:50).  
 With regard to the escalation-entrapment phase of the conflict in the 
north eastern region, the field findings suggest that the violence, combined 
with insecurity, lasted throughout the 80s and 90s, until the sixth 
parliament, on 15 March 2000, passed a resolution to disarm the region. 
This was after about 400-500 warrior deaths had been registered among 
the Bokora and the Matheniko, between July and September 1999. These 
killings had been masterminded and perpetrated by Bakora and Matheniko 
warlords (OPM report January, 2007:9-12).   
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 After phase one and two, a disarmament phase three, was launched 
in March 2006, which involved military intervention in a bid to clear the 
region of illegal weaponry. However, due to the militant and crude 
disarmament approach used, many civilian deaths occurred as a result of 
occasional combat between government soldiers and the warriors. These 
occasional clashes were found to be the result of self-defence, or of an 
effort to recover the weapons or confiscated cattle, or of retaliation for 
harsh treatment leading to deaths on both sides (HRW 2007:36-64, Safer 
World 2010:39). The region had experienced what was referred to as 
communal violence, but later the presence or intervention of the state and 
its army as well as paramilitary forces that engaged in combat with local 
warriors, leading to deaths, presented a whole new feature of the conflict 
in the region. 
 The UCDP data programme emphasizes that non–state conflicts 
should be between groups of the same level of organisation and no state 
or government should be involved at any level or be the main target. The 
national army is of a higher organisational level than the informally 
organised groups within Karamoja. When a highly organised group like 
the national army engages with a relatively unorganised armed force, this 
can be problematic in so far as it leads us to question what forms of 
conflict issues are considered in the definition of such encounters.  
 During the disarmament phases, events occurred of one-sided 
violence, conducted by the army, which led to the killing of unarmed 
civilians, and caused deaths on the side of the army as well. In a newspaper 
article entitled “900 killed during disarmament”, in the Daily Monitor, it 
was noted that:  
“…according to a report released…by the UPDF, 623 civilians and 
269 soldiers were killed either in crossfire or ambushes, which 
brought the army under the spotlight over alleged human rights 
abuses as they carried out disarmament” (Kolyangha 2011). 
 Despite how events were recorded in the north eastern region and 
how the conflicts unfolded, the UCDP did not code any incidences of 
clashes between the army and the local warriors, nor did it code the one-
sided violence inflicted on the people of Karamoja through the 
disarmament exercise carried out by the UPDF. This phase of the conflict 
was intended to be the de-escalation phase, involving the disarmament of 
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an armed population, but, quite unique from what usually ensues round-
table peace agreements, combat was part and parcel of it. 
 The final stage of a conflict is the de-escalation phase, which is usually 
composed of peace talks and resolutions leading to settlement35. When the 
LRA re-positioned to the DRC, the Juba peace talks were set in motion. 
The initiative for these peace talks was taken in 2006 by the LRA and the 
NRM; the talks went on for two years, hosted by the government of South 
Sudan, but hit a dead end when LRA leader Joseph Kony three times in a 
row refused to turn up and sign the agreement. This led to the merging of 
forces; the UPDF, SPLA and DRC armed forces, in an operation entitled 
“Operation Lightening Thunder”, tried to capture him but failed. With no 
victory declared by either side, the LRA and its leaders are still at large, 
while in the north eastern region disarmament resulted in the collection of 
a massive number of guns, which brought some ‘peace’ to the region (At-
kinson 2009:13, Dunn 2010:50).  
 As illustrated above, these two conflict categories, evolved displaying 
traits of different conflict types throughout their course. These conflicts 
were not static, as depicted by how they have been conceptualised and 
categorised. They evolved into narrower and wider conflict categories and 
ran the course of numerous conflict progression models back and forth. 
As the study reveals, the rigidities applied in the definition of these conflict 
types should be checked and questioned, because the dynamics of some 
violent conflicts, such as those in North and North eastern region of 
Uganda, cannot be captured in these rigid definitions. It is also important 
to note that the failure to acknowledge the role of significant local and 
external actors involved in these conflicts undermines their role in perpet-
uating them. The way these conflicts are coded and categorized plays a 
part in casting blame on other actors involved. 
                                                 
35Ho-won Jeong argues that, if no agreement is reached, the conflict may escalate 
again, or de-escalate. He further notes that if peace efforts between the opposing 
sides fail, re-escalation may occur, hence creating a stalemate”, with none of the 
sides victorious and with none willing to compromise, the situation can endure 
for long as one of the parties is optimistic of victory (Jeong 2008:98-99). 
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6.3 The complex “spill over effect” between these 
conflicts. 
These violent conflicts spanned on concurrently for decades. It is im-
portant to understand the complex dynamics and connections between 
these conflicts; how the pathways of either conflict impacted on the course 
of the other.  
This is significant because, since the launch of the Uppsala Con-
flict Data Project, the first of its kind to provide systematic global data on 
group-to-group violence (Sundberg et al. 2012:351-361), attention has 
been given to the need to understand the relationship between communal 
violence and civil war. According to Brosche and Elfversson (2012:47), 
this has been the case especially since the UCDP non-state conflict data 
and state-based conflict data combined showed that, between 1989 and 
2010, over 55% of active communal violence coincided with an ongoing 
civil war. They also noted that within that very same period,  on average, 
68% of all communal violence erupted in countries that had experienced 
civil war within two years after or before the outbreak of communal vio-
lence. Furthermore, they noted that, on average, 81% of all communal 
violence was witnessed in countries that were experiencing civil war at the 
same time. This has been the case with Uganda, which has had different 
types of violent conflicts, running concurrently for decades.  
The spill over effects of concurrently running conflicts is an issue 
that a number of scholars have endured to understand especially in rela-
tion to the onset of wider or smaller conflicts as well as its contribution to 
the protraction of a conflict (Jeong 2008, Murdoch & Sandler 2002, Millett 
2002). Khadiagala (2006) notes that most of the conflicts in Africa have 
been ignited and reignited by instability in neigbouring states. This is the 
case because such occurrances can impact on the dynamics of other con-
flicts. This can also be the case for conflicts within the same country, “The 
simultaneous occurrence of multiple conflicts can generate unexpected ef-
fects in the course of each” (Jeong 2008:126). This is because, “As con-
flicts do not often have clear temporal and spatial boundaries, they are 
interlocked in terms of their impact on each other’s dynamics” (Jeong 
2008:117, See also Murdoch & Sandler 2002 ). 
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Figure 6.1: Communal violence and civil wars, 1989-2010 
 
Source: Brosche & Elfversson (2012:47) – UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset v.2.3-2011 and 
UCDP/PRIO (Peace Research Institute Oslo) Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2011 
http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/replication_datasets/ 
According to the field findings, the communities in these conflict-
affected regions had similar structural conditions, tracing back to the co-
lonial era. These conditions as discussed in earlier Chapters, played a huge 
role in how tensions unfolded in the two regions. The identities of the 
communities had been shaped by the administrative policies of the Pro-
tectorate Government, and this had important implications for the way 
events unravelled in both regions. 
With that in mind, the role of politics and political struggles at the 
national level, and how they affected both regions, should be taken into 
consideration. What is significant to note is that, the group to group 
violence in Karamoja had spanned decades. And the political upheavals at 
the national level affected this conflict through out. Later, as the field 
findings reveal, state policies in relation to Karamoja besides the obvious 
effect of constant military coups and political instability, affected 
Karamoja which in turn had implications for neighbouring districts 
notably Acholiland and Teso. The effect the group to group violence had 
on the armed conflict in north Uganda is traced even before its onset. 
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 The onset of hostilities after 1979, when Idi Amin was overthrown, 
and the recurring coups that characterised the political scene, affected 
both the northern and north eastern regions. For the Karamoja region, 
this led to the proliferation of guns and ammunitions, which played a huge 
role in redefining the nature of the conflict. This proliferation came about 
because, as noted earlier, the military barrack was abandoned by the army 
and looted by the local communities within vicinity. This is because the 
acquisition of guns and ammunitions by the local people, who had 
previously been using mainly bow and arrows plus spears, armed them to 
the teeth, and drastically changed the nature of the conflict in the region36. 
Such connections between the tensions at the national level and the way 
in which the conflict in the north eastern region evolved should not be 
underestimated, because that played an important role in the history of the 
violence in Karamoja. 
 In addition, the political instability that followed the overthrow of Idi 
Amin in 1979, led to the guerrilla warfare, from 1980 to 1986, in the 
Luweero triangle. This guerrilla war was fought by the Obote II 
government against numerous rebel groups such as Dr. Kanyira Andrew’s 
Uganda’s Freedom Movement/Army(UFM/A), Brigadier Moses Ali’s 
Uganda’s National Rescue Front (UNRF), General Lumayo’s Former 
Uganda National Army (FUNA) (Kutesa 2006, Nsubuga 1999).  
 These political upheavals provided another opportunity for the 
Karamojong to acquire weaponry and ammunition. As noted earlier, when 
Tito Okello Lutwa took over government in 1985, he recruited, trained, 
armed and transported some Karamojong to the Luweero triangle to help 
the government fight the rebel factions37. However, when the NRA took 
over power in 1986, these Karamojong fled and returned home with their 
guns, just like the ex-UNLA soldiers. This one-way shift in the possession 
of guns and ammunition not only affected the Karamoja region, but the 
entire northern region as well (Otunnu 1987, Ofcansky 1996) 
 Furthermore, when the NRA took over power in 1986, it officialised 
the ownership of guns in the Karamoja region, and even provided the 
Karamojong with extra guns to protect themselves and their cattle. This 
disastrous move worsened the situation of gun proliferation in the region, 
                                                 
36 Interview with LC 5, Moroto District,  Mark Aoel Musooka (10/10/2015) 
37 Interview with Benedict Lokiru (16/10/2014) 
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and intensified cattle rustling and insecurity in the region and neighbouring 
districts (Gray 2000:410-412). Some participants suggested that the 
government took this decision, because they had a lot of rebel factions to 
deal with and did not want an additional ethnic group to worry about. 
Sverker Finnstrom writes: 
“Within two years of Museveni’s takeover, some twenty–seven dif-
ferent rebel groups were reported to be resisting the new govern-
ment…In effect, the battle zone simply shifted location, from central 
Uganda toward the north and the country’s other peripheries” 
(Finnstrom 2008:69). 
 It appeared as though the violent conflict in Karamoja was 
insignificant to the NRA government that had just taken power. But, it 
would also make sense to argue that the Karamojong were fighting a proxy 
war for the state by indirectly distabilising the neighbouring rebel 
communities of Acholi and Teso, which were fighting the NRA 
government (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999:12, Henriques 2000:47, 
Knighton 2004:447-449). Besides encouraging the Karamojong to own 
guns, after he was sworn in, Museveni disbanded all the tribal militias 
which guarded the borders of the districts neighbouring Karamoja against 
Karamojong cattle rustlers. Most of the ethnic groups neighbouring 
Karamoja from the north and eastern Uganda were the dominant groups 
in the UNLA that was fighting the NRA in Luweero. This action was 
interpreted as a sort of punishment by the NRA government38.  
 Since cattle were a major economic and cultural commodity, 
providing dowries and day-to-day necessities, they were a symbol of 
prosperity and wealth in these communities (Henriques 2000:47, Gersony 
1997:15, 27, Doom and Vlassenroot 1999:14). The turning of a blind eye 
by the government to what the Karamojong were doing to these ‘enemy 
groups’ was a deliberate policy to intimidate and impoverish the Acholi.  
 With no security structure at their borders, the Karamojong entered 
and raided the eastern (Teso) and northern (Acholi) region clean of 
livestock, to an extent never experienced before, and with no state 
intervention to calm the situation ( Henriques, 2000:47). Doom and 
Vlassenroot in line with that note that: 
                                                 
38 Interview with Obwona Byron (02/12/2014) 
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“The Karamojong turned towards the government in Kampala and ob-
tained weapons for 'self-defence'. In 1987, however, the Karamojong sud-
denly launched massive raids through Kitgum and eastern Gulu districts, 
and removed almost the entire herd” (1999: 12). 
 In spite of the argument raised above, President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni 
argued that demobilisation of these combat forces was in the interest of 
fairness. According to him: 
 “During the Obote II regime, UPC politicians complicated the problem 
(cattle rustling) further by creating tribal militia in Acholi and Teso which, 
in turn, raided Karamoja and counter-plundered” (Museveni 1996:58). 
  To shield himself from compensation claims from these ethnic 
groups that lost their cattle in raids by the Karamojong, President 
Museveni argued that for his new government, military resources were 
limited, bearing in mind, especially, the alarming number of insurgency 
groups that had cropped up (Museveni 1996:177). Within months after 
the NRA takeover, livestock in Teso had been cut down from 452,563 
heads of cattle in 1980 to 35,000 in 1989. Only 7% of the estimated total 
was left (Oxfam 1993:13). The northern region was said to have been 
swept clean of almost all its livestock. Doom and Vlassenroot note that:  
“As of 1997, both districts (Gulu and Kitgum) combined no longer owned 
more man 2 percent of the original stock. Economically, this was a catas-
trophe. In an already backward area, it represented a capital loss of nearly 
825 million, a vast economic blow” (1999: 12). 
For the people in the northern region who had lost their jobs in the 
uniformed services, the subsequent loss of the cattle that had formed the 
basis for much of their livelihood must have added greatly to their 
bitterness and grief. 
 In July 2005, leaders from the Acholi sub-region formed the Acholi 
War Debt Claimants Association (AWDCA), to seek compensation from 
the government of Uganda for the property and livestock lost during the 
NRA rebel insurgency. According to the Uganda radio, “ The war debt 
claimants said they lost property and livestock, valued in billions of 
shillings, stolen by officers of the National Resistance Army between 1986 
and 1989” (Alex Otto, 13 February 2015, Uganda Radio Network, “Acholi 
War Claimants Appeal Ruling in Battle for Compensation”).  
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 Represented by Kampala Associates Advocates, the government, in 
an out-of-court settlement, agreed to compensate the AWDCA with an 
estimated 1.4 trillion shillings. This was to compensate over 20,000 war 
debt claimants who had lost property and especially livestock in the Acholi 
sub-region39 (Ronnie Layoo & Cissy Makumbi, 13 June 2013, The Daily 
Monitor, “War debt claimants faint over cash compensation”). 
 According to the Uganda Bureau of Statistics, the Uganda National 
Household Survey 2005/2006 observed that the northern region (north 
and north eastern Uganda as a whole) which was expected to have the 
highest number of livestock, had the least number of cattle, pigs, goats, 
except for sheep, compared to other regions of the country (UNHS 
2005/2006:69-77). According to the report, the central region had the 
highest with 2 million (31.5% of the country’s total number of cattle) 
indigenous cattle and 198,000 (15.7%) exotic cattle, the eastern region had 
1.6 million (25.5%) indigenous cattle and 151,000 (12%) exotic cattle, the 
western region 1.4 million (22.6%) indigenous cattle and 890,000 (the 
highest number of all 4 regions) exotic cattle (70.5%), while the northern 
region had the fewest, with 1.3 million (20.3%) indigenous cattle and 
22,000 (1.8%) exotic cattle (UNHS 2005/2006:69-77). The survey also 
noted that: “…the northern region, which was expected to have the 
highest number of cattle, had the least” and further noted that this could 
have been due to the civil war in northern Uganda and to cases of 
underreporting in Karamoja (UNHS 2005/2006:69).  
  As clearly noted in Chapter 4, key informants were convinced that 
the NRA government was behind the drastic loss of cattle in the northern 
region. The economic crisis was caused by the widespread cattle rustling 
in Teso, which demoralised the Teso-based insurgency group UPA 
(Uganda People’s Army) that had risen up against the NRA Government. 
The Acholi were provoked by the circumstances to join insurgency groups 
in the region. Cattle raids impoverished the region, and the situation was 
compounded by atrocities and human rights abuses by the state forces 
(Doom and Vlassenroot 1999:12). These conflicts had connections, 
especially in relation to the economic and political impact the Karamoja 
raids had on both the Acholi and Teso people. Such events were noted 
                                                 
39 The Daily Monitor, 23/11/2011, “Government compensation to Acholi war 
claimants not enough” by Luke Moffett. Two trillion shillings were promised to 
30,000 Acholi war claimants instead of the 6 trillion shillings requested 
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for disgruntlement among the Acholi and consequent voluntary barking 
of insurgency groups against the NRA Government. 
 Furthermore, these conflicts were also connected by external 
conflicts. Ho-won Jeong examines this intricate complex web and concurs 
with how significant connection to other conflicts can be for local 
conflicts, “In a long series of struggles, actors, issues, and tempora 
contexts are intricately linked to each other. The course of a particular 
conflict is affected by an unpredictable series of circumstances connected 
to other conflicts” (2008:117).  The alliance between the LRA and the 
government of Sudan, combined with the instability in the Horn of Africa, 
i.e., in Sudan and Somalia, had its impact on both conflicts. In the 
Northern and North eastern regions, access to more guns was made easier. 
In the northern region, the instability in the horn of Africa provided the 
LRA with an ally, the Sudan Government, which provided support to the 
activities of the LRA, thus perpetuating the war and also, indirectly, 
fuelling tensions in the Karamoja region with human trafficking (Atkinson 
2009, Mkutu 2008:100, Bevan 2008:1-2). 
 In addition to the above, the connection and implications of the 
course of these conflicts were also found within state management of both 
conflicts. Although a disarmament programme was launched in Karamoja 
in 2001, the constant and abrupt redeployment of UPDF troops to fight 
the LRA in 2002 undermined the government’s ability to successfully 
continue disarming the Karamojong and protecting those who had been 
disarmed from those still armed. A report in the national newspaper The 
New Vision, under the title “UPDF leaves Karamoja”, noted that three or 
four battalions were withdrawn from the Karamoja region:  
“…an estimated 3,000 UPDF soldiers in Karamoja have been with-
drawn and re-deployed under Operation Iron Fist to fight Kony in 
the Pader District” (E. Allio and Wokorach-Oboi, 25 July 2002).  
This did also have implications for the armed conflict in the north, because 
the Ugandan government was unable to use its army to the full capacity to 
curb the armed conflict in the north. Thus, indirectly, contributed to the 
longevity of that conflict. Although every conflict may be equally 
important, simultaneous engagement in several conflicts cuts down on the 
available time, efforts and resources to be devoted to each of them. 
Selective, prioritising focus on one particular conflict leaves little regard 
for the other(s).  
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 Some scholars argue that the government intentionally perpetuated 
these violent conflicts, as it was, despite the instability in the north, north 
eastern and western part of the country, still able to send troops on 
fighting missions in other countries such as Somalia, DRC (Mwenda 2010, 
Branch 2007, Reno 2002). This is elaborated upon in Chapter 7. 
 In conclusion, as seen above, there were direct and indirect impacts 
sustained by both conflicts on the other. These impacts partially 
contributed to the onset of the armed conflict in northern Uganda, and 
through their course, contributed to the protraction of group to group 
violence in Karamoja as well. These violent conflicts were affected by the 
political struggles at the national level. These struggles co-determined their 
course and protraction. These complex interlinkages problematise their 
conceptualization.                            
The linkages/spillovers of conflicts, as well as the role of some actors in 
them, such as the state in ‘communal violence’, tend to be overlooked. 
This important issue will be discussed below, using the case of the 
protracted violent conflicts in Karamoja region.  
6.4 Communal violence and the state in Karamoja  
The UCDP data programme emphasises that group-to-group violence 
should occur only between groups with a similar level of organisation, and 
there should be no state involvement at any level: 
“All conflicts in which the state is an actor are excluded from the 
definition of non-state conflict, regardless of the level of organization 
of the group that is opposing the Government” (Sundberg et al. 
2012: 353).  
This is quite questionable in relation to the case of  the violent conflicts in 
Karamoja. As noted in earlier Chapters, group to group conflicts in the 
Karamoja region has been going on for decades.  Though communal vio-
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lence is defined as excluding state involvement, state involvement is inev-
itable in managing communal violence40. The state can be involved in com-
munal violence as a secondary actor, as a third party, or as a spectator.   
Elfversson (2013:01) argues that state intervention in local communal 
violence can be selective (i.e., at certain times or in certain places) as well 
as strategic. She further notes that some communal violence threatens na-
tional and regional peace and may, as well, signal state failure. So states 
should have a robust interest in containing and resolving communal con-
flicts, especially since the state has control over, the national army, the na-
tional resources and governance structures. Hence, the state is expected 
to be a critical agent in striving at peaceful conflict resolution and in cre-
ating stability in such conflict-affected communities.  
Some studies have shown that states can at times be reluctant to in-
tervene, and even when they do, their type of  response and intentions may 
be far from creating stability in the region (Johansson 2011, Fjelde 2009, 
Abdulrahman and Tar 2008). Other scholars note that a state might inter-
vene in communal violence for different reasons, such as structural, moti-
vational and humanitarian ones (Mullenbach 2005, Haas 2001). These au-
thors also note that this is usually done through the deployment of  
security forces or peacekeeping forces, to calm the violence or disarm the 
armed conflicting groups, as well as monitor the situation until peace set-
tlements are reached and implemented. 
As discussed in the previous section, state policies by themselves may 
fuel group to group violence. State policies stemming from corrupt patri-
monial political systems, that encourage tribalism, nepotism and sectari-
anism, and that involve favouring one group over the other, have been 
instrumental in cultivating grounds for communal violence41. First and 
foremost, the anti-pastoralist administrative policies of the colonial mas-
ters and post–independence governments of Uganda served to isolate and 
marginalise the Karamoja region from the rest of the country.  
                                                 
40 Abdulrahman and Tar (2008: 190) argue that “the state, including state institu-
tions and officials, plays a strategic role in the management of domestic con-
flict… as mediator and peacekeeper or as participant, depending on the dynamics of 
the conflict” 
41 See Chabal (2009) and Fjelde (2009) 
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 The creation, in the 1910s, of administrative units /county bounda-
ries, bearing names of sub-groups, restricted the mobility of people and 
cattle and instilled a sense of belonging to certain groups, erasing the larger 
Karamojong consciousness. The creation of ethnic and administrative 
boundaries restricted their seasonal movements. And at the district level, 
the boundaries created caused the loss of access to vital grazing land in 
Teso and Sebei, thereby disrupting trading relations. In 1911, Karamoja 
became a closed district; this prohibited the Karamojong from interacting 
with their neighbours (who branded Karamoja a ‘Human Zoo’)42. In 1940, 
large tracts of land were gazetted as forest reserves.  
 In 1950, in an effort to curb cattle rustling, large numbers of cattle 
were confiscated. In 1952, vast pieces of grazing land were demarcated as 
game reserves (British conservation policy). This disrupted the rotational 
grazing system and restricted the people from hunting for survival. This 
placed them in competition with their neighbours, the agro-pastoralists, 
i.e., the Iteso and Sabiny (Odhiambo 2003, Muhereza and Otim 2002, 
Gray 2000, Mamdani et al. 1992).  
 These policies had detrimental effects on the ways of life of the peo-
ple in this region, as they greatly contributed to the isolation and margin-
alisation of this region that continued even into the post–independence 
era. These policies isolated a particular group of people from the influence 
and experience that politically, economically and culturally changed the 
rest of the country. Furthermore, the post-independence governments of 
Uganda maintained a military presence in the region and continued being 
coercive in their approaches to disarm the communities. This also contrib-
uted to further hostile relations between the successive governments of 
Uganda and the Karamojong (Odhiambo 2003, Gray 2002, Wangoola 
1999).  
Despite the insecurity in the region, the NRA, after they took over 
power, authorised the ownership of guns by the Karamojong for the pro-
tection of their cattle and themselves (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999:12, 
Henriques 2000:47). This escalated the tensions in the region, and the state 
did nothing about it43. It was only until March 2001 that the state launched 
                                                 
42 Interview with Benedict Lokiru (16/10/2014) 
43 Abdulrahman and Tar (2008) note that the state can indirectly fuel local com-
munal violence 
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the disarmament of the region (OPM report, January 2007:07). Why 
wasn’t the state interested in doing something about the tensions in the 
north eastern region and waited for 14 years to officially intervene?44 The 
Ugandan state has been embroiled in political upheavals for decades. 
Thus, the decision of the government allowing the Karamojong to have 
guns must have been a strategic move, to avoid having another faction to 
fight against, as there were numerous rebel factions in various parts of the 
country that were fighting the NRA in 1986 when it took over power. 
There were the UPA in the Teso region, the WNBF in the West Nile re-
gion, the UPDA and HSM, and later the LRA rebel factions, that all 
needed the attention of the state (Gersony 1997, Behrend 1999, Jackson 
2002).  
 As noted in the previous section, the reluctance to intervene was be-
cause the Karamojong were indirectly fighting a proxy war for the state by 
raiding cattle, and indirectly impoverishing rebel factions in the northern 
and eastern parts of Uganda. This is clearly noted in the previous section. 
However, President Museveni argued that he did not intervene in the cat-
tle raiding practice because of the limited military resources at his disposal:   
"We did not have enough forces to deal simultaneously with the cat-
tle raiding. As a result the Karamojong cattle raiding intensified...” 
(Museveni 1996:177). 
Political attempts to try and ask the government to intervene were 
made. Ideas about how to disarm the Karamojong, how to provide relief 
programmes as well as suggestions for development projects for the pro-
vision of water and pasture were discussed at the Kampala conference 
centre in Kampala after the NRA take over in 198645. Even elders from 
Karamoja were consulted and peace was promised if the government 
would take up the initiative to provide alternatives to the region46. How-
ever, these demands and suggestions were ignored.  
In Chapter 4 it is mentioned that participants believed that the gov-
ernment supported the Karamojong in raiding cattle in Acholiland. Some 
                                                 
44 Tajima (2013:106) claims that it is an issue of priority for some states, depend-
ing on the level of threat a particular conflict poses to national peace and stability 
45 The New Vision (16/04/1987) 
46 The New Vision (14/05/1987) 
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had even witnessed trucks full of cattle being driven out47, although these 
claims have never been verified. However, from a political strategist’s 
point of view, when insurgency groups cropped up in the northern and 
eastern regions, the NRA government must have been concerned about 
possible mergers between insurgency groups, which would have been a 
powerful threat to the NRA government. And indeed, LRA leader Joseph 
Kony and UPA leader Sam Otai from Teso met a couple of times and 
discussed the possibility of working together, according to one of the key 
informants, a former LRA commander48. Turning a blind eye to attacks of 
the Karamojong on these neighbouring districts, that were harbouring in-
surgency groups, definitely served as creating a buffer zone and deterred 
the insurgency groups from merging. And by 1992, the UPA, with the help 
of the Teso commission, resolved the conflict with the government (Ger-
sony 1997:106, Lomo and Hovil 2004), while the LRA continued with its 
activities. 
 It should also be noted that the Karamojong are Nilohamites (Paz-
zaglia 1982), and their life style differs greatly from that of the Southerners. 
Some scholars’ claim that if they would have been a group that was closely 
linked to the government, it would probably not have taken long to inter-
vene. Likewise, if they would have had very significant patronage ties, 
which provided a significant political support base, intervention would 
have been prioritised. Furthermore, the conflict was about local issues 
such as cattle ownership, grazing land, water points, and these could be 
ignored as being a threat to the state. As one of the key informants, Bishop 
Abura, argued, the conflict in the region had no political agenda and was 
only about their culture and livelihood, and group to group violence only 
resorted to when these sources of livelihood were at stake49.  
 As mentioned earlier, the NRA government decided to intervene in 
March 2001, as a third party, hoping to disarm the region. The first phase 
was comprised of the presentation of community awareness programmes 
by local political leaders and of rewards for those who would surrender 
voluntarily. Later, after many had not yielded to the call, coercive 
                                                 
47 Interview with Solomon Okongo Oola (08/12/2014) 
48 Interview with an anonymous former LRA commander (25/01/2015) 
49 Boone (2012) claims contagious issues such as land can be easily politicized  
could to attract state intervention compared to local conflict issues such as the 
ones mentioned above about pastoral communities 
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disarmament approaches were employed (Bevan 2008, Mkutu 2006). 
Intervention in this kind of conflict is usually viewed as an effort to 
manage internal security by the state, and does not require the consent of 
the local communities, whereas in normal peace keeping missions or 
settlements, the consent of the conflicting parties is required50.  
 Nevertheless, in this case elders and local government officials were 
sensitised and in turn were asked to sensitise their communities about the 
need for surrender of their guns. They were encouraged to consider the 
rewards being given, such as hoes, ploughing tools and iron sheets (Safer 
World 2010). However, the disarmament went through other phases and 
was later carried out in a crude, militaristic force. A continued dialogue 
with the communities and sensitisation should have remained on the top 
of the agenda. This is because these people had no trust in the government 
and as Michael Odhiambo puts it: 
“ When the Karamojong first acquired guns it was as much to protect 
themselves against the Government as against their neigh-
bours…The people need to feel that the Government protects them, 
so that they can in turn see the need to support its initiatives” (Odhi-
ambo 2003:32).  
According to some scholars, the distrust towards the government was a 
major reason why the modern judicial system largely failed in Karamoja. 
These judicial channels were ignored by the local population because they 
saw such judicial institutions as foreign and against their traditions. 
Implicating a fellow Karamojong in a foreign court was unacceptable 
(Muhereza and Otim 2002). 
 Recent media reports note that the state only intervened after several 
kinds of minerals were discovered in the region. Mining companies were 
set up immediately, even during the disarmament programme.  An article 
in The New Vision newspaper by David Lumu, entitled “Over 100 mineral 
companies in Karamoja”, noted that: 
“…ever since the country’s remotest area was pacified by disarming 
cattle rustlers, over 100 mineral companies have been set up by in-
vestors” (The New Vision, 1 May 2014).  
                                                 
50 See Von Uexkull and Peterson (2013) 
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 This was after the Department of Geological Survey and Mines at the 
Uganda Ministry of Energy had discovered that the Karamoja region has 
over 50 different precious stones and minerals, such as gold, uranium, 
marble, limestone, iron, copper, tin, lithium, cobalt, nickel, graphite, 
gypsum and wolfram. The article also praised first lady Janet Museveni, 
who was then Minister for Karamoja Affairs, for championing the 
transformation of the region and attracting investors. However, though 
the poverty-stricken region was supposed to benefit from the exploitation 
of the mines, the local government officials and the locals claimed that 
they only saw trucks full of minerals leaving the region, and that no word 
about the mining or its yield had been given to the local population or to 
the local administrative offices. In a newspaper article, Joseph Miti 
mentions that the mining of minerals in this region started way back in the 
80s, and: 
“…there are no clear records showing either the amount of resources 
extracted annually or the benefits the region has realised” (The Daily 
Monitor, “The hidden treasures in Karamoja”, 21 November, 2010). 
There has been no transparency and accountability with regard to the 
resources extracted toward the people from the region according to the 
field findings. Could this have been the reason the state took so long to 
intervene? Is it possible that it could have been extracting minerals 
secretly?51 
 In conclusion, the state was reluctant for several years to intervene 
and pacify the Karamoja region. Later, it did intervene (in phases) and 
managed to rid the region of guns and ammunitions and bring some peace 
to the communities. The Karamoja case proves that a state cannot be 
excluded from communal violence. The state was present through direct 
state policy and policy blindness “inaction” as well. So through direct state 
policy, and state inaction which had an enormous influence on the 
direction of the conflict in the region. This fact clearly contradicts the 
current definition of communal violence. 
                                                 
51 Terris and Maoz (2005:564), Touval & Zartman (2001) and Bercovitch (2011: 
20-21) claim that state intervention can be strategic, i.e., to increase their influ-
ence in a particular conflict or region or to look after its own interests 
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6.5 Conclusion  
As shown above, in these two conflict categories, various complex conflict 
cycles occur, which are not systematic at all. They evolve, displaying traits 
of different conflict types throughout their course. As the field findings 
reveal, the rigidities applied in the definition of these conflict types should 
be checked, because the dynamics of these particular conflicts cannot be 
captured in these rigid definitions.  
 Further more, these conflicts reveal direct and indirect impact on the 
course of the other. Connected by political struggles at the national level 
and deliberate state policies, these conflicts had an enormous impact on 
the onset and perpetuation of the other. As is evident in these two cases, 
the power struggles and political unrest played a huge role in how events 
unfolded in both regions, were intricately linked to the conflicts and 
brought about unexpected effects to their course.  
 It is also evident that the state is a key player in both conflicts. The 
state is present indirectly by inaction, by not intervening, and directly by 
action, through state policies that nurture or pacify conflicts. The case of 
the two conflicts discussed proves that the state is a major actor local con-
flicts and their presence can not be easily detached from such phenomena. 
This demonstrates that there are causal and actor linkages between both 
conflicts, at differing levels and degrees. In the next Chapter, the causal 
and actor linkages between both conflicts are synthesized.  
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This chapter brings the two violent conflicts, i.e., the civil war in northern 
Uganda and the communal violence in Karamoja, together, synthesized at 
the level of causes and actors. The analysis is enriched by drawing on 
various views raised by conflict scholars who have written specifically 
about violent conflicts in both the north and north eastern regions of 
Uganda. The discussion also draws on some arguments raised in theories 
about the causes of violent conflicts and the nature of actors involved. 
This Chapter also refers to previous Chapters in which these violent 
conflicts have been contextualised.  
7.2 Understanding the causal interconnections 
According to the Uppsala conflict dataset, a civil war’s issues of 
incompatibility are either to overthrow a government or secede (Gelditsch 
et al. 2002:619). For communal violence, the issue of incompatibility is not 
stated (Sundberg et al. 2012:353) This may be because it is assumed that 
groups usually fight over local issues.  
 As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, a number of factors are responsible 
for the onset and protraction of civil war and communal violence. In 
Chapter 3, some conflict scholars of the political economy tradition argued 
that violent conflict is as a result of violent geo-political, socio-economic 
and cultural structures established as a result of the interconnectedness 
between the modern state and the global systems (Demmers 2012: 54-55). 
However, social constructivists, who highlight the significance of social 
identities such as ethnicity in bringing about violent conflicts. They argue 
that violent conflict is politically functional and socially meaningful, as it 
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constructs and preserves social identities which are very significant to 
communities (Demmers 2012:21-36). These and other theories of violent 
conflict are used to examine the conflicts under scrutiny, to try and 
establish causal linkages.  
7.2.1 Historical structural continuities 
As highlighted in Chapters 4 and 5, both of these conflicts had similar 
structural conditions that shaped what became of the communities in 
these regions. As Ho-won Jeong argues, “A series of conflicts can be set 
off by the same structural conditions” (2008:128). And this was the case 
with the violent conflict in the north and north eastern Uganda. A good 
number of informants said that it would be impossible to explain the flow 
of events without tracing it to the colonial era. They highlighted the 
continued relevance of historical events that combined colonial 
stereotyping with divisive administrative policies that produced pervasive 
real-life patterns in these regions. According to Dinwiddy (1981:503), 
peace was kept in the protectorate by separating the various groups, rather 
than bringing them together, hence the divide and rule policy.  
 The Karamojong were stereotyped as primitive nomads and 
marauding warriors, while the Northerners were regarded as strong, tall 
and militaristic. The stereotype views of these regions were influential in 
the adoption of specific administrative policies that were thought suitable 
for the inhabitants, based on their nature. These policies were later carried 
on by Post-colonial Governments of Uganda. As Victor Azarya notes: 
 “When a state action seems restrictive or oppressive rather than rewarding, 
certain groups may attempt to organize their life beyond , or at the margin 
of the state’s influence, i.e. they may try to keep their distance or “disengage” 
themselves from the state” (1996:1).  
For the Karamojong, these anti-pastoralist, administrative policies 
adopted by the successive governments served to politically, socially and 
culturally isolate the region’s communities from the influences and 
experiences that transformed the rest of Uganda. They lost large portions 
of land vital for their survival and their herds of cattle. This laid the 
foundation for the continuation of communal conflicts over the allocation 
and use of resources in the post-independence era. For instance, the 
military occupation of Karamoja right from the start of the colonial era, 
and the decision to make Karamoja a closed district throughout the 
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colonial era and part of the post–independence era was detrimental to the 
progress of this part of the country in all aspects, and more importantly, 
in the cultural sense. This marginalisation and isolation, along with the 
absence of an effective government and absence of a clear, consistent and 
enforced government policy on the insecurity in the Karamoja region, is 
to blame for how events later unfolded in the region. Since the time of 
colonialism, Karamoja had always been treated differently and separately 
from the rest of Uganda, and consequently the area had consistently lagged 
behind the rest of Uganda (Odhiambo 2003:28, Muhereza and Otim 
2002:120, Wangoola 1999:3-5). And more importantly, this isolation 
meant a continuation of their tradition of violence through cattle rustling, 
which intensified later with the acquisition of guns and ammunitions. 
  For the northern region, the ethnic division of labour between north 
and south during the colonial period in the early 1900s led to the 
emergence of deep regional, economic, political and ethnic cleavages. 
These cleavages persisted even after independence, leading to political 
instabilities in the country. The most significant issue was the creation of 
a “military ethnocracy” (Mazrui 1975:336), with the Northerners 
dominating the uniformed services and the Southerners in the civil service. 
This gave the Northerners a lasting identity, shaped by these north-south 
cleavages, as a group of people within a society who regarded themselves 
as economically disadvantaged and yet constituting the backbone of the 
state’s military (Kustenbauder 2010:454, Behrend 1999:19, Omara-
Otunnu 1987). 
 As discussed above, both these groups felt excluded or marginalised. 
The Karamojong felt alienated, whereas, though the Acholi had been in 
the uniformed services for long, they compared to other ethnic groups in 
the south, always felt left out as well.  Frances Stewart argues that the 
persistence of the deprivation over time and the trend in differentials 
(economic assets, political participation, incomes and employment, social 
aspects) is very significant. The narrower the gap between groups was, the 
less was the possibility of a violent conflict being initiated, but the wider 
the gap, the higher the potential for violent conflict (Stewart 2000:253).  
 From a political economy perspective, the link between structures 
and violence is through the state.  The sources of violent conflict are at 
the level of structures, i.e., the way in which the society is organised. 
Structures are the starting ground for direct violence (Demmers 2012:74). 
This explains how the colonial divide and rule, and administrative policies, 
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were instrumental in creating divisions along ethnic lines. A fragmented 
society is a pre-requisite for instability (Stewart 2000 and 2002, Cederman 
et al. 2013). 
 These divisions were carried on into the post-independence political 
system of Uganda. However, as ethnic differences, whether imagined or 
real, per se do not cause violent conflict (Demmers 2012:18-37), the 
manipulation of these ethnic identities does, as is discussed below, 
especially for the case of the civil war in northern Uganda. 
7.2.2 Ethnicisation and militarisation of politics  
Due to the extent of tribal loyalties and divisive politics among Ugandan 
politicians, Uganda acquired independence from the British Protectorate 
government with what G. F. Engholm regarded as “nothing to show for, 
in the form of a political struggle or nationalist movement”. In relation to 
that, Jan Jorgensen noted that “…the ideology of tribalism was more than 
a threat to the unity of Uganda” (Jorgensen 1981:22). This was because 
there was no unity whatsoever, and the political system plus all the political 
parties was ethnicised (Engholm 1962:15, Mittelman 197:87). This 
absence of unity was also fostered by the ancient traditions of local 
nationalism among the tribes of Uganda, manifested in the various 
kingdoms and chiefdoms, for instance in Buganda, Bunyoro, Acholi and 
Lango. This is clearly echoed in these words: “…neither the leaders nor 
the sentiments…essential to internal stability were present in Uganda 
(Pratt 1961:158). 
 After 68 years of colonial rule, Uganda gained independence on 9 
October 1962, with Milton Obote as Prime minister and Kabaka Mutesa 
II of the Buganda tribe as President. The choice for Mutesa was due to 
the elevated position of the Buganda given to them by the Protectorate 
government, in recognition of their services as colonial agents in the 
country, to its strategic location; it was the wealthiest of all tribes52 (Mazrui 
1970:1074). Mazrui further notes that the Buganda had enjoyed the 
privileged position of having a federal status, which was carried on to the 
post-independence era and ratified in the 1962 constitution.  It is noted 
                                                 
52 To get an impression of the unrivaled superiority of the Buganda tribe, see 
Mazrui (1970). The Buganda kingdom received enormous economic and political 
investments from the Protectorate government. To satisfy their separatist 
tendencies, they were awarded a federal status in 1955  
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that other tribes were concerned about the domination of the post-
colonial state of Uganda by the Buganda. To curb Buganda’s prevalence, 
Milton Obote, on 15 April 1966, suspended the 1962 constitution and 
presented a new one. He went ahead and sent state forces to attack the 
palace of Kabaka Mutesa II on 24 May 1966 in “the battle of Mengo”, 
under the leadership of army commander Idi Amin. Kabaka Mutesa II 
escaped to exile in London where he died in 1969 (Jorgensen 1981, 
Mittelman 1975). This move ushered in the militarisation of politics in 
Uganda. It is important to note that President Milton Obote denied 
Mutesa II a traditional burial ceremony, let alone allowing the return of 
his body into the country. This infuriated the Buganda tribe and 
positioned them collectively against President Milton Obote and the 
Northerners as a whole, since Obote was from the northern part of 
Uganda. In the 1968 constitution, Obote I abolished kingdoms and 
created independent new districts in his effort to deal with ethnicity and 
govern Uganda as a republic with a single central government 
(Byaruhanga, 1998: 186).  
 According to Kustenbauder (2010:458), after sidelining the Buganda, 
President Milton Obote redistributed power into the hands of the 
Northerners, away from the Buganda. The political landscape came to be 
dominated by politicians from the north and army as well. With the 
militarisation of politics, the army also assumed a pivotal role, as it 
increasingly began to be used to achieve political goals. This is aptly noted 
by E.F.Byaruhanga: 
“Ethnopolitical consideratiuons prevented him from disciplining the army, 
and finally led to the promotion of characters like Idi Amin... Obote Pro-
moted and appointed Amin to head the army on ethnic grounds. With the 
demise of the UPC-KY alliance, the UPC finally allied itself with the army 
in the period 1966 -71” (1998:186). 
This led to impunity and continued indiscipline of the army affecting the 
whole country. Consequently, this also led to a series of military coups and 
persecutions, when Idi Amin Dada ousted Milton Obote in 1971, when 
the UNLA ousted Idi Amin Dada in 1979, when Milton Obote was ousted 
by Tito Okello Lutwa in 1985, and when the NRA ousted Tito Okello 
Lutwa in 1986 (Kustenbauder, 2010:458). All these military coups were 
followed by military persecutions, as discussed in Chapter 4.  The ousting 
of Tito Okello Lutwa marked the beginning of insurgencies in northern 
509974-L-bw-isimon
Processed on: 1-5-2017 PDF page: 181
 Understanding the Causal Connections 165 
Uganda that culminated in to the armed conflict against the NRA 
government.  
 The ethnicised politics in Uganda served as a tool to gain political 
support by scapegoating other ethnic groups. This ethnicity card was also 
carried on and played by Idi Amin, who persecuted the Acholi and Lango 
soldiers, professionals and civilians at large, after he overthrew Obote I. 
E.F Byaruhanga further notes that: 
“During Amin’s time, promotions were specifically from West Nile...Eth-
nicity during Amin’s time reached a peak when thousands of Acholi and 
Langi soldiers were massacred for refusing to accept the change of leader-
ship in the army and for being closely related to Obote”(1998:187).  
 He then replaced them with men from the West Nile and some Sudanese 
speaking tribes. When Obote II took over power, UNLA units took 
revenge on the West Nilers, looting and killing them (Leopold 2005). 
Obote II continued with the ethnicised politics, resulting in the Acholi 
comprising the largest number in the army, the Banyankore second largest 
and the Langi third largest (Kustenbauder 2010:456, Gersony 1997: 6-7).  
 It should be mentioned that, since the Acholi were the majority in the 
army, the atrocities committed by the UNLA were attributed to an 
individual ethnic group, the ‘Acholi’, ignoring that also other ethnic groups 
were present in the army. This characterisation was extended to the whole 
northern population but specifically to the Acholi. Some scholars note 
that, in fact, labels such as ‘Bacholi’ or ‘Abacholi’ were used by the 
NRA/M forces in the Luweero to refer to their enemies53. They further 
note that being blamed for the atrocities in the Luweero Triangle, despite 
the fact that other groups were in charge of making policies and laying out 
strategies for the UNLA army, was disturbing for senior Acholi army 
officers. This, in turn, partially explained the overthrow of Obote II 
(Kutesa 2006, Atkinson 2009). 
 Almost as soon as Tito Okello Lutwa took over, he was overthrown 
in 1986 by Yoweri Kaguta Museveni. This loss of political and economic 
power by the Acholi was interpreted along ethnic lines, ‘Acholi vs NRA 
forces’, as discussed in Chapter 4. The loss of government power made 
them feel deprived of what they had attained and they felt cheated or 
                                                 
53 See Ronald R. Atkinson (2010:280) 
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betrayed by NRA leader Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, who overlooked the 
Nairobi agreement that was discussed in Chapter 4, an issue that was noted 
by a good number of informants in the northern region. And even though 
the NRA forces were composed of numerous tribes, as a national army, it 
was also viewed in tribal and ethnic terms as the ‘Banyankore”, as 
highlighted in Chapter 4.  
 A history of ethnic violence and of settling scores by previous regimes 
was evident. The former Acholi UNLA soldiers may have feared a 
repetition of what Idi Amin and the NRA forces did to them in 1971, in 
revenge for the atrocities during the insurgency in the Luweero Triangle. 
And indeed, as expected, according to Adam Branch, the NRA, which was 
expecting an insurgency from the people of north, immediately after the 
takeover “launched a counterinsurgency without an insurgency”54(Branch 
2007:146). They committed gross atrocities against civilians and former 
UNLA soldiers, and as Branch notes they destroyed and looted property, 
and stole hundreds of thousands of cattle.  The UPDA launched its attack 
from the 22 August 1986 in Gulu and Kitgum when they come in from 
Sudan. That is when the imagined insurgency became real (Branch 
2007:146-147, Lamwaka 2002:28-33).  
 These scenarios, combined with the propaganda on the radio and in 
the print media, which imposed all the country’s troubles on the Acholi, 
served to panic the public into joining insurgency groups in Acholiland 
and in exile, making an armed resistance inevitable (Gersony 1997:16, 
Doom and Kustenbauder 1999:13).  
 The constructivist-instrumentalism approach to violent conflict rests 
on the premise that ethnicities are functional and are used by elites to 
strategically construct antagonistic identities that they can rely on for 
support in acquiring power (Gagnon 2006:138, Demmers 2012:29). With 
its monopolised political authority, the state was used as an instrument to 
satisfy the interests of specific groups while excluding others. The 
ethnicisation and militarisation of politics by the leaders was used to 
acquire political power and access resources (Gagnon 2006:138). The 
leaders used the ethnicity card to mobilise ethnic followers, who, in turn, 
became a threat to other groups, leading to political persecutions 
whenever there was a military coup. From a political economy point of 
                                                 
54 In some exceptional cases, commanders and their units were said to be disci-
plined and trying to relate with the Acholi communities 
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view, the tensions leading up to the onset of violent conflict in Uganda 
can be linked to the state making paradox, i.e., the political, economic and 
social challenges of post-colonial states and their struggles to become an 
ideal, modern nation state.  
 The ethnicisation and militarisation of politics affected the north 
eastern region as well, but did not bring about the onset of communal 
violence in Karamoja. As mentioned in the previous Chapter, cattle 
rustling was a practice embedded in the Karamojong’s way of life. What is 
significant to note is, even post-colonial governments continued to 
marginalise the Karamojong and maintained a mainly military presence in 
the region (Odhiambo 2003: 28-29, Gray 2000:408, Knighton 2003:434-
5). The presence of the state forces in the region and political unrest in the 
country encouraged lawlessness among the national army members. 
Throughout the Obote I, Idi Amin, Obote II until NRA took over, the 
army assumed a dominant position over the political leadership of 
Uganda. One consequence was a sense of impunity that reigned among 
the armed forces (Byaruhanga 1998:186-7). The government soldiers 
molested the Karamojong communities during the tax collection process, 
confiscating the communities’ livestock, raping women and unlawfully 
imprisoning community members, as discussed in Chapter 4.  
This hostile relationship and the inability to provide security for the 
people of Karamoja by the State explained fairly well why they struggled 
to get guns and ammunitions. The acquisition of guns was interpreted by 
various scholars as resulting from a lack of confidence in government 
security structures and a lack of protection by the central government 
(Odhiambo 2003:32). The military coups created an opportunity for 
acquiring guns, which fuelled the violent conflict in the Karamoja region 
and beyond, into the neighbouring districts. For the Karamojong, 
attacking neighbouring districts to raid cattle could also have been a way 
of expressing their grievances about being marginalised. Jega (2000:25) 
argues that, in some fragmented societies, some groups are pushed to rely 
on identity politics to express their grievances and struggle to attain justice 
and fair distribution of political, economic and social opportunities and 
resources.  
From an ethno-symbolism perspective, ethnicity is socially 
meaningful and attachments to ethnicity are very powerful (Kaufmann 
2006:84, Smith 1996:54-6). Both types of conflicts can relate to this theory 
because ethnicised politics were evident in most of the communities in 
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Uganda. The communities are attached to their ethnicity, which they have 
been socialised into through cultural meanings such as language, religion, 
history and beliefs, and this has created an affective sense of belonging. 
Much of the political history of Uganda shows how powerful ethnic 
attachments have been and how they have been used to rally masses 
behind politicians of their ethnicity and against the other ethnic groupings. 
One of the reasons given for the rise of insurgency in northern Uganda 
was the ethnic attachment of the Acholi, the cultural belief of how strong 
they were and claims of how they would easily defeat the NRA forces.  
Benedict Anderson argues that ethnicity offers answers to communities’ 
existence, giving a sense of destiny and continuity (Anderson, 1991:11-12). 
The attacks on the Acholi civilian population and former ex-UNLA 
soldiers evoked strong feelings of the need to protect their ethnic group 
and led to the rise of insurgency groups. 
For the Karamojong, what Verkuyten describes below can best 
capture the value they attach to their traditions as an ethnic group: 
“Cultural meanings that are related to ethnicity – such as language, 
history and values – develop into durable tendencies and an emo-
tional and self-evident frame of reference. Social positions become 
dispositions and cultural meanings become personal beliefs” 
(Verkuyten 2005:86-7). 
The extent of value the Karamojong attach to their culture and cultural 
practices is the root cause of the communal violence in Karamoja. The 
warrior phenomenon, the value attached to cattle and the high bride price 
allowed cattle raiding, making communal violence appear as a ‘normal’ 
phenomenon. The belief in these practices was passed on from generation 
to generation (Pazzaglia 1982:74, Odhiambo 2003:27), explaining the 
continuation of communal violence throughout the pre-colonial, colonial 
and post-independence eras.  
 As mentioned above, ethnicity and the ethnicisation and militarisation 
of politics were very significant factors in the conflicts in the north and 
north east. They were instrumental in bringing about the onset of civil war 
in northern Uganda and in fostering the continuation of communal 
violence in Karamoja (north eastern Uganda). However, as conflicts 
emerge and escalate, their root causes can evolve with time as the conflicts 
progress (Berdal and Keen 1997). Both these conflicts spanned decades 
and below are some of factors that explain why these conflicts persisted.  
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7.2.3 Poverty, inequality and underdevelopment 
According to the historical account and field findings, the issue of poverty 
is not seen as a robust argument for the taking up of arms in northern 
Uganda, nor does it explain the persistence of the armed conflicts. This is 
because, besides growing crops and rearing livestock, the majority of the 
Northerners were in the uniformed services, such as the army, police and 
prisons. It is also important to note that most of the heads of state, except 
Idi Amin, came from the northern region. Throughout the years, the 
Northerners had enjoyed prominent leadership positions.  
 In Africa, for ethnic groups in power, political power translates into 
economic benefits, through patrimonial and neo-patrimonial relationships 
(Chabal and Daloz 1999). In Uganda, ethnicity has always been associated 
with these economic benefits, and ethnic groups that were not in power 
often felt excluded. The first Acholi President, Tito Okello Lutwa, was in 
power for only six months when the NRA took over in January 1986 
(Gersony, 1997:12). This disappointed the Acholi, as they knew they had 
lost their economic privileges combined with other pressures were forced 
to rise up against the NRA government.  
 However, for the Karamoja region, poverty definitely accounts for 
the group to group violence and its persistence because the region is a 
semi-arid area, noted for disastrous climatic events (Muhwereza & Otim 
2002:119). With constant drought and famine around much of the time, 
farming was and is not an option, as opposed to pastoralism, hence the 
remark by Markakis (2004:4) that pastoral violence is a survival strategy. 
The poverty indices for the Karamojo region reveal that, out of the 
estimated 1.1 million people in the region, 82 per cent live below the 
poverty line, as compared to the national average of 31 per cent (World 
Bank 2006, UNOCHA 2008).  
Key human development indicators paint a rather grim picture, as 
portrayed by the high maternal mortality rate of 750 per 100,000 live 
births, as compared to the national average of 435 per 100,000 live births 
(UNHS 2006). The infant mortality rate is estimated at 105 per 1000 live 
births, against the national average of 76, while the under-five mortality 
rate stands at 174 per 1,000 live births, as compared to the national average 
of 134 per 1,000 live births (UNICEF 2008). Other human development 
indicators portray an equally depressing situation in the whole region. In 
2008, UNICEF and WHO estimated Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) 
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in Karamoja at 11% and rising, as compared to the national average of 6% 
(UNICEF/WHO 2008). Access to sanitation units was estimated at 9%, 
compared to the national average of 59%; access to safe water stood at 
43%, against the national average of 67%. The literacy rate was at 11%, 
compared to a national average of 67%. According to Irish Aid (2007), an 
estimated 68% of 6-25 year-olds had never been to school, as compared 
to the national average of 13.8%, and approximately 44.8% of the children 
live in households that consume only one meal a day. 




Source: UNHS (2012/13:12) 
   
With such poverty indices, many participants claim, they were trapped, 
and though cattle raiding was a cultural practice, its purpose evolved to be 
more of for survival. 
 Figure 7.1 below reveals the poverty status report of various regions 
in Uganda. The poverty status report 2014 noted that the highest number 
of poor people were in the Karamoja region, at 74.2% of the total 
population, followed by the West Nile region at 42.3% and then the Mid-
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North region (Lango and Acholi) at 35.2%. The lowest number of poor 
people were found in the central region (Central 2, central 1 and Kampala) 
(UNHS 2012/13:8-12).  
 In line with this, Stewart (2000:253) argues that the persistence of 
economic, political and social deprivation over time is very significant for 
bringing about conflict among groups. In the same light, Murshed 
(2010:78) also argues that relative deprivation of a group can enhance 
rebellious sentiments that become a unifying factor and enable collective 
action to alter the status quo. The ongoing poverty in Karamoja may very 
well explain the persistence of communal violence in the region.  
7.2.4 The emergence of a war economy 
There are some authors who argue that the war economy in Uganda was 
“imagined” compared to the one Sierra Leone or the DRC, which in-
volved extraction of precious natural resources for looting by the state or 
rebel groups (Lomo and Hovil 2004:41, Reno 2000a:15). However, Wil-
liam Reno notes that for the case of Uganda especially involving the state 
- it was at a more sophiscated level (Reno 2002:425-432). The war econo-
mies features have been described as comprising of pillage, extortion, ex-
treme violence against civilians, composed of highly privatised black mar-
kets and shadowy actors and mostly involved in trade of lucrative 
extracted natural resources among others (Reno 2000b, Ballentine 
&Nitzchke 2005:01) 
For the case of Karamoja, as John Markakis notes, in pastoral 
communities, cattle rearing and raiding was purposely for:  
“…subsistence and not for the market. Even though pastoralists may 
engage in market transactions, they do not raise animals for the mar-
ket” (Markakis 2004:31). 
 In Karamoja, the development of the illicit cattle trade and the rise of 
commercialised cattle raids was driven by attributed to economic interests 
of the young men who were involved, to meet basic needs and gain status 
under conditions of widespread poverty and limited economic 
opportunity. At times, cattle sales were planned in advance with 
businessmen who would ferry the stolen cows to markets outside of 
Karamoja (Stites et al. 2007). According to Mercy Corps (2011), some 
elements within the government, such as the UPDF, police and local 
officials were also involved in facilitating the raiding and selling of stolen 
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cattle in Karamoja. With businessmen willing to buy and sell the stolen 
cattle in other markets, in Mbale, Lira, Gulu, Kitgum or Soroti, the 
continuation of communal violence was encouraged. Hence, materialistic 
tendencies contributed to altering the function of this cultural practice, 
leading to the protraction of communal violence in Karamoja. Some 
authors have regarded events surrounding loss of livestock as mere “cattle 
theft” by the local community and external actors such as army officials 
and politicians among others (Kinghton 2003, Doom and Vlassenroot 
1999). And even though the case of Karamoja has been described as mere 
theft of cattle, the lucrative tendencies can be drawn from how the state 
benefitted from continued instability in the region which will be elaborated 
upon below. 
 These motive-oriented tendencies were also evident in the course of 
the civil war in northern Uganda. Various scholars argue that the war in 
northern Uganda was prolonged because it became profitable 
economically as well as politically for the actors involved (Reno 2000a, 
2002, Kustenbauder 2010). William Reno argues that state leaders are 
entrusted with the responsibility of providing social services to the 
population, but instead they use their status for their own privileged 
access. By doing so, they manipulate state institutions, which allows them 
to accrue a lot of benefits, which may be political, economic and military 
in nature (Reno 2002:417).  
 Some analysts note that the Ugandan government and its army 
claimed they could not do much, as they were poorly equipped, and that 
the only option was for the LRA rebels to surrender. Startled by such 
claims, the international community intervened in support, donating 
millions of dollars of donor aid to the cause (Mwenda and Tangri 2005, 
Atkinson 2010).  However, it was expected of President Museveni, based 
on his background as a former successful guerrilla warfare leader, that he 
would be able to deal with LRA militarily. Far from containing the war in 
the north, in 1997, the Ugandan government offered troops to oust 
Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire and replace him with Laurent Kabila. Yet, that 
very same year, in January 1997, when troops were sent to Zaire (DRC), 
the LRA massacred close to 400 people in a four-day raid in Kitgum and 
Gulu (Gersony 1997:42, Mckinley 1997). Despite claims of being unable 
to deal with the civil war in northern Uganda, Ugandan government forces 
of about 10,000 soldiers were occupying and controlling large chunks of 
territories in the eastern part of the DRC. They were also accused of 
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looting resources at the same time (Reno 2002, Reno 2000a). All this is 
aptly noted below:  
“UPDF forces have since 1997 occupied significant areas of north-
eastern Congo. The UPDF occupies Kisangani, a major trading city 
with river and air transport facilities. Other towns such as Isoro and 
Butembo host UPDF brigades. After the UPDF’s falling out with 
Kabila, these towns, along with Kisangani, serve as points to train 
and aid forces of the Congolese Liberation Movement (MLC) of Jean 
Pierre Bemba and the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD-
Kisangani) of Prof. Wamba dia Wamba” (Reno 2000a:10). 
 Although the state argued that their incursion into the DRC was to 
try and contain the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) rebels who were 
located at the western borders of Uganda (Africa Confidential, 1 August 
1997, 4-5). In June 1999, one of the Ugandan army generals, James Kazini, 
created a province in the DRC and named it Kabali-ituri, and even 
appointed a Governor for it. In addition to the above, independent 
researchers and the International Court of Justice, seated in the Hague, 
found that between August 1998 and June 2003 massive human rights 
violations were committed by the UPDF in the territory of the DRC, 
including the training of child soldiers in UPDF camps, incitement of 
ethnic conflicts, and the killing and torturing of civilians. It is also noted 
that such activities were secondary to the primary enterprise of the UPDF, 
which was the economic exploitation of Congolese natural resources. This 
mostly benefited powerful members of the Ugandan elite, including 
Museveni’s half-brother and former commander of the UPDF, Salim 
Saleh, and a close relative of the President’s wife, Col. James Kazini (Reno 
2000a:10). 
According to William Reno, General Salim Saleh, the head of the 
UPDF, owned gold-dealing companies located in zones controlled by the 
UPDF. These companies were accountable for an estimated 60 million 
dollars of gold export to Uganda in 1996 (Sebunya 1997, Reno 2000a:10). 
Reno quotes the Background to the Budget of Uganda 1998/99 and the 
ministry of natural resources, highlighting the increase in gold exports, as 
a result of this violent incursion into the DRC, when he says:  
“Uganda became a more prominent exporter of gold. According to 
official Ugandan figures, the country’s exports rose from $12.4 mil-
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lion in 1994-95 to $110 million in 1996-97…By 1999, gold had be-
come Uganda’s largest non-coffee official export. There is scant evi-
dence that gold is produced in anywhere near these quantities in 
Uganda itself according to industry journals” (Reno 2000a:10) 
 The claim that the  Government of Uganda was unable to deal with 
a rebel faction of a few thousand people over a timespan of twenty years, 
even if Sudan’s detrimental interference in the conflict is taken into 
account, while they were very able to exert substantial military power in 
the DRC, is raises a lot of questions. As noted earlier, a considerable 
amount of resources was diverted to support military operations in 
neighbouring Rwanda, Southern Sudan, and the DRC. Uganda’s 
involvement in these regions reveals the obvious lack of political will to 
deal with the LRA rebels. It clearly shows that, to these ruling elites, the 
stability of northern Uganda was not on the priority list. The irony of the 
situation is highlighted by northern Ugandans, who asked: 
“How can the president support the SPLA, the RPF and Kabila, and 
still pretend that he is lacking the means to protect the Acholis from 
the LRA?” (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999:32).   
 The authors claim that this shows that, a set of complex interests, 
processes and organisational structures at the national level put a solution 
for the problems in the north low on the government’s priority list. In 
addition, they claim that the political and military elites have little to gain 
and much to lose (revenues from resource extraction and small arms trade) 
by diverting troops from neighbouring conflict zones and concentrating 
them in the north. It seems that as long as the fighting remained in the 
outskirts of northern Uganda and did not pose a threat to the central 
authority, the Ugandan government was willing to continue to deploy 
military forces in neighbouring regions, outside the state boundaries, 
where lootable resources were in plenty. The role of the state is further 
elaborated upon in section 7.3.2 below. 
In addition to political and military factors responsible for prolonging 
the northern conflict, the continued military presence and insecurity in the 
region gave rise to a low-level war economy. It was hardly surprising that 
various actors, those involved, came to rely on these new economic 
arrangements and did whatever was necessary to sustain them, which 
involved ensuring the continuation of instability in the Northern region. 
This is what Doom and Vlassenroot refer to when they note that: “Some 
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government agents or officials are blocking the peace process in the 
pursuit of a private agenda” (1999:32). This was an issue that several 
participants highlighted during the field exercise. They noted that some 
high-ranking officers were benefitting through private business with the 
LRA rebels and local community as well, as noted in Chapter 4. Some 
participants noted that generals working in the conflict-ridden region were 
entitled to enormous privileges, and some were gaining promotions as 
well. They were, probably, not too eager to see the war come to an end. 
Van Acker also aligns with the above issue and notes that a low-grade 
war economy cropped up around the civil war in northern Uganda, 
allowing senior officers to profit from allowances and from trafficking 
army fuel and supplies, among other revenue-generating practices 
(2004:354).  For instance, as discussed earlier, some scholars say that it is 
an open secret that the army was heavily involved in cattle rustling in 
Acholiland, so that by the mid-1990s, almost all Acholi cattle, the bulk of 
their wealth, had been stolen (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999). They 
conclude that it is likely that Museveni made empty promises about 
putting an end to the LRA war while handing out private concessions, to 
retain the loyalty of key political and military officials, who might 
otherwise threaten his power to rule.  
 There are claims that political gains for the NRM government also 
played a huge role in its reluctance to end the war.  Some scholars argue 
that the Acholi, specifically, were of little political significance to any 
incumbent government. They were just one of the many ethnic groups in 
Uganda. This meant that, though the conflict in Acholi land undermined 
Museveni’s popularity in the north, he did not need the support of the 
Acholi to stay in power. As long as the violence was contained to the 
north, most Southerners were not bothered with the conflict, since it was 
perceived by many of them as an inter-Acholi war (Doom and Vlassenroot 
1999:32). Hence, the southern provinces, that were beneficiaries of NRM 
policies, had little reason to pressure the NRM government into making a 
peace deal with the LRA.  
 In addition, some scholars argue that the horrific violence and weird 
spirituality of the LRA allowed the government to present the north as a 
kind of barbaric periphery. Although Museveni is from the south-west and 
not from Buganda, he presents himself to the people in the south as the 
most certain guarantee that the oppressions by the likes of former 
Presidents Amin, Obote and Okello will never re-surface. So, encouraging 
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a situation of instability and insecurity in northern Uganda was an easy 
way for the NRM leaders to disenfranchise thousands of Ugandan citizens 
and effectively constrain the opposition. Well known for his hostility 
against multi-party democracy and opposition leaders, critics note that 
Museveni has often used the northern conflict to crack down on potential 
political opposition by associating the opposition groups with the LRA 
and attacking opponents who questioned the UPDF’s actions in northern 
Uganda (Cline 2003:124).  As Boas points out: 
“…the government’s attempt to link main opposition politicians to 
armed rebel movements such as the LRA…is a message to the pop-
ulation at large about what constitutes the alternative to Museveni’s 
NRM” (Boas 2004: 297). 
 It was noted that President Museveni’s speeches showed a pattern of 
him using the armed conflict in northern Uganda as a cane to beat the 
masses and opposition into loyalty to the NRM. Lawrence Cline 
summarizes this point well: 
 “Clearly, in various ways the continued existence of the northern in-
surgencies has been of some political use to the government in crack-
ing down on potential political opposition.” (Cline 2003:124). 
 Museveni’s frequent criticism of grassroots organisations and non-
governmental institutions (NGOs) working to negotiate a peace 
settlement only underscores the political benefits he has gained by 
perpetuating the conflict according to Doom and Vlassenroot (1999:23).   
 The fact that the war in the north lasted as long as it did, was also 
attributed to LRA activities and their leader Joseph Kony’s insanity by 
several conflict scholars and by the participants in the field as well. This 
insanity theory was used by the Government of Uganda to explain why 
negotiations were cancelled in earlier course of the conflict. Frank Van 
Acker frames the LRA brutality as a product of ‘religious fanaticism’ and 
clearly emphasizes that it is definitely non-political since it’s based on 
religiously driven actions. He further notes that this “religious terrorism” 
seems “morally justified, almost as a sacramental act” giving the violence 
a ritualistic meaning (Van Acker 2004:348-349).  
 Some scholars claim that the armed conflict went on for so long 
because the LRA had neither a clear political agenda nor a clear strategy. 
Robert Gersony, in his report, argues that the LRA rebel faction is 
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“strikingly devoid of political content” (1997:103). Doom and Vlassenroot 
(1999:25-27) describe Joseph Kony as a “mad max” engaging in “auto-
genocide”. They nonetheless acknowledge that this ‘blind terror’ is 
produced unintended political results by traumatising the whole 
population, reinforcing the LRA position, hence creating a high impact 
with minimal effort. In the same light, Anthony Vinci also notes that 
“throughout the conflict neither Kony, nor any other member of the 
organization, has produced a clear and sustained description of the realistic 
goals of the organization” (Vinci 2007:342). And one of the former rebels 
note that as well when he said: “…but the intention of his fighting no one knows 
up to now. No one knows the intention of fighting, or why Kony is fighting” (John 
Komakech, 18/01/2015, Gulu District).  
 These descriptions of the LRA violence, likened to being illicit, awful, 
atrocious, barbaric, illogical and simply non-political, led by a self-
proclaimed spirit medium leader, fits in the new war thesis of 
incomprehensible events in violent conflict that Robert Kaplan describes 
as “the coming anarchy” (1994:34-60).  
 However, some scholars disapprove of Robert Kaplan’s “new 
barbarism thesis” and argue that there are political and economic motives 
for the atrocious acts perpetrated by rebel factions. David Keen argues in 
“The economic functions of violence in civil wars” that such seemingly 
senseless violence is in fact useful for reaching certain rational or strategic 
objectives, especially in terms of economic gain or function for those who 
use that violence, when he says: “Therefore tended to increase their efforts 
to accumulate funds from domestic sources - either for military purposes 
or for private gain” (1998:34). He further also notes that “Rebels lacking 
substantial resources may resort to brutality in a bid to create maximum 
impact with minimum funding, and to depopulate resource-rich areas.” 
(Keen 1998:34). Here, Keen clearly offers an economic motivation as an 
explanation for violent conflict, as witnessed in the case of the armed 
conflict in northern Uganda. 
 Stathias Kalyvas, using the case of Algerian Islamic extremists, argues 
that these ‘wanton and senseless’ massacres or killings “are not irrational 
instances of random violence…instead they can be understood as part of 
a rational strategy” ( 1999:243). He strongly emphasises the political 
rationale behind violence in conflicts:  
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“To be efficient, terror needs to be selective; indiscriminate terror tends to 
be counterproductive. In a regime of indiscriminate terror, compliance guar-
antees no security…Disaggregating mass massacres into well-planned, indi-
vidually targeted, and selective killings might thus be an indicator of a strat-
egy initiated by insurgents to maximize civilian compliance (more precisely: 
to minimize loss of civilian compliance) by deterring defection; hence, ex-
treme brutality can be instrumental” (Kalyvas 1999:251)  
He clearly notes that massacres are aimed at “shaping civilian behaviour” 
especially that of defectors, as a warning. He notes that rebels invest in 
violence and reap compliance within their ranks and from the civilian 
population (Kalyvas 1999:251), as evident in the case of northern Uganda.  
 In line with the above arguments, Adam Branch believes that the 
LRA merits to be viewed as “a legitimate political force”, because clearly 
it had a political position. He notes that the ‘irrational and excessive 
violence’ used was for strategic purposes (2007:43). He argues that firstly, 
this so called excessive violence was used to sustain the LRA through 
looting and abductions to fill their ranks within the faction. Secondly, he 
claims this violence was directed against government collaborators who 
were frustrating the LRA’s activities by informing the government of their 
movements. Such collaborators, notably the ‘civilians-turned-militias’ 
group members, like the Arrow Boys, local defence units and home 
guards. The third argument was that the LRA aimed at establishing itself 
as “the effective political authority” by punishing those who went against 
their rules, restricting their movements on certain days, and forcing them 
to work on days like fridays. To Adam Branch, these restrictions had a 
symbolic effect and were also designed to show the Acholi population that 
the government cannot protect them. Lastly, using violence, a community 
within the LRA’s ranks was created through “complicity in violence” 
(Branch 2007:40, see also: Paul Omach 2002). All these actions were aimed 
at terminating support for the Ugandan government and establishing its 
own authority.  
 Sverker Finnstrom aligns with Branch’s arguments and notes that 
during peace negotiations, the LRA manifesto included the request for the 
national political integration - on equal basis - of the Acholi, a stop to state 
terror against the Acholi, compensations for the livestock and property 
lost by the Acholi and a multiparty status for Uganda (Finnstrom 
2003:161-172). In 1996, the LRA were noted for taking part in the 
electoral politics and encouraging the Acholi population to vote for 
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Presidential candidate Paul Semwogerere (The Sunday Vision article, titled 
“Kony rebels hold political rallies,” 14 April 1996, Doom and Vlassenroot 
1999:32), hence highlighting the political position of the LRA. 
  On the economic front, the LRA has also pursued what may be 
called economic strategies of personal benefit. Some scholars argue that 
one of the most basic explanations for the LRA’s continuation of the 
conflict is that it served as a profit-making enterprise for those involved. 
The outcomes of interviews with various aid workers and local 
government officials in northern Uganda all pointed to the fact that the 
LRA’s primary source of supplies was the yield of raiding operations in 
the region. Trucks carrying valuable goods were regularly looted, especially 
for anything that could easily be sold in the local trading centres, such as 
bicycle tyres or farm tools. Similarly, the LRA would loot villages and IDP 
camps. According to Vinci (2007:343), he notes that like other groups in 
the Great Lakes Region, the LRA learned that rebellion can be a legitimate 
and lucrative business and by prolonging the conflict, LRA members were 
able to make a better livelihood for themselves and for their families than 
would have been the case if they had returned to civilian life. These 
commercial activities were vital for the LRA’s continued existence and, 
hence, prolonged the armed conflict in the northern region.  
    
 The above arguments show that a combination of factors were 
responsible for the persistence of violent conflicts in the north and north 
eastern Uganda. Besides the underlying factors responsible for the armed 
conflict, new factors emerged through out the course of these conflicts, 
influencing their course and leading to their protraction. And what is 
important to note is these violent conflict had causal linkages. As seen 
above, they were rooted in the structural historical continuities, the 
ethnicisation and millitarisation of politics, poverty and 
underdevelopment, and the raise of a war economy which prolonged these 
conflicts. Besides the underlying causal linkages between these violent 
conflicts, actor linkages are important as well for understanding the full 
interconnectedness of the conflicts. 
7.3 Understanding the actor linkages 
According to the field findings, a range of actors were involved in the civil 
war in northern Uganda and the communal violence in Karamoja, 
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throughout the course of these conflicts. Stathias Kalyvas notes that 
violent conflict cultivates interactions among a range of actors who are 
“local and supralocal actors, insiders and outsiders, individuals and 
organizations, civilians and armies” (2003:837). These actors have 
different identities, motives and interests. David Keen argues that violent 
conflicts have multiple functions, and instead of defining violent conflicts 
as a challenge or failure, he suggests alternative ways of looking at them. 
According to David Keen,   
“…events, however horrible and catastrophic, are actually produced, 
they are made to happen by a diverse and complicated set of actors 
who may well be achieving their objectives in the midst of what looks 
like failure and breakdown” (Keen 2008:15).  
 The section below highlights their positions and role in influencing the 
course of these conflicts.          
7.3.1 Local actors in both conflicts 
According to the field findings, the groups involved in the communal vi-
olence in Karamoja and the civil war in northern Uganda were ethnic 
groups who felt systematically excluded from social, economic and politi-
cal opportunities, as opposed to other groups, notably the Southerners. 
Unlike the Karamojong, the Acholi at least had a political relationship with 
the government, as they dominated the army, with a number of  officials 
in high-ranking positions. Cederman’s polity model is used to illustrate the 
positions of  the ethnic groups chosen for the study. 
 According to the field findings, the Acholi were among the included 
groups dominating the army ranks, which positioned them to feel as the 
‘Ethnic Group in Power (EGIP)’ (Cederman et al. 2013:59, Cederman and 
Girardin 2007:183). This was especially the case after the army assumed a 
pivotal role in Uganda’s political struggles, with the onset of  the militari-
sation of  politics (Jackson 2002, Gresony 1997, Branch 2005, Branch 
2008). Although they dominated the uniformed services, which was seen 
as a ‘privileged’ position, it is noted by various scholars in previous chap-
ters that they had limited access to other economic opportunities, as the 
Southerners were dominating the civil service sector of  the country.  
The Karamojong were worse off, as they were politically, 
economically and socially excluded, as mentioned in the previous chapters. 
They were a ‘Marginalised Ethnic Group’ (MEG) (Cederman et al. 
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2013:58). They were, through the colonial and post-colonial administrative 
policies, systematically excluded from state employment opportunities and 
political representation to mention but a few. ‘Alienated’ as they were, they 
had no option but to continue their cultural practice of cattle raiding. 
Figure 7.2: A Polity Model with Included and Excluded groups 
 
Source: Adapted from Cederman et al. (2013:59) 
Even with the current NRM regime of President Museveni, ethnic 
exclusionary tendencies towards the northerners especially has been 
noted. The NRM government has been accused of awarding multiple 
promotions to officials mainly hailing from the western part of Uganda. 
This is aptly notes below: 
 “Of the 35 army officers promoted and published in the press, 23 are west-
erners. All of them speak Runyoro-Rutoro-Rumyankole-Rukiga, which was 
recently named Runyakitara, and live in one area, the west and south west-
erner parts of the country. Of the 23 western officers promoted, 18 are Ban-
yankole, 16 of the Banyankole are Bahiima, who form only 20 percent of all 
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the Banyankole (Monitor, 16-19 August 1996). Quoted in Muhereza and 
Otim, 1998:199).  
Besides that, additional exclusionary tendencies were evident in the allo-
cation of ministerial positions. The Daily Monitor 10 July revealed that, in 
1996 after the Presidential election victory, President Museveni’s cabinet 
reshuffle was criticized, because:  
“…out of twenty one cabinet posts…the western region was well repre-
sented with ten posts and the north two…Overall, fifty-one ministers (cab-
inet and state) were appointed: eighteen from the west; fourteen from Bu-
ganda; while the north (Acholi and Lango) “took the crumbs” (Monitor, 8-
10 july 1996) quoted in (Muhereza and Otim 1998:195). 
This was evidence that indeed, the ethnic factor is still a protruding issue 
in Ugandan politics. This pinpoints the state as the cause of such 
discrepancies in opportunities among communities. And as highlighted in 
previous chapters, such tendencies involving the uneven distribution of  
opportunities may lead to tendencies of  rebellion against the government. 
When the NRA took over power in 1986, for fear of  losing their privileged 
position to what Cederman et al. (2013:59) describe as ‘alien rule’ by ‘for-
eign’ ethnic groups, the seeds were planted for the birth of violent conflict 
in the northern part of Uganda. This is in line with what Williams 
(2003:150) claims, when he says that not only disadvantaged groups but 
also included groups are involved in violent conflicts, usually to retain their 
own positions, which is a case that can be related to the Acholi in northern 
Uganda. 
Furthermore, these groups taking part in these conflicts had some 
similarities with regard to the kind of  actors involved. Even though each 
of  these actors played different but significant roles in these conflicts. In 
the context of  both conflicts, traditional leaders were significant figures. 
The traditional leadership system was respected by the people in the North 
and North eastern region. In an attempt to curtail their influence, Adam 
Branch notes that, immediately the NRA government came to power, they 
set up the Resistance Council system which had administrative and legis-
lative power, and accountable to the state. Although it tampered with the 
role and influence of  the elders in both regions, the Acholi were able to 
survive its negative effect on their influence (Branch 2007:166-170). 
 In the earlier stages of  the insurgency in northern Uganda, the tradi-
tional leaders were blamed for making the ex-UNLA soldiers feel guilty 
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about the atrocities committed in the Luweero triangle, forcing many to 
join insurgency groups, such as the UPDA (Gersony 1997:22, Behrend 
1999:28)55. However, at the later stages of  the conflict, the Acholi religious 
leaders were very significant figures in the lobby for peace between the 
LRA and the Government of Uganda. They were the link between the 
government of Uganda and the LRA, and were in touch with the LRA 
leaders and exhausted various avenues to find a peaceful solution that 
could bring the armed conflict to an end (Allen 2006).   
In the case of Karamoja, the elders were special beings as well, re-
spected and very central to the community’s existence and culture. These 
elders were responsible for organising and blessing cattle raids, and would, 
at times, participate in them as well. Without their blessings, no raid would 
be carried out (Pazzaglia 1982:74, Stites et al. 2007:57). They were key 
players in promoting communal violence before the era of the gun, before 
the youth took over. From a social constructivism–culturalism and ethno-
symbolism perspective, the roles and positions of traditional leaders in the 
conflict contexts highlight how the ethnic groups valued their culture and 
were embedded in their cultural contexts, in relation to how they under-
stood and valued the leadership structures within their group. The strong 
cultural attachments these groups had later changed with the multiplica-
tion of guns that helped to erode the authority of elders. With the raise of 
Opportunistic and materialistic youth the nature of cattle rustling and its 
fuctions were altered. From being a traditional practice during the pre-
colonial era, it became more commercialised. This explanation places the 
source of human action at the level of individual actors. Yet previously, 
the way in which young men behaved was defined from within a cultural 
context. This is what Kalyvas (2003: 481) refers to when he argues that 
                                                 
55 However, Branch (2007:154-156) argues that the emphasis on the part of the 
traditional leaders for the ex-UNLA to get cleansed traditional was due to a lead-
ership crisis. This internal political crisis had emerged as result of the millitary 
occupation of Acholiland and the introduction of the resistance council leader-
ship system by the new government. In addition to that, the arrival of thousands 
of indisciplined armed idle young men was seen as “a threat to internal order and 
to their own positions” as well. So their only option was to use the only language 
they knew, which was to appeal to their traditions hence demanding that these 
ex-UNLA soldiers undergo cleansing rituals. 
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local actors can go beyond being subjective followers to pursue their pri-
vate objectives. 
The Karamoja youth were known as the ‘Karachuna’, and were usually 
between the age of fifteen and forty (Stites et al., 2007:56). According to 
Ocan (1992), youth became “Prototype Warlords” through raiding cattle 
for their own benefit, selling off the cattle and keeping the proceeds, and 
controlling who was entitled to the spoils after a raid. In this way, a role 
that was held by elders or parents in the pre-gun era came to be controlled 
by youth, which intensified the dynamics of armed conflict in the region.  
In the case of the armed conflict in northern Uganda, the youth 
involved were mostly abducted and forced to fight. They became 
significant actors during the course of the conflict, and they did so 
involuntarily. According to Chris Dolan, boys and girls as young as 7 years 
old were abducted (2009:57). These children became vital, later on, to the 
existence of the LRA as Kony would use them to fill the ranks. Children 
were forced to maim and mutilate relatives after they had been captured. 
This would weigh on their conscience and made it less likely they would 
run away to return home. So, by having young boys – and also girls – as 
fighters or in support roles, Kony was able to loot food and other 
resources whilst keeping the LRA in motion as a fighting force (Olsen 
2007:3-9).  
 Girls and women were significant parties in the conflict in both 
Karamoja and Northern Uganda. In Karamoja, women were significant 
actors in the communal violence that engulfed the region. According to 
field findings, a woman’s position among other women in the community 
depended on the number of cattle a suitor paid for her dowry. Wives with 
a high bride price wore special bangles and beads. . For men, in the 
Karamoja culture, having more wives meant more prestige since it was 
taken as evidence of affluence (Pazzaglia 1982:16). To have more wives, 
one needed more cattle. Indirectly, women were said to encourage men to 
raid cattle for reasons such as hunger, basic needs or to pay the bride price. 
However, when interviewed, a good number of women denied any direct 
contribution to the conflict, since they did not settle the bride prices. They 
attributed this role to their parents, and mainly the father. It is he who 
determines the bride price.  
 The role of abducted girls and women in the northern region was vital 
to the LRA’s continued existence. According to one Amnesty 
International report, girls and women were expected to cook food, collect 
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water, wash clothes, and dig in the family gardens of the top LRA officials. 
Girls that reached the age of thirteen were allocated to male soldiers, to 
carry out domestic tasks and serve as wives to their “husbands”. 
According to the Amnesty International report, this was “part and parcel 
of the military strategy of the LRA and the social order devised by the 
leadership” (Amnesty International Report, 17 September 1997). They 
also note that girls and women were treated as instruments, as a kind of 
incentive/reward for hard-working, male LRA soldiers and officials. They 
were a source of prestige and proof of status, because the higher the rebels’ 
rank the greater the number of women or “wives” they had. 
 The civilian and business community played a huge part in both 
conflicts. Like the civilian community (discussed in Chapter 4), private 
sector actors provided support to the rebels. Business men sold goods and 
supplies to the rebels and collaborated as spies for the LRA and the UPDF 
(Jackson 2002:47, Van Acker 2004:354). Most of the civilian community 
withdrew their support from the LRA in the wake of a brutal one-sided 
campaign against local people.  
 In the Karamoja region, most young warriors emerged from within 
the community and they were the ones who raided cattle. The absence of 
restrictions by the state and the proliferation of guns were very significant 
factors in the persistence of violent conflict in the north eastern region. 
These factors played a huge role in transforming the violence in the region 
and in introducing other types of conflict, and crime as well. With the 
introduction of guns, the elder’s authority diminished, and there 
consequently, the reckless cattle raids and killings as a result emerged. The 
power was transferred to the youth, who became the decision makers 
(Odhiambo 2003:44, Muhereza and Otim 2002:168).  Later, with the 
gradual commercialisation of cattle raids, local businessmen came forward. 
Some studies reveal that businessmen were often aware that the cattle had 
been raided, and yet would go ahead and purchase them. It is also noted 
that some businessmen would connive with raiders to support them in 
raiding and selling the livestock (Mercy Corps, 2011:7). Not only the 
business community, but also local political leaders and some government 
individuals in the UPDF and other security agencies, were involved in 
buying and selling raided cattle. In the 1980s, according to Okudi (1992), 
some high-ranking government officials were found involved in taking 
huge numbers of cattle which had been caught in retaliatory raids between 
the Karamojong and the Iteso. Ben Knighton concurs with this view when 
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he says, “The state is just another raider…a cattle raider” because elements 
within the UPDF were enriching themselves “taking cattle seized by force 
for their own herds or be selling them fro meat” (2003:449).  
 In both conflicts, local politicians contributed to a certain extent to 
how events unfolded in the conflict regions. According to the field 
findings, in northern Uganda, local politicians (mostly senior government 
officials) encouraged civilians to arm themselves against the LRA. Among 
these politicians was the minister for the Pacification of the North, Betty 
Bigombe (Branch 2007:181, Doom and Vlassenroot 1999:23). The 
civilians were encouraged to join defence units equipped with bows and 
arrows, kill or report any rebel in sight. Former LRA rebels noted that 
such acts were responsible for the brutal campaign against the people of 
Acholi. In the Karamoja region, according to Odhiambo (2003:46-47), the 
political leadership was characterised by loyalty to the various clans. And 
with competing interests they had sabotaged or intervened in actions 
against their clans, in connection with cattle raids. In certain cases, 
selective action against other clans was recommended, leading to 
retaliatory raids. These political leaders would indirectly act as clan leaders 
and some of the clashes between soldiers and communities were a 
manifestation of political power games among these political leaders.   
 Besides the role of the local actors, the state was noted for its actions 
and strategies, which reflected a lack of political will to contain these 
conflicts.  
7.3.2 The state as an actor in both conflicts 
As noted above, the state has been a significant actor in these conflicts. 
Scholars such as Ronald Atkinson note that President Yoweri Museveni 
had, since 1986, a very low opinion of the Northerners.  Atkinson refers 
to him as describing the Northerners, and more specifically the Acholi, as 
‘primitive’, ‘backward’ and ‘ignorant’, as documented in the The New 
Vision’s article “NRA to cover rebel areas” of 21 August 1987 ( 2010: 289).  
 The lack of political will to end the war in the north is also reflected 
in the President’s actions and words, for instance when he, in the middle 
of peace negotiations, gave the LRA a 7-day ultimatum to surrender, 
which accelerated the conflict further (Gersony 1997:34, Branch 
2007:181). The President’s obvious intentions of not ending this war are 
also noted by Caroline Lamwaka who quotes the President as dismissing 
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any sort of negotiations with the LRA and describing an agreement to 
negotiation as “like giving first aid to a snake” (Lamwaka 1998:160). 
Because of such questionable actions, a parliamentary committee, set up 
in 1996 to investigate the causes of the protraction of the war in the north, 
summoned and heard General David Sejusa (also known as David 
Tinyefuza), one of the high command members of the UPDF and senior 
presidential adviser. According to John Kazoora, who was one of the 
committee members, on 29 November 1996: 
“Tinyefuza accused the Government of lacking political will to end 
the insurgency. He also talked of the mismanagement in the army like 
soldiers going into ambushes with saucepans, lack of necessary mili-
tary logistics and other damning criticisms” (Kazoora 2012:154). 
He noted that, because of these criticisms, David Tinyefuza was 
reprimanded by the President and accused of treason, forcing him to 
resign in December 1996, although his resignation was rejected at first 
(The New Vision, “Tinyefuza takes army to court”, October 2009). Doom and 
Vlassenroot  align with Tinyefuza’s remarks and note that government 
troops were indeed in a sorry state and with a low morale to fight: “Rank 
and file soldiers are not properly fed, and war fatigue is high…The 
fighting, if possible, is left to the Local Defence Units, which are poorly 
equipped” (1999:31). They further note that this was the case since many 
non-Acholi government troops seemed unbothered as the civil war was 
viewed as an ‘Acholi affair’ and many were not willing to risk their lives in 
what they regarded as an alien war.  
 In his book, John Kazoora, a former Member of Parliament, also 
notes that President Museveni “…deployed troops in Congo without 
recourse to Parliament” (Kazoora, 2012:147). As discussed earlier, in 
section 7.2, although the Ugandan state claimed it could not contain the 
LRA rebels, it was able to dispatch soldiers to other countries, such as the 
DRC. In his articles “War, Debt and the Role of Pretending in Uganda’s 
International relations” and “Uganda’s Politics of War and Debt Relief”, William 
Reno clearly highlights deliberate actions and strategies by the Uganda 
government aimed at acquiring political and economic resources (Reno 
2000a:13-14, 2002:417). These actions and strategies used by the state to 
acquire entrepreneurial opportunities were part of what Bayart et al. (1999) 
described as “criminalisation” of the state.  
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 Having the capacity to occupy another state’s territory – the DRC and 
extracting natural resources from that territory, while neglecting the 
internal strife at home, the state indeed must have had other priorities. 
Reno notes that the Ugandan state’s strategies had a political and 
economic agenda and the incursion in the DRC was important because it 
had:  
“…an important political role in managing relations with Uganda’s 
multilateral creditors. Second, significant increases in “non-tradi-
tional” [Congo] exports ameliorate Uganda’s balance of payments 
difficulties. This assists creditors’ efforts to portray Uganda as a suc-
cessful example of neo-liberal reform. The strategic advantage in this 
for creditors lies in Uganda’s superior performance as an early client 
of the Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative” (Reno, 
2000a:11).  
He notes that, due to these activities in the DRC, Uganda was able to 
earn itself debt relief from the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) 
program and acquire additional loans from the Paris Club (Reno 2000a:13, 
Reno 2002:428). 
 It should be mentioned that these commercial activities in the DRC 
did not only benefit the state but the UPDF officials involved as well 
(Reno 2000a, Reno 2002:422-3).  Even those who were stationed in the 
northern region were indifferent towards containing the war and (falsely) 
pretended to be in favour of it, since the continuation of the conflict meant 
a continuous flow of operational allowances in the combat zones. In 
addition to that, some army officials profited by selling army supplies, such 
as fuel and food (Van Acker 2004:354, Doom and Vlassenroot 1999:31-
2).  
With regard to Karamoja, scholars such as John Markakis clearly 
point out the challenges that pastoral communities have endured from the 
governments of the countries in the horn of Africa and in eastern Africa. 
He notes that pastoral communities such as the Karamojong have been 
neglected by the government since the colonial era, when he says:  
“No investment or technological innovation was brought to the pas-
toralist economy, nor were any ‘modernizing’ processes such as com-
munications, education, health care, transport or urbanization intro-
duced into the pastoralist milieu. As a result, when independence 
came, pastoralism was isolated on the margin of the African state and 
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society. Independence did not halt the decline of pastoralism; it ac-
celerated it… There was little more investment or technological in-
novation brought to the pastoralist zone in the postcolonial period 
than earlier” (Markakis 2004: 02).  
Instead, the Karamojong’s movement was restricted within new 
administrative boundaries. Their land was taken without notice or 
consultation and given to agricultural communities or turned into forest 
reserves and game reserves. This led to increased resource competition 
and communal violence among the pastoral communities (Gray 2000:408, 
Mamdani et al. 1992:23). Apparently, the colonial and post-independence, 
successive goverments of Uganda were focused more on the development 
of commercial livestock ranching (Muhwereza 2001:100-124, Muhwereza 
and Otim 2002:119, Markakis 2004:02). 
After independence, Prime Minister Milton Obote, in 1963, after he 
visited the Karamoja region, was quoted by the NewsPaper Uganda 
Gazette as saying: “we shall not wait for Karamoja to develop”. According 
to The Daily Monitor newspaper article “Waiting for Karamoja to 
develop: or Uganda’s uneven development”,   
 “Those words capture the simple reality yet powerful inequity of de-
velopment in Uganda. Obote is said to have uttered the words after 
a visit to Karamoja, then the least-developed part of newly independ-
ent Uganda, and decided the country had to move on. Fifty years 
later, Karamoja is still one of the least-developed parts of Uganda but 
it is not clear whether the rest of the country is (still) waiting for it” 
(The Monitor reporter, 20 June, 2012).  
John Kazoora notes that, when President Museveni took over power in 
1986, in the “Ten Point Programme” of the NRA government, the 
development of the Karamoja region (point 8b) was highlighted (Kazoora, 
2012:209). However, as noted earlier, in section 7.2.3, the Karamoja region 
currently has the lowest human development indicator value and the 
highest poverty level compared to the rest of the country (UNHS 2006, 
UNHS 2012/13). A newspaper article by Steven Ariong and Simon P. 
Emwamu, titled “46 dead as hunger pounds Karamoja, Teso” (The Sunday 
Monitor, 17 July 2013), revealed that very few families could afford a meal 
a day and had to depend on relief from the government. Two years, later, 
the Observer News Paper (20 September 2015) also reported that “Several 
dead as drought, famine hit Karamoja”.  
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 Such events reveal how neglected the region has been, even in very 
recent times. And yet Uganda, like many others states in East Africa, has 
pledged to protect and provide for pastoral communities, such as the 
Karamojong, who have been described as minority groups. According to 
John Markakis: 
‘The UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National 
or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (1992) requires states 
not only to protect ‘all human rights and freedoms without discrimi-
nation’ (Article 4), but to promote them through appropriate policies 
and legislation. The International Convenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (1966), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (1965) and the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples Rights (1981) have similar provisions. All the states in eastern 
Africa and the Horn have formally adhered to them (Markakis, 2004: 
30). 
Despite such agreements, states like Uganda have only intervened in 
and recognised the issues affecting these communities as a result of 
external pressure. Markakis writes: “…it took external pressure to bring 
recent attention to their plight, geared by funding offers from international 
organisations and aid agencies” (Markakis 2004:30). Alhough there are 
claims of earlier attempts by the NRA-backed government to intervene 
and contain the conflict in north eastern Uganda after they took power 
(HRW, September 2007:21), evidence cited in the discussion in section 6.4 
shows that the NRA government, instead of intervening in and pacifying 
the turmoil, authorised gun ownership in Karamoja and even provided the 
Karamojong with more weapons to protect their livestock and themselves 
from the neighbouring pastoral communities (which they did, and even 
did more by attacking and raiding cattle from the rebel communities of 
Teso and Acholi, that were fighting the NRA government) (Henriques 
2000:47, Gersony 1997:15, Doom and Vlassenroot 1999:12). As Ben 
Knighton clearly notes that allowing such instability to continue was a 
strategic move by the state: “The government had been quite content for 
many years to let these sources of political opposition be weakened by the 
Karamojong” (2003:427). The Karamojong continued to engage in 
communal conflicts without much restriction and they managed to 
disorganise and displace “hundreds of thousands in the region”, notably 
the Acholi, the Lango, the Teso, and the Sebei (Knighton 2003:427).  
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The government deliberately ignored the course of events in the 
region. It was not until members of parliament originating from the Teso 
region pressured the government to intervene and contain the situation in 
Karamoja, that a disarmament programme was formally launched in 
December 2001 (OPM 2007:07).   
Bearing in mind the recent discovery of minerals and the provision of 
funds by the World Bank for the development of the Karamoja region, 
some scholars have criticised the fact that the President after all these years 
decided that time had come to appoint his wife as the Minister for 
Karamoja Affairs in 2011 (Kazoora, 2012: 209). 
All in all, as discussed above, the state and its institutions were very 
influential in determining the course of both conflicts. The state’s 
approach in dealing with either conflict prolonged and even deepened it.  
Although there is emphasis on actor difference in the way these conflicts 
have been conceptualised, in both conflicts the role of the state is visible 
and paramount, which highlights actor linkages in both conflicts of which 
the state was a central actor.  
7.3.3 External actors both conflicts  
How-won Jeong argues that external players or allies provide different 
types of support that add complex dimensions to the internal conflict. 
They can either mitigate or intensify the conflicts with the different types 
of support they provide (Jeong 2008:121). In both conflicts, external in-
tervention played a significant role in the perpetration of violence. 
 One frequently cited explanation for the protracted armed conflict 
in northern Uganda is regional and international involvement. The Sudan 
Government was accussed of supporting the LRA They provided the LRA 
with logistical and military support; food, weapons and communication 
equipment, in retaliation for the Ugandan government’s support to the 
Southern People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in southern Sudan (Branch 
2007:182, Gersony 1997:68, Doom and Vlassenroot 1999:28). According 
to a report by Amnesty International (1997), advanced kinds of armament, 
such as the AK 47, the G3 assault rifle, anti-tank weaponry, mortars and 
land mines were provided by Sudan. This military equipment enabled the 
LRA to upscale the levels of violence against civilians in both Sudan and 
northern Uganda. According to Robert Gersony, Sudan’s support legiti-
mised and professionalised the LRA’s activities, as they became well-paid 
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mercenaries fighting against the government of Uganda and the SPLA. 
With rear bases in Sudan, the LRA operated with a free hand, taking ad-
vantage of the protection, security and immunity offered by Sudan 
(1997:68). With this support, the LRA was able to continue its activities. 
However, some scholars note that the role of international actors in 
Uganda’s violent conflicts was strategically planned by the President of 
Uganda. Dominant narratives, which Sverker Finnstrom has defined as 
the ‘official discourses’ surrounding the brutality of the LRA and the ab-
duction of children were used by the President Museveni to instil fear and 
nurture political support domestically and internationally. This is said to 
have earned him diplomatic and budgetary support from international 
agencies such as the World Bank and donor states such as the U.S. and 
U.K. for military purposes, among others things (Mwenda 2010:45-58). It 
also enabled him to convince the U.S. to include the LRA in the list of 
terrorist groups. As a result, making it possible for arrest warrants from 
the International Criminal Court in 2005 to be issued for the arrest of 
Joseph Kony and his top commanders (Atkinson 2009:9).  
In relation to the role of humanaitarian intervention and its role in pro-
longing the war in northern Uganda.The violence inflicted on civilians by 
the rebels and the government troops was politically motivated. Several 
key informants noted that, the NRM Government, set up ‘protected vil-
lages’ or IDP camps, as a counter-insurgency approach. However, there 
are claims that that strategy was targeting humanitarian intervention from 
the international community. According to Adam Branch, there is an in-
ternal logic to humanitarian intervention by those who instrumentalise it. 
And it is a “vehicle for external political interests” (Branch 2007:2-3). And 
that were the objectives of Uganda’s Government. 
This IDP camp idea was strategically manufactured as it produced 
needy victims that were going to be dependent on outsiders for their eco-
nomic and military aid as they were unable to help nor protect themselves. 
Adam Branch further notes that by 2003, the majority of the Acholi pop-
ulation were in IDP camps, as part of a counter-insurgency strategy, and 
the government knew that this strategy was “only sustainable because of 
the massive relief distribution system established by the humanitarian 
agencies” (Branch 2007:14).  
He further notes that the counter-insurgency strategy opened the way 
for the Ugandan government to gain access to foreign material, political 
and symbolic resources, thus permitting it to go ahead with the war.  He 
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argues that humanitarian intervention normalised the situation of emer-
gency in northern Uganda while providing support to the state and, hence, 
prolonging the conflict.  This is because it created better political condi-
tions that had implications on the dynamics of the conflict, and putting 
people at more risk: “…although purporting to save lives, reduce suffer-
ing, and resolve conflict, it can prolong conflict and intensify the suffering 
of those in whose name it takes place” (Branch 2007:12).  
 Furthermore, Adam Branch also argues that western academics and 
policy groups deliberately refused to acknowledge the LRA as a political 
force, and were fixed on the violence being irrational and 
incomprehensible. Such attitudes led to the production of reports that 
favour the Ugandan Government’s interest and military approach, which 
was adopted by the UPDF army (Branch 2007:34- 42).  He further argues 
that prejudices against the LRA by Western Governments, international 
organisations and the aid agencies were based on moral issues due to the 
brutal campaign characterising the war, yet many informants highlighted 
the state as a key actor in this campaign. Extreme brutality against the 
Acholi and especially children made it necessary and morally correct to 
disqualify the LRA as a faction with a political agenda (Branch 2007:32-
45, Dolan 2002:68-71). This position has been attributed to Uganda’s close 
relationship with the U.S. and its war against terror, which has made this 
disqualification appropriate (Branch 2007:42, Atkinson 2009:9). 
Organisations such as the International Crisis Group recommended to 
have no peace negotiations with the LRA and, instead, lobby for 
continued donor support to Uganda from the U.S. and U.K. (ICG 
2004:20). Adam Branch aptly notes this below:  
“… the demonization of the LRA by such groups as UNICEF and 
other humanitarian NGOs is supported by Western states and 
international financial institutions, who do not want to grant 
legitimacy to the rebels. The characterization of the LRA as a-political 
and their violence as fundamentally irrational and meaningless is in 
the interests of western media, western states, NGOs, international 
institutions, and the Ugandan government. The media sell gory 
images of incomprehensible barbarism in Africa; western states 
protect their East African ally; NGOs collect funds through 
marketing the plight of abducted children; and international agencies 
undertake humanitarian intervention while absolving themselves of 
the need to engage complex issues” (Branch 2007:43).  
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Those that have written articles and reports against the political 
legitimacy of the LRA have been accused of pursuing their personal 
interests, because Western Governments and various non-governmental 
organisations fund various surveys and studies, and it is “predictable that 
there will be little divergence from this official line” (Branch, 2007: 43). 
Authors such as Robert Gersony, funded by USAID (Gersony 1997:1) 
and Frank Van Acker,employed by and involved in “NGO, academic, 
donor” work (Van Acker 2004:335) have written extensively about the 
illegitimacy of the LRA.  To the writings of those who have openly 
declared the political legitimacy of the LRA, disclaimers have been added, 
stating that they are not backing the LRA rebel faction (Branch 2007:43). 
This has been the case as well for the communal conflicts in north east-
ern region. Ben Knighton notes that relatively little has been written about 
the voices of the pastoralists, despite many planned NGO interventions 
(2003:431). Instead, there has been a focus on violence and guns. Over the 
years, certain terms have been used to refer to Karamojong warriors such 
as, ‘clan elders to warlords’ (Oloka-Onyango et al. 1993:17, Ocan 
1994:140, Muhereza and Otim 2002:112,116). Although such terms have 
been used to portray the disintegration of culture and a social change in 
leadership from the elders to the unruly youth, they have had a huge in-
fluence on policy papers and planned interventions. Such descriptions of 
the Karamojong have been employed by various NGOs, international 
agencies and the Government of Uganda (Knighton 2003:431-2).  
Michael Odhiambo noted that: “…the gun problem in Karamoja…it 
is through these borders that guns and ammunitions infiltrate into Kara-
moja” (2003:58-59). “These borders” are notably those between Uganda 
and southern Sudan. The instability in neighbouring states, such as Sudan, 
as well as the armed conflict in northern Uganda, undoubtedly contributed 
to the dissemination of small arms in the wider region. With the prolifer-
ation of arms, that have been trafficked from conflict ridden regions such 
as Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia, and found their way in to Karamoja - the 
Karamojong have been referred to as “criminals” involved in ‘transna-
tional criminal networks’, involving arms trade and thus posing as a threat 
to global peace and prosperity (Mkutu 2008:100, 2001:ii). This is aptly 
noted below: 
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“The last 25 years have seen the acquisition of modern firearms transform-
ing raiding into large-scale armed conflict with outside actors. Beneficiaries 
have links to the market economy… Armed conflicts have moved beyond 
limited communal resource based conflicts and become embedded in wider 
criminal networks serving national and regional areas” (Mkutu 2008:100). 
As a result, the U.S. government, through USAID, offered support to 
the Government of Uganda, to be devoted to conflict issues such as the 
disarmament of the north eastern region (Knighton 2003:430, USAID 
2002 Performance and Accountability Annual Report, data for Uganda). 
The World Bank offered 100 million U.S. dollars for the reconstruction of 
the north and north eastern region through the “Northern Uganda Social 
Action Fund (NUSAF) Project”. The New Vision reported that the Gov-
ernment of Uganda had received donor funds for anti-terrorist activities 
and the pacification of the Karamoja region respectively (The New Vision, 
26 February 2003).  
Consequently as seen above, as Ho-Won Jeon argues “Different moti-
vations and power dynamics get involved in the formation of layers of 
conflict relationships” (2008:118). Through such facilitation, international 
community has indirectly facilitated the perpetuation of the armed con-
flicts in Uganda. These cases of violent conflict highlight how significant 
the international community and global processes have been in the pro-
traction of violent conflict in Uganda. And as the discussion above reveals, 
the trajectory of these conflicts, and their change in form and direction 
was as a result of twists and turns embedded in the strategies, orientations 
and goals of the various actors involved. 
7.4 Conclusion 
In conclusion, as shown above, both conflicts was connected to the wider 
ways in which the local society and Uganda were organised and governed. 
Long-standing traditions of local nationalism divided communities along 
ethnic, linguistic and regional lines. The cases discussed show how 
identity-based explanation theories are significant in revealing the 
significance of cultural and ethnic attachments and how identity can be 
instrumentalized. Both these conflicts reveal how identity makes a conflict 
socially meaningful as well as politically functional.  
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 This study unravels the complex dynamics that characterise both sets 
of violent conflict. Issues such as colonialism, Uganda’s post-independent 
political struggles, poverty and underdevelopment, the rise of a war 
economy and the role of external actors, can all be referred to as essential 
to the political economy of violent conflict, which are all evident as 
discussed above.  
 All in all, it is important to note that (and how) these two sets of 
conflict have both causal and actor linkages. However, what stands out is 
the state’s involvement in both regions. These findings problematise the 
rigid definition of civil war as state based conflict and communal violence 
as a non-state conflict. As highlighted in the above discussions, exclusion-
ary policies and a deliberate move not to intervene and contain the group 
to group violence in Karamoja by the state served to prolong the instability 
in Karamoja. How these conflicts are defined, influence how they are 
viewed, understood and approached. How policy makers design interven-
tions in such conflict-affected regions is important, and this brings the 
researcher to the concluding Chapter (8), which provides some recom-
mendations with regard to the general insights gained from this study, and 
lays out some suggestions for future academic research.  
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8 Summary and Research Agenda for 
the Future  
 
 
8.1 General research findings 
The main research question of this study is: What are the complex 
interconnections between the civil war in northern Uganda and the 
communal violence in north eastern Uganda? In response to this question, 
this study as a whole has found evidence of causal linkages between civil 
war and communal violence. These conflicts are interconnected by virtue 
of their histories and the national political and economic context that were 
both instrumental in the outbreak of violent conflict and in its persistence 
over time. This finding is important for academic conflict studies, and 
more research should be undertaken in the future to better understand the 
complex dynamics of, and causal connections between, these categories 
of violent conflict: civil war and communal violence. 
 The study found evidence of interesting conflict dynamics of the civil 
war in northern Uganda and the communal violence in north eastern 
Uganda. The nature and dynamics of the violent conflict in each of these 
two regions impacted on how these conflicts should be conceptualised, 
measured and understood, separately and in relation to one another. The 
field findings clearly show that the connections between these two 
differently classified forms of violent conflict have in the past tended to 
be under-theorised, since each is seen as a distinct category of the overall 
phenomena of violent conflict. Each of the two conflicts displayed several 
interesting inter-linkages with the other, as shown in this thesis. Neither 
conflict was static in terms of the dynamics over time. Each conflict had 
its own longer-term cycles of violence and relative calm and both evolved 
beyond the simple classification of a civil war or a case of communal 
violence. 
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 It became apparent from close study, oral testimony and reading of 
the results of research in the field, that both conflicts – the civil war with 
the LRA in the north, and the so-called communal violence in Karamoja 
– were equally complex and multi-faceted. Each evolved in ways that 
echoed both the narrower and the broader typologies of conflict. Through 
the course of several decades, the two sets of violent conflict also inter-
twined, and each influenced the course of the other. This means that 
neither of the violent conflicts in this case can be understood within the 
rigid categorical definition used to measure and quantify them in the 
databases.   
 Even these conceptualisations are too confining to capture the 
dynamic spillovers between situations of violence that are adjacent, yet 
recorded separately. The way in which violence is measured thus needs to 
be re-visited in this respect at least.  It should be possible in data collection 
to also take into account the transformation taking place over time in both 
civil war and communal violence. The interplay between these forms of 
conflict may even set up a scheme that can lead to the unnecessary 
prolongation of these conflicts. This can have a significant bearing on 
academic researchers. Those who wish to elaborate on such overlaps, 
spillovers and complex inter-conflict dynamics, may become better 
prepared for giving policy advice in future. Policy formulation and 
intervention may even become less data-driven and more evidence-based 
in the future. In this way, such protracted cases of - parallel and only 
apparently mutually exclusive - violent forms of civil and communal 
conflict can be avoided.  
8.2 Specific research findings 
Chapter 1 highlights the emphasis conflict scholars have put in differenti-
ating these conflicts. The problem is that, by making these differentiations, 
the realities of these conflicts are overlooked. Such types of conflicts may 
not be easy to differentiate from each other, and are at different times 
linked to each other. This is argued with reference to cases of violent con-
flict in Sudan and Somalia. To be able to understand the interlinkages be-
tween the case of civil war and that of communal violence, the research 
focused on Uganda, one country among many conflict-affected countries 
in Africa.  
To examine the complex interconnections, the main research question 
was broken down into several sub-questions: 
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1. What were the underlying causes of the civil war in northern Uganda 
and the communal violence in north eastern Uganda?  
2. Who were the main actors in the two conflicts?  
3. What were their incentives and their role in influencing the direction 
of these conflicts?  
4. Under what circumstances did the form, content and direction of 
these two conflicts interconnect and overlap?  
5. What are the implications of the distinct and overlapping nature of 
these two conflicts for how civil war and communal violence are 
conceptualised and measured? 
 
Based on these sub-questions, the section below will synthesise the field 
findings and reflect on the contribution of this study to conflict studies, 
and on the implications for theorisation and analysis of violent conflicts.  
The study’s major findings were presented and discussed in Chapters 
4, 5, 6 and 7. In response to sub-questions 1 and 2, Chapters 4 and 5 
contextualise the civil war in northern Uganda and communal violence in 
Karamoja. This involves an analysis of the history of these conflicts and 
the key sources of tensions that led to the onset of the civil war in northern 
Uganda and the continuation and redefinition of communal violence in 
north eastern Uganda. Drawing on empirical and secondary sources, these 
Chapters identified key actors and their role in influencing the direction of 
these conflicts from the colonial, post-independence era until the current 
NRM regime.  
Chapter 4 reveals that the civil war in northern Uganda evolves taking 
a local, national, regional as well an international dimension. These devel-
opments come with new issues and external actors that shape its course. 
Chapter 5 reveals that the cattle rustling in Karamoja is an old tradition 
that later gets transformed with the multiplication of guns and ammuni-
tions in the region. These developments are characterised by cycles of 
cattle rustling and counterraids, not only with neighbours across the 
border of Uganda, but also among the groups themselves, and with other 
ethnic groups across other districts, and later occasionally in combat with 
state actors. These transformative conflict situations concur with the 
argument presented in this thesis that these conflicts are not static, and 
may overlap and get embedded in larger conflicts or become an extension 
of smaller or narrower conflicts. The pathways of these conflicts have 
implications on how they can be conceptualised. 
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In an unchronological manner, but aimed at making the researcher’s 
arguments clear, Chapter 7 gives a response to sub-question 3, while, sub-
questions 4 and 5 are covered by Chapter 6, which critiques the 
categorisations of these conflicts. The study reveals that the databases, 
through coding, play a big role in understanding the role of key actors in 
influencing the direction of these conflicts. The civil war in northern 
Uganda, led by LRA rebel leader Joseph Kony against the government of 
Uganda, evolved into narrower and broader conflict categories, involving 
atrocities against innocent civilians (which is coded as one-sided violence), 
and later involving battle field confrontations with not only the UPDF but 
with a highly organised rebel faction, the SPLA, in southern , as well. This 
scenario develops with continued attacks on civilians in Uganda and 
southern Sudan. Later, the LRA launches incursions into Teso and Lango 
in the north eastern districts of Uganda and clashes with ethnic 
paramilitary groups in these districts. This section critiques the coding of 
these conflicts, that understates the role of the Ugandan state and the role 
of external actors such as Sudan. The study notes that the civilians in 
northern Uganda have experienced terror from both the state troops and 
the LRA Despite this fact, the UCDP only codes the state’s involvement 
in one-sided violence aginst the Acholi people in 1990/91. The atrocious 
role of the state is also revealed in the negligence of the IDPS Camps, the 
appalling conditions in which led to deaths of thousands of civilians, due 
to the lack of the necessary social services and the spread of deadly 
diseases.   
The conflict in the north develops from civil war, to one-sided 
violence, to combat between highly organised millitias. Although the 
conflict was internationalised early on, the UCDP only later codes it as an 
internationalised armed conflict. The concern noted here with these 
conflict categorisations is that they understate the role of significant actors 
such as the state in the one-sided violence in northern Uganda. They also 
understate the role of external actors such as Sudan. In this case, the 
conflict was coded as an international one only in 2005, whereas the 
governments of Uganda and Sudan were supporting the SPLA and LRA 
rebels, sponsoring their activities and deploying active troops to fight 
alongside them against the respective governments, from as early on as in 
1995/96.  
Chapter 6 shows that the protraction and changing nature of the 
violent conflict in Karamoja were to a large extent due to deliberate anti-
pastoralist administrative policies by the colonial and post–colonial 
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governments. These policies served to isolate and marginalise the Kara-
mojong from the rest of the country and fostered a resource competition 
that fed the continuation of the conflict. Later, when the NRA took over 
power, it adopted a non-intervention policy that favoured continued ten-
sions in the Karamoja region. The case of communal violence in Karamoja 
reveals that there were different levels of conflict that emerged with time. 
There was conflict between the Karamojong and cross-border ethnic 
groups in neighbouring countries, conflict within Karamojong ethnic 
group itself, conflict between the Karamojong and ethnic groups from 
neighbouring frontier districts, and conflict between the Karamojong and 
the state actors. Karamojong warriors engaged in combat with state forces, 
and this is not recognised in the UCDP conflict datasets.  
Chapter 6 reveals that the linkages between these two conflicts are 
predominantly in state policies and political struggles at the national level. 
It is important to note that the military coups fostered the proliferation of 
guns and ammunitions in the Karamoja region and also introduced a tra-
dition of persecution of other ethnic groups, such as the Acholi, by in-
coming governments. Direct and indirect causal linkages between these 
conflicts are traced to the political instability and political struggles (that 
included several military coups), which characterised the political scene in 
post-independence Uganda and the subsequent rise of the NRA.  
This tradition of persecution was adopted by the NRA government 
when they took over power in 1986, and especially the Acholi were af-
fected by it. This led to the rise of rebel factions, not only in Acholi but 
also in Teso and the West Nile. In relation to the Karamoja region, the 
state authorised the ownership of guns by the Karamoja to protect them-
selves and their livestock against other cattle-rustling ethnic groups such 
as the Turkana and Pokot. Apart from allowing this free gun ownership, 
the state disbanded militia groups protecting the borders of neighbouring 
districts from cattle-rustlers. The study reveals that the state, through de-
liberate policies, used the Karamojong to impoverish the Acholi and other 
rebel tribes, such as the Teso, that were seen as a threat to the state. This 
free gun ownership policy fuelled the conflict in Karamoja in turn, and 
also contributed to the onset of the civil war in the north.  
What is significant to note as well is the policy blindness employed by 
the state towards the Karamoja region. Much of the executive actions with 
regard to conflicts in the country were directed towards the LRA in north-
ern Uganda, and not to the Karamoja region. This, as seen above, the the-
sis argues was a deliberate strategy of the state, aimed at disorganising rebel 
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tribes. Even though finally, in 2001, a disarmament programme is put in 
place, minimal effort is put into it, as is evident from the constant rede-
ployment of army troops from Karamoja to northern Uganda, whenever 
the LRA would strike.  
In response to sub-question 3, Chapter 7 discusses causal linkages and 
shows that the colonial legacy that created a fragmented society and divi-
sive politics was carried on by the successive governments of Uganda. It 
should be noted that it was the ethnicisation and militarisation of politics 
in Uganda that led to the civil war onset in northern Uganda and contrib-
uted to the continuation of communal violence in Karamoja. As these 
conflicts developed, other factors emerged that fostered their protraction. 
These factors were poverty and underdevelopment, and the emergence of 
a war economy. Against a backdrop of widespread poverty in Karamoja 
and the limited economic opportunities, the commercialisation of cattle 
raids took off and this contributed to the continuation of the communal 
violence. The study shows that, with regard to the northern region, it was 
mainly the government’s lack of political will to end the civil war that led 
to its protraction.  
 The study shows that social identities of groups played an important 
role in the onset and protraction of violent conflict. In both the civil war 
in northern Uganda and the communal violence in Karamoja ethnicity 
played an important role. These conflicts show how significant the 
emotional power of ethnic attachments can be and how communities can 
draw on them to fight other groups. The constructivist–culturalism school 
argues that the socialisation of communities leads to the internalisation of 
cultural practices that create an affective sense and, consequently, a belief. 
This was the main reason for the cattle rustling among the Karamojong, a 
tradition embedded in their cultural system. This is also relevant in relation 
to the atrocities against the Acholi that were committed by the NRA forces 
in early 1986. The fear of group extermination due to the emotional value 
of ethnicity created a context in which rebel leaders used to mobilise 
masses to fight the NRA government. The constructivist–culturalism 
school of thought clearly highlights the significance of deep ethno-
symbolic resources and culturalism by groups in both conflicts.  
 The constructivist–instrumentalism school’s view can be related to 
both cases, but was much more relevant for the civil war in northern 
Uganda. This is becuase elite ex-UNLA officials, dwelling on the atrocities 
being committed by the NRA among other reasons, initiated rebel groups 
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and rallied significant numbers of the Acholi population into joining them 
in fighting the NRA government. However, although this approach 
focuses on the predatory nature of the elites who manipulate the masses 
for their own selfish interests, the study reveals a combination of factors. 
The collective fears created were actually witnessed by the masses. 
 The study also shows that ethnic groups from the conflict-affected 
regions were discriminated against and had limited political and socio-
economic opportunities. Violent conflict can be constructed in uneven, 
unfair and unrepresentative structures. The experiences of the 
Karamojong and the Acholi in north east and northern Uganda clearly 
illustrate that structural violence prepares ground for violent conflict, 
which the political economy school of thought argues is the major 
underlying factor responsible for unrest in the global south. The study 
concludes that the onset and continuation of these conflicts was as the 
result of a complex chain of causes, involving the state as the central actor 
alongside other local and external actors. Through lack of political will to 
end these conflicts and by diverting resources to pursuing alternative 
policies in foreign countries, the state contributed in the shaping of the 
conditions for, and sustenance of these violent conflicts. In relation to the 
above, the following section will highlight the implications of this study, 
and its contribution to conflict analysis. 
 
8.3 Theoretical and methodological implications of 
the study for conflict analyses 
8.3.1 Rethinking connections: State, ethnicity and sub-ethnic 
groups   
These conflicts are interconnected by virtue of their histories and the na-
tional political and economic context that were both instrumental in bring-
ing about the outbreak of violent conflict and in its persistence over time. 
This study shows that the classification of conflicts used in conflict 
databases significantly underrates the role of the state in violent conflicts.  
 The conflict databases underrate the role of the state in conflicts of 
which the agenda seems local and are referred to as ‘communal’, meaning 
that groups without a political agenda can be taken for granted.. The field 
findings reveal that the state deliberately neglected the Karamoja region in 
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policy processes while attending more to the civil war in the north through 
strong executive actions, but with minimal will to actually contain it. These 
actions/inactions have been largely attributed to ethnicized politics, iden-
tity-based explanations and opportunistic motives by the state.  
 In conflict theorisation, debates have revolved around a number of 
issues related to the causes of violent conflicts (Zarkov and Hintjens 
2015:10, Demmers 2012:01-17). According to one source (Zarkov and 
Hintjens 2015:04), classical methodological approaches in conflict studies 
principally refer to an array of qualitative approaches. This essentially 
means that theorising in conflict studies is derived from “…philosophy, 
history, and law, and that is characterized above all by explicit reliance 
upon the ‘exercise of judgement’, acknowledged as ‘scientifically imper-
fect’ ” (Bull, 1966:361). Bull argues that this approach relies mostly on:  
“… ‘Perception and intuition’ rather than on ‘…strict standards of verifica-
tion and proof…based either upon logical or mathematical proof, or upon 
strict, empirical procedures of verification” (Bull 1966:362). 
The key debates on the explanations of the causes have been centered on 
opportunistic motives, identity-based explanations and ‘new war theories’ 
(Demmers 2012:01-17). This study contributes to the debate on how eth-
nicity was a persistent antagonistic force in Ugandan politics.  
 According to historical records and the field findings of this study, 
the multi-ethnic structure of Ugandan society and the rivalry among ethnic 
groups, exacerbated by the colonial masters, were the major causes of the 
problems in Uganda’s politics, and led up to the post-independence polit-
ical upheavals. Since the pre-colonial, colonial and post-independence 
eras, the ethnic dimension manifested itself, in explicitly negative terms, as 
a source of conflict instead of unification, since different ethnic groups 
had a high sense of local nationalism, i.e., identity to their ethnicity, rather 
than national consciousness.  Through ethnicised politics, ethnic groups 
in Uganda have used the state as a means to meet political ends and deter-
mine the distribution of resources, which often led to the exclusion of 
other groups. 
 This has contributed to the history of ethnic violence through ethni-
cised political struggles in Uganda, and was a major factor in the onset of 
the civil war in northern Uganda and fostered the continuation of the 
communal violence in Karamoja. Also, the protraction of these conflicts 
has been attributed to structure-based issues. As noted above, the history 
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of Uganda established its basic structures of violence through social, eco-
nomic, political and religious processes that went on from the beginning 
of the post-colonial era until today.  Contemporary Uganda still witnesses 
regional and ethnic cleavages, especially in the conflict-affected regions.  
 The study finds that the NRM government has deliberately fostered 
the protraction of the civil war in northern Uganda and the communal 
violence in Karamoja. The study also shows that, with the ongoing inse-
curity in the country, the state accrued economic and political benefits, as 
did the LRA.  The study problematises the conceptualisation of these con-
flicts by focusing on the role of the state. It will, however, regard this as a 
contribution to conflict theory.   
 As discussed in previous chapters, the NRM government took ad-
vantage of its peripheral position in the world economy and of the frame-
work and norms of global governance. With this argument, this study has 
been able to contribute to the global debate about predatory economic 
motivations for the protraction of violent conflicts that come with political 
benefits for state governments as well. In this broader structural context, 
the violent conflicts within Uganda increased the flow of resources in the 
form of aid from the World Bank and other multilateral agencies. With 
the help of these funds, the state was able to divert some of its resources 
to military expenditures, not only for trying to contain the war in northern 
Uganda and communal violence in Karamoja, as they claimed, but also for 
sustaining the occupation and violent commerce in the DRC.    
 Despite the predatory activities of the Ugandan military, the state was 
able to maintain its relationship with creditors. As discussed in Chapter 7, 
this was a manipulative strategy of global norms by the Ugandan state, 
showing how the structure of global governance can aid the protraction 
of violent conflict. Eventually, under mounting pressure, after threats of 
aid cuts aid from the international community, the Ugandan government 
was forced to contain the civil war in northern Uganda and the communal 
violence in Karamoja. The danger of loss of international aid was one of 
the major reasons the state intensified its requests for peace negotiations 
(Kustenbauder 2010:475-479). 
8.3.2 Methodological contribution and implications  
Besides problematising the rigid definitions that do not capture the 
transformative nature of these conflicts, this study shows how the politics 
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of conflict classification plays a huge role in casting blame and 
responsibility to other actors while overlooking  the role of significant 
actors such as the state and external actors. The study shows that the 
databases, through coding, play a big role in understating the role of 
significant actors in influencing the direction of the conflicts.  
 In the case of civil war, the study found that external actors and their 
role are underrated or neglected because of the conflict coding criteria, 
such as the role of Sudan, as discussed in Chapter 6. In Karamoja, the role 
of the state is absent. The study shows that low-intensity and ‘non-
political’ conflicts, such as the communal violence in Karamoja, are 
deliberately neglected by the state through strong executive actions and 
policies that target and prioritise high-intensity conflicts, such as the civil 
war in northern Uganda. Such cases of communal violence come to mind 
when Schultze-Kraft and Hinkle (2014) say that violent conflicts are not 
just a mirror of social problems within the country but are closely linked 
to political processes within their settings. Through policy processes the 
state was central in the continuation of communal violence in Karamoja. 
The databases do not recognise this, and the interconnections between the 
role of the state and the perpetuation of the conflict go unnoticed.   
 Furthermore, these conflicts fed in to one another, reinforcing each 
other and providing conditions that contributed to their perpetuation. The 
civil war in northern Uganda led to suitations that were of help in the 
multiplication of guns in Karamoja, and also took up the lion’s share of 
attention from the state. The common conceptualisation of these violent 
conflicts does not take their compound nature into consideration, which 
is interlinked, entangled and reinforces the other at different levels (Lind 
2014:01). 
  The UCDP datasets and the conceptualisations of conflicts do not 
deal with these with interconnections between conflicts. Conflict scholars 
have noted that econometric and quantitative modelling has dominated 
much of the peace and conflict studies (Kalyvas 2008:397). This modelling 
has been facilitated by numerous dataset programmes that were created to 
allow conflict scholars and researchers to measure variations of conflict 
phenomena. Using the existing quantitative databases, conflict scholars 
have sought to identify causal patterns of violent conflict. This has raised 
criticism about relying on these dataset programmes (Kalyvas 2006, 
Kalyvas 2008, Tarrow 2007).  
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 Benedict Korf refers to the quantitative bias as “arm chair empiri-
cism”, in the sense that it would be easy to arrive at conclusions by just 
using the already available datasets, instead of also paying visits to the field 
(Korf 2006:459-476). Consequently, over the years, scholars who initially 
relied uniquely on quantitative methodologies, increasingly integrated 
qualitative research in the field into their research, and several scholars 
have recommended to increase the use of empirical narratives to supple-
ment research based on quantitative datasets (Tarrow 2007:590, Kalyvas 
2008:397).  
 This study adopts more of a qualitative approach and should be seen 
as based on a mixed-methods approach, which has been noted as the more 
credible approach of researching conflicts.  As noted below: 
 “Mixing quantitative and qualitative methodologies may be particularly im-
portant in conflict research. Not only do theoretical assumptions and meth-
odological strategies need to be questioned, but the data too, as they are 
often collected from the media, and during conflict periods, thus sources of 
data are unlikely to be particularly reliable. Whatever the sampled popula-
tion, in conditions where violence prevails, surveys are not likely to elicit 
full, open answers” (Hintjens and Zarkov 2015: 04). 
In the light of the discussion above and the field findings of this study, 
there is a need to review the criteria used in defining some of these violent 
conflicts, especially when looking at the African context, its conditions 
and its nature. Conflict criteria have been globalised and made to be used 
as a yardstick across all continents, ignoring the local context and local 
dynamics of conflicts. They rely more on actual parties involved and on 
recorded death tolls than on conflict context. The study is not against a 
quantitative analysis but suggests the addition of evidence-based criteria 
to quantitative data-driven criteria when coding these conflicts. This will 
allow the capture of the underlying conflict dynamics and the complexities 
involved in conflict development.  
 Although communal violence has been defined as devoid of any state 
intervention, as opposed to civil war, in which the state is involved, this 
study shows that ethnicised politics within and by the state have been very 
instrumental in bringing about violent conflicts of either type and in fos-
tering their continuation. Simply defining communal violence as devoid of 
state presence negates the visibility of the state in such conflicts. Based on 
the field findings, the state’s presence in both conflicts shows how well 
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the combination of a qualitative and quantitative approach can assist in 
understanding the complex connections and dynamics involved in these 
conflicts, and in enabling a comparison between these conflict categories. 
Based on the above analysis, this study recommends the conceptuali-
sation of conflicts using relevant factors of analysis, such as systemic po-
litical, economic and social-cultural discrimination that hamper the pro-
gress of one group in relation to another. This can be used as a basis for 
comparison among horizontal groups involved in different intra-state con-
flict categories. This, in turn, can be useful in understanding the sources 
of conflict and gauging the level of state involvement in these conflicts.  
 As noted in this study, ethnicized politics by the state was a central 
factor. Cederman et al. note that “ethnicity serves as the most important 
criterion of boundary formation” (2013:96). Furthermore, they note that 
groups exposed to more than one dimension of inequality are more likely 
to be engaged in violent actions. Thus, formulating criteria that examine 
state processes in social-cultural, economic and political dimensions can 
be very useful in enabling a comparison between intra-state conflict cate-
gories and in determining the role of the state in conflicts. 
 The groups seen in this study, the included and excluded ones, are 
defined in ethnic terms, as in the figure in Chapter 7 section 7.3.1, and 
their political relationship with the government. Some of the groups, 
which are referred to as the included, enjoy privileged access to power by 
virtue of being represented by its elite members in the government’s ex-
ecutive organs. Other ethnic groups, which are referred to as excluded or 
marginalised ethnic groups, are excluded from power. The politically rele-
vant, included groups such as the Acholi had access to political represen-
tation through their domination of the army ranks, whereas the Karamoja, 
who were a totally marginalized group, were irrelevant and played no ex-
plicit role in national politics. This kind of political marginalisation consti-
tutes what Cederman et al. (2013:59) refer to as “…a direct violation of 
the principle of nationalism and self-determination”. This is remarkable 
because the state has a role to ensure all groups within the state are repre-
sented: 
“Rather than being primarily a matter of the group’s own actions, the central 
state’s institutional and informal policies determine the power status of eth-
nic groups living within its borders (Cederman et al. 2013:61). 
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 Politically relevant/included groups that are active in national politics 
and are directly discriminated by the government (Cederman et al. 2010), 
can become operational by using their influence on a country’s executive, 
by obtaining cabinet seats or by controlling the army in military regimes 
(Cederman et al. 2013:67). As for indicators of political influence, a crite-
rion that involves a measure of a group’s institutional access to power can 
go a long way in revealing conflict-related state processes, and may be use-
ful for the comparison of different intra-state conflicts with one another. 
The same can be said for criteria for the evaluation of wealth/income 
(economic) differences among ethnic groups. Such criteria would also be 
helpful in assessing the contribution of state processes to conflicts among 
groups.  
 Political entrepreneurs can use ethnic boundaries for distributional 
purposes, in order to exploit and hoard wealth for the ‘in’-group, leaving 
behind disgruntled ‘out’-groups, with conflicts as a result (Tilly 1999, Gurr 
1993). Hetcher (1978) notes that political dominance leads to uneven cul-
tural division of labor, as shown by the political and economic history of 
Uganda in the lead-up to the political upheavals in the country. To meas-
ure economic inequality, national household surveys for poverty differ-
ences between groups in violent conflict with one another would be use-
ful, as they might reveal the politics involved in the appropriation of state 
resources and opportunities.  
 These micro-meso level insights are very important in disclosing 
wider patterns of state processes at the macro level (Balcells and Justino 
2014:1346, Kalyvas 2012:658). A criterion that can be used in establishing 
a theoretical link between political processes and local conflict dynamics.  
8.4 Towards mixed evidence-based policies  
Based on its field findings, this study recommends an evidence-based ap-
proach combining both quantitative and qualitative data in assessing con-
flicts and designing intervention policies. Conflict has been an interesting 
subject for academic and policy research. Studies of conflict and conflict 
databases form the basis for academic theorisation of conflicts, and this 
may serve policy makers as well. A mixed-methods approach, it can be 
suggested, might work best for evidence-based policy advice.  
 This study has examined Uganda’s intra-state conflicts, in line with 
the global trends highlighted by conflict literature. It is interesting to note 
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is that earlier studies found that several communal conflicts and civil wars 
in conflict-affected countries were running simultaneously or immediately 
one after the other, in a ‘cycle’ or series of interconnected conflict events. 
This study has been able to carefully reconstruct the narratives and exam-
ine the datasets in relation to understanding two such occurrences, and 
their interconnections. Using the case of Uganda, where these conflicts 
spanned decades, this study raises questions that are important for aca-
demic researchers when advising policy makers. Insight in the causal con-
nections between different categories of conflict typologies may even af-
fect the design of intervention policies and how they are taken up. 
This study sheds light on the politics of classification used in conflict 
databases. The study found that groups whose issues appear not to be 
political can be ignored or taken for granted. In the case of Karamoja, 
participants stated that their conflict issues were not about politics but 
about ‘domestic’ things, such as cattle, pastures or grazing spaces, and wa-
ter. For that reason, the conflict was regarded as ‘communal’.  
 According to several studies, evidence should also involve different 
‘levels’, if policy makers are to be fully and adequately informed prior to 
making crucial decisions about how to intervene in, manage or reduce vi-
olent conflicts (Balcells and Justino 2014:1346, Kalyvas 2012:658). The 
different, and sometimes contrasting, macro-micro and meso-level dimen-
sions of violent conflict should be factored into research that seeks to ad-
vise policy-makers. In this way, insights from macro-level studies or mi-
cro-level studies can inform one another, and combined with meso-level 
mixed-method conflict research data, lead to a better understanding of the 
complex dynamics between different levels. This multi-level evidence base 
can provide important insights in state processes and their contributory 
role in communal violence and civil war onset and protraction, for aca-
demics and policy makers alike.  
Policy makers should take into consideration the fact that a conflict 
within a country can, in various ways, affect other conflicts or have a spill-
over effect. Direct or indirect interconnections do exist between them, so 
the same level of attention should be given to what they may consider 
‘significant’ and ‘insignificant’ cases of violent conflict. This is because, as 
seen above, selective or biased intervention played a huge role in the pro-
traction of violent conflict in the Karamoja region as well as the northern 
region. 
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Protracted communal conflicts can cause enormous human insecu-
rity. Such is the case in the Karamoja region, which has the lowest human 
development indicator values in the country and endures never-ending 
famine and hunger episodes that claim lives in their wake. Despite the 
existing peace, a number of people have died over the years due to hunger. 
Examining the origins of conflicts and understanding their interconnec-
tions can go a long way in avoiding their protraction and help in deriving 
proper intervention mechanisms.  
  However, even though a proper case analysis of a conflict may be 
done, there can be instances where intervention is shaped by other factors 
such as the local stereotype narratives, traditional and religious beliefs, lo-
cal, regional, national  and international politics. In some cases, politicians 
and policy makers have a tendency to choose the analysis of a conflict that 
suits their interests. Naturalization of conflicts may occur, such as in the 
case of the civil war in northern Uganda and the communal violence in 
north eastern Uganda, where ethnic groups in the neighbouring districts 
regarded these conflicts in inter-ethnic terms. The civil war in northern 
Uganda was regarded as an ‘Acholi war’ because the Acholi were dominant 
in the LRA ranks, and when they launched excursions into Teso and 
Lango, the local militias, the ‘Arrow Boys’ and the ‘Amuka Boys’, com-
posed of local people from these ethnic groups, regarded the tensions as 
along ethnic lines. The same applies to the Karamojong, who have en-
dured being labelled and stereotyped by neighbouring ethnic groups as 
‘marauding warriors’.This has definitely co-determined the nature of the 
policy interventions that have been designed to pacify the region.  
8.5 Future directions and areas of research  
This study has examined the complex relationship between two conflict 
categories and established that, in the case of civil war and communal vi-
olence, there are causal and actor linkages between them. The role of the 
state has been – unjustly - underestimated in both conflict cases. Improper 
coding and categorisation of conflicts is a serious political act with serious 
political implications that play a great role in the deliberate casting of 
blame and responsibility. Further studies should invest in the development 
of criteria that can be used for comparison in coding conflicts. Ideally, a 
qualitative–quantitative model for coding and categorising conflicts 
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should be developed. Such a model should allow the understanding of 
how state processes are related to certain intra-state conflict categories. 
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Appendix 1: Time line of the armed conflict in 
northern Uganda 
x 1892 - Imperial British East Africa Company extends its control to 
southern Uganda and extends its assistance to the Protestant mission-
aries  
x 1894 - Uganda is made a British Protectorate  
x 1900 – The Buganda agreement is signed and Buganda is given auton-
omy as a constitutional monarchy  
x 1958 - Uganda is awarded internal self-government  
x 1962 – Uganda gets independence with Milton Obote as Prime Minis-
ter (Obote I) 
x 1963 - Uganda becomes a Republic with Kabaka Mutesa II as Presi-
dent 
x 1966 - Milton Obote ousts President Kabaka Mutesa II and promotes 
himself to the presidency  
x 1967 - New constitution is made   
x 1971 – Idi Amin topples Milton Obote  
x 1972 – Idi Amin evacuates over 60,000 Asians from Uganda 
x 1972-73 - Uganda clashes with Tanzania over border 
x 1978 - Uganda invades Tanzania  
x 1979 - Tanzania invades Uganda with the UNLA and topples Idi 
Amin. Yusufu Lule is made President, but is immediately replaced by 
Godfrey Binaisa  
x 1980 - Binaisa is overthrown by the army  
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x 1980 - Obote II wins contested elections and rebel factions raise up 
against his government  
x 1985 – Tito Okello topples Milton  
x 1986 - National Resistance Army rebels take over Kampala and 
Yoweri Museveni becomes President  
x 1987 - Alice Lakwena launches an insurgency with the Holy Spirit 
Movement in northern Uganda, against the NRM government 
x 1988 - Joseph Kony, Lakwena's cousin, emerges and forms a rebel fac-
tion that later is referred to as the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) 
x 1994 March - The LRA increases ambushes and abductions in the 
north of Uganda and the south of Sudan 
x 1995 April - Uganda and Sudan end diplomatic relations over proxy 
war between the SPLA and LRA 
x 1996 July - Thousands of people flee villages due to LRA violence in 
the Gulu District 
x 1996 - Museveni elected as President in Uganda's first direct presiden-
tial election  
x 1997 - Ugandans aid the overthrow of Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, 
who is replaced by Laurent Kabila  
x 1997 January - About 400 people are massacred by the LRA in a 4-day 
raid in the Kitgum District 
x 2001 April - The United Nations Human Rights Commission con-
demns the LRA for abductions and atrocities against humanity 
x 2002 April - Uganda and Sudan diplomatic relations restored and the 
UPDF is granted permission to pursue the LRA in Southern Sudan  
x 2002 – The army evacuates more than 400,000 civilians into IDP 
camps 
x 2002 December - Peace deal between the Uganda National Rescue 
Front (UNRF) rebels and the Ugandan government after more than 
five years of negotiations  
x 2003 May – Uganda evacuates UPDF troops from the eastern DRC. 
Thousands of refugees seek asylum from the DRC  
x 2004 February – Over 200 people are massacred in an IDP camp by 
suspected LRA fighters  
x 2005 April - Uganda denies accusations of looting and crimes against 
humanity committed by the DRC at the ICC in The Hague  
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x 2005 October - ICC issues arrest warrants for five LRA commanders, 
including it’s leader Joseph Kony  
x 2006 July 14 - The Juba Peace talks begin in southern Sudan, between 
the Ugandan government and the LRA 
x 2007 March – UPDF troops are deployed in Somalia as AU peace 
keepers  
x 2008 February – A permanent ceasefire agreement is signed between 
the Ugandan government and the LRA  
x 2008 April 10: The signing of a peace agreement is adjourned when 
Kony fails to turn up 
x 2008 December 15: The Southern Sudan, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo and Ugandan armed forces join arms in a major offensive 
against the LRA rebels 
x 2009 January – The LRA appeals for a ceasefire in face of a continuing 
offensive by regional countries  
x 2009 March - Ugandan forces withdraw from the DRC after failure to 
capture LRA rebels  
x 2011 December  U.S. Special Forces arrive in the east of the CAR to 
aid the fight against the LRA 
x 2012 March - U.S. charity Invisible Children releases a video about the 
LRA  
x 2012 May 15 - Caesar Acellam, a top LRA leader, is captured in the 












Processed on: 1-5-2017 PDF page: 232
216 Understanding the Complex Interconnections of Civil War and Communal 
Violence: the Case of Uganda  
 
Appendix 2: Time line of the communal violence in 
Karamoja 
 
x 1910 - Colonial era. Divide and rule: creation of administrative units 
/county boundaries bearing names of sub-groups  
x 1911 - Karamoja becomes a closed district; this prohibits the Kara-
mojong from interacting with their neighbours ( who branded Kara-
moja a ‘Human Zoo’) 
x 1940 - Large tracts of land gazetted as forest reserves 
x 1940 - Young men recruited to fight in World War II; a handful re-
turned 
x 1943 – Severe drought in Karamoja 
x 1950 – Livestock confiscated under pretext of curbing cattle rustling, 
and attempted disarming of the Karamojong 
x 1952 – Vast pieces of grazing land demarcated as game reserves (Brit-
ish conservation policy)  
x 1961 – Severe floods in Karamoja and Teso 
x 1962-71- Disarmament and Imprisonment of Karamojong. Reckless 
killings and mistreatment by soldiers “Panda Gari’ – Get in the 
vechicle, no return/disappear 
x 1963 – Seizure of cattle using helicopters  
x 1965-66 – Severe drought and massive migration 
x 1971 – Dress Up Decree and mass killings - “the Nawaikorot Massa-
cre” 
x 1971 -1979 Reckless killing and grabbing of livestock by government 
soldiers 
x 1973 – The Lokiriama Peace Accord. The Matheniko make peace with 
the Turkana 
x 1974 – The Matheniko raid the Bokora – Destruction of the Kara-
mojong unity/alliance 
x 1973/74 – First production of the ‘Amatida’, a home-made gun 
x 1979 – Amin is ousted by the UNLA 
509974-L-bw-isimon
Processed on: 1-5-2017 PDF page: 233
      Summary and Research Agenda for the Future   217 
x 1979 – Moroto Barracks, Police and Prison armoury abandoned and 
looted by local communities 
x 1980 – Severe drought; famine and cholera outbreak 
x 1980 – Increased level of cross-district cattle raids 
x 1982 – Apolaris, Matheniko Warrior and Kraal leader, is killed by the 
Iteso in a meeting in Wera. Leads to bloody revenge raids by the Kara-
mojong in Teso 
x 1983-5 – Karamojong recruited to fight for the UNLA 
x 1984 – Uganda and Kenya joint disarmament programme, with Kenya 
para-military; characterised by indiscriminate bombing of homesteads 
and livestock in Karamoja 
x 1984-5 – Famine and mass migration to Teso 
x 1985 – Milton Obote ousted by Tito Okello Lutwa 
x 1986 – The NRA seizes power 
x 1986 -  The NRA officialises the ownership of guns in Karamoja  
x 1986 - 90 – Massive raids by the Karamojong in neighbouring districts 
x 1987 – Panyagara – the killing of 200 soldiers 
x 1991 – The NRM gives more guns to the Karamojong 
x 1992 – Road ambushes and thuggery 
x 1992 – Creation of Vigilante groups to curb criminal activities as well 
as cattle raids 
x 1996 – Vigilantes supervised by the army 
x 1996 - 2000 – Drought and massive migration  
x 2001 – Voluntary disarmament 
x 2002 – February – Forceful Phase interrupted by LRA incursions into 
Teso 
x 2006 – Cordon and Search with human rights violations 
x 2007/8 – Floods in Karamoja and Teso 
x 2008 – Dramatic increase in NGO activity in Karamoja 
x 2009 – Decrease in raiding 
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